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-ARCHIVE Editorial Board 2015
Means to an End:  
A Study of Women in Weimar Germany

*Käthe Kollwitz. “Nieder mit den abtreibungs-paragra-phen.” Lithograph. 1924. LOC #2007686807

Molly Coleman is a fourth-year student studying political science and history. Following graduation in May, she will be serving as a Team Leader with City Year New York. This paper was prepared for Rudy Koshar’s History 600 course on Weimar Germany.
Just as there is no one “female” experience in the United States in 2014, there can be no definitive “female” experience in Weimar Germany. Women experienced the Republic in ways that varied immensely based on socio-economic status, religion, sexual orientation, family background, and more; there is simply no unifying factor that pervaded each and every woman’s life. Despite these innumerable differences, several powerful forces worked ceaselessly to impact as many women’s lives during the years from 1919 – 1933. These forces seem at first contradictory: how is it possible that a society that experienced a highly visible sexual revolution could experience simultaneous policing of women’s bodies? These seemingly opposing phenomena stem from the same source. In Weimar Germany, women were not seen as autonomous beings. Weimar elites’ desired to build a modern society that resulted in attempts to sexually liberate German women; the Weimar government’s desire to build a strong society led to reproductive oppression of the very same women. Although these two visions for the Weimar state had very different impacts on the female population, they both viewed women, and specifically women’s bodies, as a means for achieving their vision of an ideal German society.

Rising out of the ruins of World War I and the revolution in Germany, the Weimar Republic carried immense potential for large-scale change. Emperor Wilhelm II abdicated after a short-lived uprising, and with him, the imperial rule of Germany ended. Women entered into the workforce during the war, leading to changes both inside and outside of the home. Citizens moved into the cities in ever increasing numbers, changing the composition a previously agricultural society.

All of these changes and more were evident in the Constitution unveiled in August of 1919. The document guaranteed: freedom of speech, freedom of the press, a declaration of the equality of the genders, universal suffrage, legalization of collective bargaining, state protection for mothers, children, and the unemployed, and a democratically elected government. In this rapid shift away from the traditional powers of Germany, the constitutional delegates to Weimar were offering a vision of the best of what their republic
could be. No longer content to follow the lead of a hereditary ruler, the delegates demonstrated a desire to stand amongst the century’s most progressive nations. In no provision is this progressive desire as apparent as that of women’s suffrage. While the movement towards equal enfranchisement was underway in many areas by the 19th century, it wasn’t until the 20th century that the fruition of the women’s movement became visible. As one of the first nations to universalize the right to vote, Weimar Germany made a public declaration that it intended to be at the forefront of the modern world, regardless of the German defeat in WWI.

Amidst the numerous legal changes to German life ushered in by the Weimar Constitution, certain institutions remained untouched. Prominent among these was the criminal code; specifically the code’s infamous Paragraph 218, which “decreed a five-year jail sentence for aborting a fetus.” Although in force well before the collapse of the imperial regime, this paragraph gained a new importance during the republic, due both to its increased enforcement and the growing controversy surrounding it. Throughout the duration of Weimar, the number of women convicted for obtaining an abortion increased drastically from 2,450 at the beginning of the 1920s, to 60,000 by the republic’s end. As Edward Ross Dickinson observed, “If acquittal rates and wartime losses are taken into account, the Weimar state clearly policed the larger category of moral and reproductive offense more intensively than the empire, not less so.” What caused this society, which had publicly announced itself as a progressive state, to institute such severe restrictions on women seeking to take control of their own reproductive organs? How does this relate to the sexual liberation, especially for women, sweeping throughout Germany? To this point, the existing literature has focused largely on just one of these phenomena, as authors look at either women’s liberation in Weimar or their continued reproductive oppression. By not looking at the two in conjunction, it is impossible to gain a true understanding of the myriad forces exerting pressure on women in Weimar during the interwar period; in this study, I will try to do just this. First, I will be exploring the phenomenon of women’s reproductive lives in Weimar. Following
will be a discussion of the Weimar sexual revolution, and its significance. Finally, I will attempt to understand these two phenomena as pieces of a whole.

**Childbirth in Weimar**

Prior to WWI, the German government touted their population policy, which was fervently pronatalist. The state directed women to have as many babies as possible in the name of the nation, largely without regard to their life circumstances or position in society. Following the war, this rhetoric took a different turn. Instead of focusing purely on quantity, the conversation focused on “quality.” Nonetheless, evidence suggests that the state pressured women deemed “high-quality” to have a large family. Although different segments of society took different approaches to these beliefs, there was immense concern paid to women’s reproductive choices across the political spectrum. With few exceptions, this attention stemmed from concerns about the future of Germany as a whole, rather than from respect for women as individuals. Weimar government policies focused on growing the population for the future, but that focus came at the expense of the current generation’s women. As Cornelia Usborne has demonstrated, while seemingly more disjointed than under the Wilhelmine regime, a national population policy did indeed exist in Weimar. As she argues: “The importance attached to population policy arose out of the belief that the birthrate could crucially influence state power and national well-being and that it should therefore be regulated to fit the requirements of the time.” Evident far before the outbreak of WWI, this belief took on a new prominence following Germany’s defeat because new concerns arose about the nation’s ability to maintain its military and economic position in the world. To be sure, this concern was not entirely without cause. Germany had lost a significant portion of its population in the war and Berlin had the lowest birthrate of any city in Europe. Weimar Germany’s national population policy declared that reproduction was not a private issue, but rather an issue of the state. Policymakers on both the ideological left and right considered reproductive decisions that the German woman
made consequential to society. Although leftist parties advocated for the equality of women than the ight, their support of reproductive choice extended far beyond the intrinsic worth of individual women. Parties that argued in favor of increased individual reproductive control, such as the SPD, retained pronatalism at their core; they ultimately believed that the good of the community superseded to one's own personal desires.\textsuperscript{10} Socialists needed masses in order to realize “power for the proletariat.”\textsuperscript{11} Other leftist parties, while they may have been unwilling to concede it publicly, tacitly acknowledged that population led to national strength and they wanted to mold that population by controlling women's bodies.\textsuperscript{12} The rhetoric and policies of left parties superficially aligned with feminist ideology; however, at their core, they tended to see women's bodies as a tool by which to create their ideal society. The Weimar government utilized a number of approaches to ensure that women gave birth to a number of “high-quality” children. Among these were social welfare programs designed to incentivize childbirth, increased prosecution of women seeking abortions and the individuals who performed them, and the introduction of eugenic practices. Despite the uniqueness of each of these practices, they all encouraged women to reproduce many children. In essence, they are meant to remind women of the state's opinion as to what they should or should not do with their body. As a Weimar gynecologist stated “with evident amazement,” “women seemed to feel that the fetus was a part of the female body, 'with which the carrier could do whatever she wanted.’”\textsuperscript{13} Through the incentivizing of childbirth, the prosecution of attempted abortions, and eugenics, Weimar meant to remind women that this was not, in fact, the case. For the purpose of this paper, my focus will remain on more controversial of these three policies, namely the prosecution of those involved in abortions and the growing interest in eugenics. Nonetheless, the positive governmental incentives for women to have children remain extremely important, as do the many methods that were attempted that are not addressed here.

The best estimates available suggest that, during Weimar, the average German woman had two abortions during her lifetime.\textsuperscript{14}
Clearly, this rate is extraordinarily high, one that has few parallels in modern, civilized societies. Of the hundreds of thousands of abortions performed annually, only a small percentage were ever prosecuted; yet as has already been established, that number increased throughout the existence of the Weimar government. Interestingly, this increased prosecution came at a time when the judicial system seemed less interested in interfering with individuals’ sexual autonomy; however, as Dickinson explains, the concern about the health of the family continued to grow throughout Weimar. Thus, in sexual decisions regarding the creation of children, the judicial system became more actively involved.\textsuperscript{15} Going further, Dickinson uses German records from Weimar to show that:

…the protection of fetal life was not the foremost concern driving what can only be described as a massive campaign against abortion. The main motivation for those involved appears to have been twofold: concern for the integrity of the family as the site of social reproduction and the fear that declining fertility would deprive Germany of the manpower to hold its own, militarily or economically, in international politics.\textsuperscript{16}

While by modern American conceptions this would fall into the category of “pro-life” activity, this term does not accurately convey the intentions of the judicial system in Weimar. Women (and to a lesser extent, men) were not being arrested because they had violated the so-called sanctity of life; they were being punished for not using their bodies to advance the “national cause.”

By only looking at the arrest rates as related to abortions, an image emerges of a state that punished actions prevented the growth of the population. The picture becomes significantly more complicated when considering the role of eugenics. At no point in Weimar did the national government implement a policy that explicitly called for a purification of the population through the practice of eugenics. However, the idea became increasingly widespread during the 1920s that, “in order to secure or even improve the quality of [Germany] biologically, the ‘best’ of its citizens needed to
reproduce most and the ‘unfit’ least or not at all.” For many, even those on the left, state resources would be better allocated if money was not spent on the unfit – people who were mentally or physically disabled, the so-called genetically inferior, those with hereditary diseases, etc.

This belief did not need to be official state policy for its influence to be felt. Given the increased medicalization of the reproductive field, individual doctors had a significant amount of discretion as to whom they would assist with family planning (both legal and illegal), and whom they would not. An extreme example of this is sterilization. While popularly considered to be a practice of the Nazi regime, doctors performed eugenic sterilizations in significant numbers under the Weimar government. While so-called “forced” sterilization was never an official policy of Weimar, many sterilized women did so without their clear and uninhibited consent. Convicted criminals were frequent targets of sterilization; while they were not required to undergo the procedure, when it was offered as an alternative to imprisonment there was some level of coercion. In this extreme form of control, the practice of eugenics (particularly negative eugenics) demonstrates the lack of autonomy that women were believed to have over their own bodies, and by extension, their own lives. Decisions about eugenic sterilizations were not made based on if individual women believed they would be able to raise successful and productive members of society. Instead, doctors and other authority figures used their positions to control women’s bodies to create the society that they deemed best. Repeatedly, women were shown that they were not valued for their own merit, but rather as bodies that were best controlled by outside forces.

**The New Woman and German Modernity**

Throughout Weimar, the lessons taught to the female population regarding their sexuality remained unchanged from the Wilhelmine period. For girls and young women in the German youth leagues, the ideal German woman was still described as one who was “naturally chaste and respectable,” and who was preparing
herself to “uphold the pillars of German womanhood,” of which there were deemed to be only two: marriage and motherhood.20 However, for a growing number of women in Weimar, there was the increasing sense that womanhood could consist of more than this traditional conception. As the concept of the New Woman gained popularity, women began to reimagine in a number of different ways. In many arenas, this seemed to represent significant progress for women in Germany. Upon closer inspection, this sense of progress does not tell the whole story. Contained within this female liberation, there remained a strong degree of state control in which the larger society used women’s bodies to achieve their ideal nation.

As was apparent from the creation of the Weimar Constitution, the post-WWI Germany had no intention of being seen as a so-called backward nation. Framers of the Constitution aimed to create a republic that could be mentioned alongside other global powers, and this meant embracing modernity in all of its forms. For many reformers, when it came to women, embracing modernity meant embracing sexual freedom and autonomy. In matters ranging from economics to the workplace to sexuality, the United States influenced German conception. In the U.S., the flapper embodied the sexually liberated woman of the 1920s. In Weimar, the New Woman filled this role. The New Woman lived a life that was “oriented exclusively toward the present,” making decisions that benefited her in the here and now.21 Inherent in this concept was the idea that women were able to make their own decisions regarding when and with whom they would engaged in sexual activity. Especially in cities such as Berlin, they were able to wear shorter skirts, attend cabaret, and have premarital sex, all while remaining within the confines of what was considered to be a modern woman.

To be certain, given the immense backlash by conservatives and the older generation, the New Woman did not permeate all levels of society. For many in Germany, however, this New Woman became a ubiquitous part of life. The extent of this complete change in young women, and especially in the expectations regarding their sexual decisions, can be seen in Gret Ujhely’s “A Call for Sexual
Tolerance.” She describes a society in which women have become so sexually free that Germans now need reminders that women do have an equal right to not engage in sexual activity. “A girl or woman who, for example, wishes to be faithful to her friend, or even to her husband, or who, for example in winter, is simply not in an erotic mood, or who for any other private reasons whatever completely or temporarily wants to live chastely—she becomes with absolute certainty ridiculous.”

This quote demonstrates the radical change in society: previously, females who engaged in sex before or outside of marriage were viewed with “intolerance,” embodied by “the whispering of envious girlfriends; dramatic scenes with the husband; the decline in invitations from the wife of the postmaster; parental curses…” The attempts to modernize Weimar, and therefore the women of Weimar, created a society in which sexual expectations had changed immensely yet they were still expectations about acceptable conduct. Women were still expected to use their bodies to construct an idealized society, even if that meant going contrary to their own true desires.

Unlike women’s reproduction, the state was not responsible for creating this modern ideal of women’s sexuality. On the contrary, many government channels vehemently rejected everything the New Woman embodied. As seen in the preceding section, the Weimar government wielded powerful influence over women’s reproduction, but it was not the only institution with influence. In the case of women’s sexual liberation, powerful nongovernmental elements of society exerted control over women to fulfill their vision of a modern society.

The cultural elite attempted to engineer a sexual revolution. Weimar Germany was a society in which cultural elites possessed incredible influence and their perceptions and opinions reached large segments of the population through new forms of media and communication. When it came to a topic such as modernity, it was largely up to the cultural elite to determine what this was to mean for Germany; it is therefore of no small significance that “artists and intellectuals construed modernity as feminine.” Furthermore, Marxists, a critical component of the leftist intellectuals, tradition-
ally believed that “the emancipation of women [was] an indicator of the stage of historical development.”

This linked women with modernity; in other words, Weimar could only achieve modernity with a sexual revolution. Thus begins to form the groundwork necessary for society to begin to once again exert control over women and their bodies, in order to achieve the goal of “a modern progressive republic.”

While the major political parties focused their concern with women’s sex lives on the reproductive elements, the cultural elites and intellectuals focused predominantly on sexuality as distinct from reproduction. As Willem Melching explains, the intellectuals of Weimar, specifically with leftists, saw “The extension and guaranteeing of individual liberties in the field of sexuality [as]…an essential step in the building of a better society.”

In this vision of creating a “better,” more modern, society, the intellectual segment of the population was not alone. Throughout Weimar, there was a strong sense of potential. People believed that a new age was coming to Germany, one which would usher in both “cultural and spiritual renewal.” Naturally, nobody believed that this utopian future was inevitable. Germans understood that they would have to work to create this improved nation, and for many, they believed that this would come about by the work that they did on behalf of the sexual reform movement.

Popular culture characterized women in ways that indicated a new sexual liberation – from books such as Irmgard Keun’s The Artificial Silk Girl to films like “Metropolis,” women began to be depicted as openly embracing their sexuality. Writers, cinematographers, and others artists formed the core of the intellectual elite that was devoted to the modernization of Germany, meaning that their cultural portrayal of young women was certainly no accident. Not only were they reflecting the times, but they were attempting to shape them. By showing young women embracing their sexuality and all of the ups and downs that could occur with this, these members of the cultural elite were making “attempts to make employed women (and men) conscious of their real situation.” While Kracauer was referring more broadly to the depiction of the lives
of working women, to depict this would necessarily entail showing a society in which young women “find their amusements...[in] making love, giving themselves either mechanically or romantically because they have nothing else.”³⁰ By giving this New Woman a platform in popular culture, the cultural elite were attempting to ensure her perpetuation, and guarantee that the women of Germany would continue to act in a way that befit their conceptualization of modernity.

Newspaper columnists attempted to push young women towards openly embracing their sexuality occurred in many realms outside of popular culture to portray the New Woman. Sex columns such as that of Doctor Max Hodann argued that “sexuality [is] the most natural thing in the world,” and that it would “flourish in an atmosphere of openness and good common sense.”³¹ In a more radical example of this open advocacy of women’s sexuality, Magnus Hirschfield and Maria Krische wrote in their column that a man should not voice any opinion over “his wife’s lesbian affair,” as it was “none of his business so long as she also served him well sexually.”³² By making calls for the open discussion of women’s sex lives, these reformers were attempting to ensure that their new conceptualizations of sex permeated as many realms of society as possible, thereby impacting the decisions of the large possibly number of women.

Undoubtedly, acknowledging that women had their own sexual desires independent of their desire to reproduce, and then providing them with the social freedom to act on these desires had tangible positive consequences. However, some negative outcomes of this so-called liberation call into question whether women actually wanted an extreme sexual revolution. In many ways, the cultural elites were pushing women to behave in a way that society as a whole, as well as governmental policies, were not prepared to accept; this caused a significant number of difficulties and trauma for those who did embrace the concept of the New Woman. For these young women, traditional pressures continued to exert themselves, until they “found [themselves] not liberated, as [they] had naively assumed, but now doubly bound...between uninhibited drives and inhibited mores [and] conflicts between the public
and private aspects of her life, which could not be synthesized." While this author blames the women's naivety for their experiences, when the sexual liberation of women is viewed in the context of the cultural elites who pushed it, the implications become quite different. Again, a segment of society used women's bodies to shape the future they desired for Germany. Like the government, they disregarded women's autonomy for their own agenda.

**Conclusion**

Reproductive oppression and sexual liberation seem like two entirely distinct concepts – one is blatantly designed to control women and their choices, while the other is seemingly an attempt to offer women agency over their own lives. In Weimar Germany, however, these two phenomena represent two different sides of the same coin. The government and political parties supported one view of German society; the intellectual elites had another unique vision. Underlying both of these dreams were women, whether that meant the children that women would produce or how women would conduct their sexual lives. In both cases, women represented the means to an end. The detrimental potential consequences for the women whose bodies were being controlled (either by official regulations or by social pressure) were overlooked in a rush towards building a future, showing the ultimate disregard that so many in society had for women.

While this paper focused on the negative aspects of a period that is heralded as a time of advancement for women, a larger lens could offer a less bleak picture. Women gained unprecedented power in Weimar, and had doors opened for them that had remained tightly closed before World War I. Though they were often shoved through these doors, the advancements in women's rights during this era arguably supersede governmental and societal pressures.

Is women's fate then so uniquely poor? While important, this is a question for a future study. Here I will conclude simply with the ultimate take-away from this study of German women under the Weimar Republic: When it comes to policies, either official or unofficial, regarding women and how they should use their body, there
is generally far more to the story than a superficial glance would show. Vigilance remains critical in both historical analyses and modern commentary in order to ensure that the true best interests of women themselves are at the heart of the policies that involve them.

**Endnotes**

3. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 29, 37.
11. Ibid., 37.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 105.
16. Ibid., 228-229
18. Ibid., 106.
19. Ibid., 141.
21. Herrmann, Elsa, “This is the New Woman,” in *Weimar Republic Sourcebook,*
23. Ibid.
30. Ibid., 217.
32. Ibid., 29.
Corporate Governance and the Rise of Big Business: Gentlemen’s Clubs Among the Social Elite, 1899-1914


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Chefs served fresh caviar on silver platters to the dozens of hungry guests seated in the Metropolitan Club’s dining hall. Cape Cod Oysters and Crab Gumbo, prepared in elaborate sauces and dressings, soon followed the appetizer. These dishes were the first of many served on the fifteenth of January at the New York Farmers’ second meeting of the 1907 season. Reconvening at the Metropolitan Club house, the New York Farmers served a variety of lavish dishes that night, from Filet of Beef Larded with Fresh Mushroom Sauce to Aiguillette of Long Island Striped Bass au vin blanc. The meeting, with guest speaker B.T. Galloway, Chief of the Bureau of Plant Industry, focused on prevalent crop diseases and state-of-the-art measures taken to combat their spread. However, this meeting was more than just a dinner and talk; the club brought together members of society who held a high degree of prominence in finance, law, commerce, or prestige. The affiliates of the organizations could further their success in business ventures, be appointed to new boards of directors, and create large-scale trusts due to the networking opportunities at these gentlemen’s clubs. Trusts utilized anticompetitive tactics, sparking the outcry of the U.S. government and several public committees. Gentlemen’s clubs and other similar social establishments show a direct relationship between club membership and profitable business deals, increased employment opportunities, and the rising trends of monopolistic trusts formation.

Often called “gentlemen” clubs for their exclusive admittance of only men, the groups of leading industrialists of the early 20th century promoted an air of elitism through their invite-only policies to upper-class individuals and leading industrialists with considerable influence in society. They limited acceptance to only those nominated by at least two affiliates of the organizations. According to the biographies of patrons at the aforementioned Metropolitan Club dinner, the pinnacle of club prominence occurred between the 1890s through 1920s, as is evident through member enrollment, prominence, and exclusiveness.

One banker known as John Pierpont Morgan stands as one of
the successful elitist financiers of his day. Through the processes of *morganization* and vertical and horizontal integration, J.P. Morgan and his family capitalized on the advantages and opportunities of an unregulated U.S. economy. As a member of numerous clubs and leagues, Morgan stood as the epitome of a networking pioneer, conducting countless financial negotiations to expand his sphere of influence.

Direct causation between membership in a social club and success through business undertakings cannot be proven. Yet the membership of these eight clubs affirm that a strong correlation had existed between these two factors. Late 19th- and early 20th-century America witness the expansion of these gentlemen’s clubs, whose structure and membership can help explain trends in the creation of bonds between members, the development of far-reaching spheres of influence, and the formation of large trust companies.

**History of Social Clubs**

Gentlemen’s clubs originated in 17th and 18th-century London, where they were known for their exclusiveness and admittance of leading figures in society, including members of the royal family and politicians. Numerous clubs, including White’s, Boodle’s, and the Oxford and Cambridge University Clubs lined the sides of St. James Street in London. Clubs soon emerged in the United States, developing in the major cities of Philadelphia, Baltimore, Boston, and New York, where they began to play a key role in economic and social affairs. While the Century Association invited men who had a prominent “social and literary life,” the Union Club consisted of members known for their strong post-war support of ex-Confederate supporters. Whereas the Union League Club focused on state and national politics and introducing new legislation, the University Club emphasized an appreciation of art, culture, and literature. However, these organizations shared the common characteristic of attracting men whose authority in a specific field would enhance the club’s reputation. Accordingly, America’s influential business-
men, lawyers, architects, politicians, and physicians joined these clubs. Often these social establishments were composed of members of the same family. Families were not simply biological ties, but acted as microcosmic social institutions from which connections could be established. A private “domestic sphere,” the people over whom one had significant influence, expanded due to affiliations crafted at gentlemen’s clubs.

**Social Capital**

Social capital involved the added economic benefit of having a network of relationships with others. By networking with others and carrying out mutually beneficial ventures, members were sure that clubs provided a network of resources to help improve their firms’ operations. Clubs offered individuals the opportunity to get to know others who shared similar lines of business, thereby raising each member’s social capital. Although some clubs forbade overt discussion of business operations, it was likely that such conversations were held behind closed doors.

At times, members informed one another of recent news, insider trading secrets, or the future of certain industries, thereby creating syndicates. One example of the prominence of social capital involved business affairs between J.P. Morgan and Charles Schwab, both of whom were members of the University Club in 1900. During a round of golf at the St. Andrews Golf Club in Westchester, Charles Schwab successfully convinced the aging Andrew Carnegie to sell Carnegie Steel to Morgan. Sold for $480 million, Carnegie Steel combined with Morgan’s other steel enterprises formed United States Steel Corporation, the largest American business at the time. It also was convenient that the lawyers who prepared the framework for the steel enterprise shared membership in clubs with Morgan: Francis Stetson in the Metropolitan, University, and Century; Charles MacVeagh in the Metropolitan and Century. In another instance, J.P. Morgan used social capital to negotiate a merger between his company and Cyrus McCormick Jr.’s McCormick Harvesting Machine Company, Charles Deering’s
Deering Harvester Company, and several smaller firms. Interestingly enough, McCormick, Deering, and Morgan were members of the Metropolitan and Jekyll Island Clubs. The merger would later create International Harvester, a farm equipment company with 85 percent market share. By the start of World War I, it was the fourth largest firm in the country.

John Pierpont (J.P.) Morgan was born into money. His father, Junius Spencer (J.S.) Morgan, was one of America’s “commercial elite,” merchants of the Jacksonian era who held much of the nation’s urban wealth, and accordingly, considerable influence in political and economic affairs. Described as “Old Money,” those from affluent backgrounds over several generations, J.P. Morgan came from a long line of merchants and bankers, who used social clubs as a mechanism for success. Sociologist C. Wright Mills argued that, through Morgan's membership in almost two dozen different organizations, the financier was able to gain “authority and credibility by conducting business at their clubs.” These clubs allowed him to expand his network, offer jobs to his acquaintances, and build large-scale trusts that dominated entire American industries.

Morgan’s companies were built from the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of smaller entities until they became larger conglomerates of trusts. They focused on a variety of consumer and capital goods, such as the National Tube merger in 1899, which controlled 85 percent of the steel tube, pipe maker, sheets, wires, and nail industry. In 1901, the National Tube Company combined with nine other companies to form the aforementioned U.S. Steel Company, the world’s first billion-dollar firm. This merger marked the zenith of Morgan’s success, upon the formation of a firm valued at $1.4 billion, which was more than three times the federal budget.

The idea of creating a giant steel conglomerate arose at a dinner held one year earlier at the University Club. On 12 December 1900, prominent figures including Morgan, Vanderbilt, Depew, Harriman, and Stillman, attended the dinner at the club’s house. At the engagement, Schwab spoke of his vivid dream of a vertically integrated steel giant that would dominate the industry; the creation of
U.S. Steel did precisely that.\textsuperscript{27}

**Railroad Expansion**

Following the Civil War, the country witnessed an industrial explosion when “railroad trackage doubled to seventy thousand miles, [and] a spree fed by tens of millions of acres in federal land grants.”\textsuperscript{28} For much of the late 19th and early 20th century, the railroad industry was the driving factor for the U.S. economy, allowing transportation of people and goods over long distances at unprecedented speeds. It soon represented the new American identity, and forming this identity were the industrialists.\textsuperscript{29} Most of the members of New York’s elite social clubs had connections to railroads: a great majority were directors, partners, officers, advisors, or presidents of railroads.

Morgan and his partners reorganized railroads in order to streamline operations, increase efficiency, and cut costs. Through this method of *morganization*, he engaged in M&A transactions, often in the railroad industry, and reconstructed them in a way that allowed for maximal output at minimal expense. Around 33,000 miles of railroads, or one-sixth of the country’s railroads at the time, were “morganized”, including the Erie, Philadelphia & Reading, Great Northern, New York Central, and Southern Railway.\textsuperscript{30} He and his partners rearranged the capital structure, substantially reduced many of the fixed liabilities, and issued new securities in order to cover the costs of improvements made to the lines. The Commerce Commission sought to investigate the merger due to the prospect that the railroad put Morgan in a position of too much territorial control, decreasing healthy competition among the other smaller railroads in the area.\textsuperscript{31} The company’s trustees were two of Morgan’s close acquaintances, George F. Baker and James Stillman, presidents of the First National Bank and National City Bank, respectively.\textsuperscript{32, 33}

At the meeting of the New York Farmers were presidents from the New York Central Railroad System (Chauncey M. Depew, Hamilton McKown Twombly), Atlanta and Charlotte Air Line Rail-
road (Charles S. Fairchild), Great Northern Railroad (James J. Hill), Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad (Samuel Sloan), Union Pacific Railroad (Edward H. Harriman), and Mohawk and Malone Railway (W. Seward Webb). There is little doubt that these presidents were invited to the dinner because of their financial power and influence in the growing railroad industry.

At meetings, members engaged in mutually beneficial business deals with one another. These deals included M&A, public offerings, leveraged buyouts, and reorganization techniques, which represented about 50 percent of Morgan’s railroad undertakings between 1894 and 1934. In one instance, J.P. Morgan, Hamilton Twombly, Chauncey M. Depew, and William K. Vanderbilt issued $100 million in 3.5 percent coupon bonds from the New York Central Railroad, while also buying shares in the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern. At the same time, all of these men were employees of both railroads. The notion of interlocking directorates, where executives would be on boards of multiple companies in the same industry, not only connected firms in similar industries, but also linked individuals who were represented on multiple boards. Known as “money trusts,” interlocking directorates were composed of industrialists from prestigious clubs who knew each other well, gave each other jobs, and worked together to raise revenue, giving oligopolistic control over the financial industry to a few individuals.

Clubs provided the opportunity for these men to mingle and expand their domestic sphere of influence, working together in order to raise profits and eliminate the competition. Among the large groups there existed an unspoken Gentleman Banker’s Code, under which bankers did not actively search for customers, but rather waited for them to come. The syndicate of bankers under this code ensured that the economic power to control the markets was always maintained in an environment with no advertising and no price competition. In the unregulated banking community of early 20th-century America, such collusions were legal and often seen as necessary for success. The point of controversy for many of these
deals was the seemingly “unfair” legal violations that arose through a company’s managerial activities.

In 1885, on the first of a series of yachts he owned, the Corsair, J.P. Morgan negotiated agreements between William K. Vanderbilt, of the New York Central, and Jay Gould, of the Pennsylvania Railroad, owners of two of the largest railroads at the time. In what is known as the Corsair Compact, Morgan was able to befriend both of these men through their club memberships since Vanderbilt and Gould were high-profile partners in numerous clubs, then convince both that they should cooperate through mark-ups (increased prices) for both major railroads, thereby increasing revenue and removing competition. Despite antitrust legislation, such collaboration continued for years until the U.S. government realized the devastating economic and social impact of monopolies. Association with even one club was a key to success, and anymore than than one allowed a banker to expand his sphere of influence drastically. Stillman, represented in all eight clubs mentioned, used his connections to aid in his successful career. Originally a cotton trader, James Stillman became president of New York’s National City Bank in November 1891. Stillman had significant business interested in railroads at a time when they were revolutionizing American transportation. Marriages, such as the nuptials of two of Stillman’s daughters into the family of William Rockefeller, established familial relationships between prominent club members, and kept business within the family.

Upon learning of the efficiency and centralization of Standard Oil management and financial activities, Stillman incorporated the structured hierarchy to his own bank. Throughout his time as president and chairman, Stillman held significant stake in numerous industries, giving him the status as the largest lender of money on the New York Stock Exchange in 1913. Due to the collusion of the two families in both banking and railroads from the marriage of Stillman’s daughters, the two corporations operated under similar goals to the point where the National City Bank was coined the “Standard Oil Bank.” The collaboration of the two groups reached
its pinnacle upon the merger of the Consolidated Gas Company of New York and Edison Illuminating Company in 1899, where Standard Oil essentially gained control over the entire lighting system of New York.\footnote{47}

Not only did clubs promote business ventures, but they also permitted members to obtain employment at one another’s companies. Stillman wanted the affiliates of his company to have connections with others, and thus he was able to maintain the financial power of the railroad and banking industry in the hands of a select few. Frank Vanderlip, director of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, Southern Pacific, and Union Pacific Railroad, became vice president of National City Bank due to his affiliations with Stillman in 1902.\footnote{48} Similarly, others were able to gain admission to other companies through their enrollments in prominent clubs.\footnote{49}

Although Morgan, Baker, and Stillman were competitors in the securities underwriting markets, they realized their capabilities if they cooperated in an oligopolistic fashion. In a period of little to no bank regulation, these men exploited the markets by conspiring.\footnote{50} They elected each other to directorate positions to the boards of one another’s companies, raised prices in tandem, and collaborated over potentially advantageous acquisitions at meetings. Through gentlemen’s clubs, bankers were able to extend employment at each other’s firms, keeping the financial power of railroad decisions among a small group of men, a characteristic that would permanently change the working business environment.

**Big Business and Government Response**

Throughout the 1890s and 1900s, gentlemen’s clubs created a network of connected business moguls who dominated the American economy, allowing for the establishment of large trusts. In response, there was a sharp government attack on the big businesses that formed, resulting in the formation of stringent antitrust laws. Initial anti-monopoly concerns arose in the 1890s during the bankruptcy of several major railroads, including the Philadelphia & Reading, and the failure of several large banks, culminating in the
one of the first economic depressions in the United States; this era of uneasiness led to the passage of legislation to hinder the dominance of too-big-to-fail trusts in the markets, such as the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.\textsuperscript{51}

After the turn of the century, critics denounced large corporations even more sharply for their unjust business practices and control of the markets. A crackdown against these companies, along with numerous lawsuits against them, culminated into the groundbreaking case of \textit{Northern Securities v. U.S.} (1904) case. Newly elected President Theodore Roosevelt stopped the formation of the Northern Securities Company, which threatened to monopolize the transportation industry in the Northwest. Earning the nickname “trust buster,” Roosevelt used new legislation to dismantle monopolies, end the practices of discriminatory business tactics, and ultimately ban the formation of trusts.\textsuperscript{52}

Northern Securities Company, a New Jersey-based holding firm, owned a majority of shares in other railroad lines, including the Northern Pacific Railway Company and the Great Northern Railway Company.\textsuperscript{53} With James J. Hill as president, the Northern Securities Company alarmed the federal government, identifying it as a “bad trust” for having raised rates to exorbitant levels and controlling a large market share.\textsuperscript{54} Northern Securities was intended to provide safety for the owners of railroads, but the government perceived it as a threat to public welfare.\textsuperscript{55} James J. Hill collaborated closely with Morgan by using his capital to purchase $37,023,000 in common stock and $41,085,000 in preferred stock in the Northern Pacific Railway.\textsuperscript{56} Northern Securities held stock of other railroad companies to reduce risk for the owners by only putting the holding company’s assets at risk. The government found that holding shares in two separate corporations might monopolize the railroad industry in the western United States, putting too much economic power into a few people’s hands.\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Northern Securities v. U.S.} was one of the first in a series of antitrust lawsuits that used the Sherman Antitrust Act to stop the consolidation of a pyramid holding company.
Investigations into the activities of James Stillman and his constituents continued over the next several years. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was responsible for regulating the price rates of carriers and transportation lines, including telephones, railroads, and bus rates. In 1906, it published “An Enquiry into the Consolidation and Combination of Carriers,” denouncing the purchase of Chicago and Alton Railroad by business moguls James Stillman, Jacob Schiff, George Gould, and E.H. Harriman. Supreme Court suits followed in 1910 and 1911, culminating into the full-scale Money Trust Investigation of 1913.

The growth in big businesses and the consolidation of numerous industries during the early 20th century brought on harsh attacks from workers and government alike. At social club meetings and dinners, ideas were exchanged about how to create bigger and better companies. Communication among parties grew through new innovations, such as the telephone, typewriters, and other methods of accelerated news sharing. Phones in the U.S. increased from 3000 in 1876 to 13 million in 1920, displaying a large influx of communication devices to individual households. Staggering growth allowed men who belonged to the same social club to coordinate over pricing discrimination and other methods of dominance in the market. Morgan even sought to control the American Telephone & Telegraph Company in 1909, he partnered with Henry P. Davison, a banker who had significant stake in the company as well as in another banking company, Bankers Trust. Born into a family of banking magnates, Davison was prominent in the Metropolitan, Century, Jekyll Island, and Union League Clubs. Davison and Morgan used almost $300 million of the firm’s securities in order to buy majority control of another communications firm, Western Union. However, this unregulated business environment inevitably fostered the creation of antitrust committees and legislation that attacked these corporations for their prescribed unlawful offenses.

In the months before his death, J.P. Morgan stood before a congressional investigative subcommittee that sought to uncover the
 unfair business practices that contributed to his wealth. The Money Trust Investigation, also known as the Pujo Committee of 1913, believed Morgan and his constituents were operating under the same motives, allowing each to profit handsomely at the expense of the average consumer. The committee filed lawsuits against alleged alliances of bankers, forged through club business ties, that cooperated by manipulating prices through rebates and discounts. One of the main targets was the group that “saved” the U.S. economy during the Panic of 1907 by bailing out companies: J.P. Morgan, George F. Baker, and James Stillman, who together amounted an estimated fortune of firm value and personal wealth to well over three billion dollars. The Pujo Committee further speculated that interlocking directorates, formed through social clubs, shut out competition through a “community of interest and family representation” in businesses, where members simply hired their friends and acquaintances to act as directors. Through these indictments, the investigation ascertained that many railroad tycoons utilized illegal tactics to eliminate the competition and maintain financial power. Following the investigation, the commission forced Morgan to withdraw his directorship position from the National City Bank, National Bank of Commerce, American Telephone & Telegraph, and other mostly non-financial corporations.

Conclusion

During one of the interrogations, Samuel Untermyer, the leading attorney of the committee, asked Morgan his beliefs pertaining to the reason of his success:

Untermyer: Is not commercial credit based primarily upon money or property?
Morgan: No sir. The first thing is character.
Untermyer: Before money or property?
Morgan: Before money or property or anything else. Money cannot buy it… because a man I do not trust could not get money from me on all the bonds in Christendom.
Morgan himself believed that, while power, money, and skills were pertinent, the ultimate determinant of success was character; how others perceived and viewed Morgan was the key to his effective deals. With the social capital achieved through clubs and his evidently attractive demeanor, he became an influential financier, mediating between various parties through his ability to convince, persuade, and flatter those around him. Untermyer questioned the legality of Morgan’s operations, which used social capital, an asset developed through business relations, to keep America’s wealth among the financial and political elite. Numerous bankers and railroad magnates profited from social networks and maintained a tight-knit circle of colluding capitalists in leading industries. These clubs permanently changed the business industry by altering how deals were conducted and how companies were formed.

Members of social clubs occupied the higher echelons of American society, representing the epitome of high class, wealth, and privilege that others could not enjoy. By being affiliated with even one club, members had advantages in enhancing business connections, breaking into their industries more easily, and spawning the growth of their corporations. Through the concept of social capital, gentlemen’s clubs offered support for a system in which financial and societal success was not based on “what you knew, but on whom you knew.” Elite groups paved the way for the creation of large trusts that dominated American industries, such as electricity, oil, steel, gas, and railroads. They encountered a barrage of backlash from new antitrust legislation and the Pujo committee, which criticized the bankers of having an excessive amount of authority over the financial and credit systems. The commission crafted a charter to create the Federal Reserve System in 1913, a central bank that, among other responsibilities, supervised and regulated the banking institutions of the country. In some respects, this marked the end of the era of influential social clubs, large-scale trusts, and interconnected business networks that made the rich continually richer. Some would say that the system under which gentlemen’s
clubs dominated American society began to falter after the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913 and the new waves of legislation that swept the country. The system would ensure that the power to provide credit and finance businesses could no longer be held in the hands of a few. However, the wealthy elite continued to dominate many major American industries, as these groups provided connections to those in top positions of financial and political influence, such as when it was revealed that the first president of the Federal Reserve Bank was Benjamin Strong Jr., a close friend of J.P. Morgan himself.68

Endnotes
4. Susie Pak, *Gentlemen Bankers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 71.; Tom Nite, “NYC Social Clubs: Members Only,” *Thrillist*, 11 May 2014. http://www.thrillist.com/entertainment/new-york/nyc-social-clubs-members-only; Gentlemen's clubs deemed irrelevant to this paper are those that explored certain leisure interests (ex. arts, hiking, etc.), focused on charities, or advocated for a political party. Although they were exclusive in some respects, these arts- or charity-focused groups were rarely characterized with the same level of prestige as were these other clubs.
6. Appendix A.
7. *Morganization* is the process by which J.P. Morgan acquired, reorganized, and made profitable companies. vertical and horizontal integration both refer to the acquisition of new companies.
12. Appendix A.
14. Ibid., 75.; Social capital refers to the economic value of having a large social network. Members of the same social circle benefit from one another’s connections.
15. Kendall, Members Only, 3.
16. Pak, Gentlemen Bankers, 73.
Other lawyers included William Nelson Cromwell, William J. Curtis.
22. Referred to hereinafter as simply “Morgan.”
27. Ibid., 109.
33. Ibid., 371.
35. Pak, Gentlemen Bankers, 16.
40. Appendix B.
43. Pak, Gentlemen Bankers, 95.
47. Burr, The Portrait of a Banker: James Stillman, 144.
51. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 attacked trusts and large conglomerates. The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 made price discrimination, tying contracts, and interlocking directorates illegal. Price discrimination occurs when companies sell goods or services at different prices depending on the location or consumer involved. Tying involves selling one good to a customer contingent upon their purchase of another good.
52. Hoyt, The House of Morgan, 257.
56. “Railway Merger: Inside History of the Northern Securities Company,” Chicago Daily Tribune (Chicago, IL), 26 Sep 2012.; dollar amounts in 1901 USD. James J. Hill was represented in four of the eight clubs.
60. Hoyt, The House of Morgan, 290.
64. “Report of the Committee Appointed Pursuant House Resolutions 429 and 504 to Investigate the Concentration of Control of Money and Credit,” 139.
72. Metropolitan Club of the City of New York: Officers, Constitution, By-Laws and List of Members (1903).
74. Officers, Members, Constitution and Rules of the Union Club of the City of New York (1905).
76. Annual of the University Club (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905).

Editor’s Note: The appendix referenced here will be published in the online edition.
The Arguments For and Against the Religious Oaths in the Debates of the 1820-21 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention

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In November of 1820, a convention met in Boston at the behest of voters to discuss how to amend the Constitution of Massachusetts. The primary purpose for calling the convention was to determine the relationship between religion and government, which at the time was formally integrated, largely because the population of religious dissenters in Massachusetts had been increasing. The delegates agreed almost unanimously that civil government should continue to support Protestant Christianity in some form, yet they disagreed on the manner in which this support would take. A majority of the delegates agreed that the government should continue to support the Church financially. Which churches should receive tax dollars, however, was a contentious issue that would remain unresolved until 1833, when it was ultimately decided that no churches would receive government funding. Another big question was whether the state should retain a test in the form of an oath required by the 1780 Constitution that ensured that only those professing to be Protestant Christians would hold offices in the executive and legislative branches.

This paper will focus on the second question, and how those delegates participating in the convention tackled whether or not the Constitution should require this Protestant oath of office. The convention, while eventually voting to remove the religious oath and replace it with a temporal oath (or affirmation) of allegiance, was divided on the issue, and even those believing that there should be an oath differed on what this oath should require. The purpose of this paper will be to analyze the arguments presented by delegates for and against the religious oath during these debates. Moreover, I will attempt to analyze the delegates’ arguments in order to better understand what they believed the relationship between religion and the political process should be.

I will argue that, while there was a near universal agreement that Protestant Christianity was essential to the values of a righteous and moral society, there appeared to be an apprehension among delegates over the formal integration of government and religion. Although the convention failed to remove the official
sponsorship of Protestant institutions via tax dollars, the removal of the religious test for state office suggests a movement toward disestablishment that would eventually be achieved in 1833. Moreover, I will analyze why the religious oath was removed while the financial support was preserved, and discuss how delegates considered the oath unnecessary but financial support as essential to promote Christianity. I should note here that the reasons for this apparent apprehension with establishment exhibited by the delegates are beyond the scope of this paper.

While there have been numerous references in scholarly literature to the disestablishment of religion in Massachusetts in the early 1800s, few scholars have analyzed the Constitutional Convention of 1820-1821. Scholars so far focused primarily on the debates and the failure to pass the proposed amendment to Article III that would have allowed for more churches to receive tax dollars. Historian John D. Cushing writes about the process of disestablishment in Massachusetts from 1780-1833, yet he refers only to the debates and the proposed amendment to Article III, he neglects the proposed amendment to the religious oath. Indeed, Cushing appears to assume that disestablishment refers solely to withholding financial support for religious institutions by the government. David Sehat does not make the same assumption, arguing instead that disestablishment in Massachusetts comes in two parts: the 1820 removal of the religious oath requirement and then the 1833 removal of the state’s financial support of churches. Yet Sehat focuses on the larger trend of evangelicalism and its’ disruption of the religious establishment in New England. So, while Sehat’s argument may possess merit, he fails to adequately analyze the debates and provide an understanding of the specific reasoning for the removal of the oath. Finally, perhaps the most detailed analysis of the debates of the convention of 1820-1821 come from J.C. Meyer, whose book details the relationship between the “Church and State” in Massachusetts between 1740 and 1833. Yet Meyer, too focuses primarily on debates concerning the third article, devoting only a paragraph to the oath of office. He hastily summarizes the statements of a
delegate on each side—in one instance, he states that one delegate “made a valiant fight to have the oath retained”—and then writes, “An amendment was submitted which provided for the abolition of the oath.”

Consequently, there is much to be analyzed regarding the convention’s decision to propose removing the religious oath. Understanding the specific reasons for the dispatching of this prominent feature of Protestant establishment in Massachusetts is crucial to our comprehension of disestablishment in Massachusetts during this period.

I will utilize primary sources to understand why the convention sought to remove the religious oath as a requirement to hold office in Massachusetts. Similarly to secondary sources, I found primaries sparse in number and variety. However, the most important document I will be using, the Journal of Debates of the Constitutional Convention, contains much of the necessary information regarding the reasoning that went into this proposed amendment and will be the foremost source I utilize throughout this paper. Other secondary sources include newspaper documents—mainly editorials that are useful for gauging the external opinions of bystanders to the proceedings inside the convention.

**Overview**

The oath went as thus: “I, A. B., do declare that I believe in the Christian religion, and have a firm persuasion of its truth...” While the debates in 1820 focused on whether to remove this oath, a majority agreed that officeholders should be Christian. This assumption went unchallenged throughout the debates, with few exceptions. One delegate, S.A. Wells, noted that, although he opposed the oath, he “expect[ed] that the people would elect none to office who are not Christians.” Another opponent, Joseph Stone, stated, “If Christians were a bare majority...it would be right, because it would be necessary for the preservation of the religion,” indicating that he too felt that officeholders should be Christian, despite the fact that he would ultimately vote against the oath. Those supporting it
argued more firmly that officeholders should be Christian. Thus, for many the debate focused on whether the oath should be required, not about whether the lawmakers ought to be Christian. As the convention's explanation for the proposed amendments suggested, “It is implied that every man who is selected for office...must have such sentiments of religious duty.”

A majority of the delegates likewise agreed that the people of Massachusetts had a right to require an oath of Christian faith, although they did not agree as much about its “expediency” or “propriety.” Reporting the findings of a convention committee which had discussed the issue and favored the oath's removal, Daniel Webster stated, “The people [have] such a right...They may grant, or they may withhold it at pleasure; and if it be for them, and them only, to decide whether they will grant office, it is for them to decide, also, on what terms, and with what conditions they will grant it.” Wells, although opposed to the oath, stated that the people “undoubtedly have a right to institute such a form of government as they conceive to be best calculated to secure their peace and happiness.” Yet, unlike the “implied” understanding that elected officials would be Christian, which was almost universal, there were multiple objections to the right of the people to require a religious oath to hold office, and these objections would in part serve as a basis for arguments against the oath.

**Arguments for the Oath**

The arguments for retaining the religious oath relied primarily on the need to ensure that state officials were moral and therefore could be trusted to do good for the people they served. Writing before the convention, Massachusetts Supreme Court Chief Justice Isaac Parker, the president of the convention, suggested in an opinion piece in a newspaper that the oath was necessary to keep out atheists and deists. He wrote:

“As to Atheists I should think upon every principle they ought to be excluded, for no dependence could be
placed upon the faithful execution of any trusts committed to them…And as to Deists, I cannot but think that those who are able to resist the testimony in favor of revealed truth, have such perverted understandings that the community will suffer no loss by their exclusion.”

According to Parker, an atheist could not be trusted with the important task of serving the Commonwealth, and people would be better off without deists in government. Along these lines John Phillips pointed out that their constituents were not “indifferent…to whether their rulers should be Christians or followers of Mahomet.” The implication here, of course, is similar to the one mentioned above, that any non-Christians would possess less moral character. Following this line of thinking, Samuel Hubbard noted that it would be a poor idea to “admit a mahometan, or a deist, or a jew, to hold office over a Christian people.” To be clear, these were not arguments that would run counter to the beliefs of those desiring to remove the oath. But what marks them as significant is their argument that the consequences of having a non-Christian holding office would be severe enough to necessitate constitutional mechanisms to protect against the possibility of it ever happening.

The belief that professing one’s faith in Christianity should be required because it proves one’s morality and is therefore imperative to good governance is further exemplified by the arguments advanced by delegates who believed that the oath does not go far enough—that it should also apply to the judicial branch. Webster asserted that there can be no office in which the “sense of religious responsibility is more necessary than in that of a judge; especially those judges who pass, in the last resort, on the lives, liberty and property of every man…Of all places, therefore, there is none, which so imperatively demands that he who occupies it should be under the fear of God.”

A second argument presented at the convention in support of the religious oath was based on the belief that removing the oath, which manifested the government’s support of Christianity,
would indicate to citizens that it was not important for government officials to be Christian. In his opinion piece, Parker wrote that by striking out the oath of office, “we could hardly escape the imputation of an attack upon religion [Christianity] itself, or at least should incur the charge of regarding it less than those did who for purposes to them seeming wise introduced the test.”

Joseph Tuckerman stated during the debates that if the oath had not already been established, he would not have advocated it, but “it has now become associated with the sentiments, and habits, and feelings of forty years; and if you now remove it, you declare to the people, and they will not misunderstand the declaration,—that you do not deem it to be of importance that our magistrates should be Christians.” For these delegates, the oath was no longer necessary, because it was extremely unlikely that a non-Christian would be elected. However, removing the oath would create a problem because citizens would ostensibly be concerned with government failing to recognize the value of having Christian leaders.

Moreover, these arguments can be read a bit further to suggest that these delegates were concerned that by removing the religious tests, the government would be intimating a movement toward the complete abandonment of Christianity. These arguments indicate the concern that no longer supporting Christianity would not be viewed as a neutral decision—namely, that it would no longer be favoring any single religion—but instead it would be viewed as a direct attack on Christianity.

**Arguments Against the Oath**

When the convention adjourned and submitted its list of proposed amendments to the people of Massachusetts in 1821, the eleventh article aimed to change the oath to a simple pledge of allegiance to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In addition, the convention submitted explanations for the proposed alteration. The convention (officially) reasoned:

We have agreed that the declaration of belief in the christian religion, ought not to be required, in the future;
because we do not think the assuming of civil office, a suitable occasion for so declaring; and because it is implied, that every man who is selected for office, in this community, must have such sentiments of religious duty, as relate to his fitness for the place, to which he is called.  

The official pronouncement of the convention states that the delegates saw that taking office was not a “suitable” environment for professing one’s faith, and that one’s faith does not need to be stated expressly because it is implied that the electorate will know a candidate is unfit if he is not a Christian.

Yet the debates reveal that the Convention’s official reasoning was far from a consensus. In fact, there was a lack of consensus even among those delegates who wanted to remove the oath. As we shall see, even though they agreed it should be removed, they did not submit uniform reasons in arguing for its removal.

The most common reason given for the oath’s removal was that it was unnecessary. This sentiment is similar to the official reasoning submitted by the convention as a whole. Many delegates believed that voting would function as an unofficial religious test—voters would likely elect a Christian. Webster, noting the opinion of the committee, stated that it was unnecessary because in “this Commonwealth, ninety-nine out of every hundred inhabitants profess to believe in the Christian religion.” Henry Dearborn echoed this line of thinking. He noted that because other parts of the Constitution, such as the Article III, included measures designed to ensure the promotion and cultivation of Christianity, he was confident that the electorate would remain Christian. Therefore they could “expect that the people would elect none to office who are not Christians.” J.T. Austin, while still supporting the “unnecessary” argument, took a more radical stance. He indicated a willingness to remove the oath because there was no need for legislators to be Christian: “[T]his [religious] qualification [is] related to opinions which do not bear upon the duties of government and are not connected with the public safety…
No one would say that a belief in Christianity was indispensible to legislators.”

Some believed the oath to be unnecessary because it did little to prevent non-Christians, or at least immoral men, from holding office. James Prince proclaimed that the oath was “not effectual safeguard [against] ambitious, unprincipled men from [taking] office.” Dearborn believed that the religious test was more likely to prevent “good and conscientious” men than it would “immoral and wicked” men from office. Lovell Walker opposed the oath because “it did no good… [the oath] will not operate to exclude [infidels] from office.” Finally, one delegate, N.W. Williams, argued that “there was more danger of insincere professions of belief if they were demanded as a qualification for office,” and it would therefore do more harm than good, enticing nonbelievers to take the oath, rendering it useless.

Another protest against the oath was that it prevented qualified candidates from taking office. This argument focused on qualified candidates who were Protestant but believed it violated their religion to take the oath. Prince asserted that even if most people were willing to take the oath, one qualified candidate who refused could make the test unjust. Indeed, he claimed to know a certain man who was an ardent Christian but could not take the oath because his faith prohibited it, thus depriving one of the most “distinguished citizens, and a most enlightened and prominent patriot.” He went on to claim that the oath “may deprive society of talent and moral excellence.” James Savage asserted that men qualified for office may currently doubt Christianity, and therefore it deprived the state of good candidates, but moreover that by preventing them from taking office, they would never convert to Christianity. Savage presents an interesting perspective: he recognizes the potential of a non-Christian to be a qualified office holder, even though he clearly thinks it important that everyone should be Christian.

Others, however, went so far as to argue that the religious oath violated inalienable rights, and that one should not have to profess a certain faith to hold office. Taking an exceptionally radical stance,
William Nichols asserted that voters should be able to “elect whom they [please] to fill any office,” and that the Declaration of Independence stated that all men were created equal, not “all Christians are born free and equal.” Others did not go quite so far, but nonetheless argued that forcing one to proclaim his religion violated their inalienable rights, and therefore the oath should be removed. J.T. Austin noted that, “everyone who contributes to the expenses of government and bears his share of the public burthens, has a right to be a candidate for public favor.” Prince stated that “religion is a matter exclusively between God and the individual” has no place as an oath for office. A number of delegates asserted that not only should it be up to the people to choose their leaders, but also that government had no right to force a religious test upon certain candidates.

Why Remove the Oath but not State Financial Support?

If the delegates expressed concerns regarding the relationship between religion and the government in the context of the religious oath debate, then what about the financial support of churches? Delegates indeed pushed the convention for the removal of financial support of the state for churches, but the proposal was defeated 136 to 246. Thus one can imagine that a considerable sentiment in favor of disestablishment existed in the convention that would have favored the removal of both financial support and the religious oath. I believe that the oath’s removal reflects an undercurrent of apprehension involving religion and government that had been increasing in Massachusetts during this period.

As I mentioned previously, a number of delegates argued that the religious oath should not be included because the government had no place forcing one to profess his religion. Indeed, the official explanation given by the convention states that it does not believe “the assuming of civil office” a “suitable occasion” for professing one’s religion. While this statement does not explicitly reject integrating religion with government, it nonetheless reflects concern for the relationship between the two. Indeed, it points out that the
office is “civil,” suggesting secularism. One delegate, Paul Dean, questioned whether it was “proper to have two ways of professing religion, one evangelical, the other a matter of state policy.”

Thus, some reasoning behind the removal of the oath, at least from some members, was that the oath did not belong in a civil government.

Others, however, make their desire to separate religion from the government more explicit, including but not limited to the religious test. As I’ve previously mentioned, William Nichols cited the Declaration of Independence, asserting that all men—not just all Christians—are created equal, indicating his support for removing favoritism for Christians. J.T. Austin addressed the broader relationship between religion and government, stating that, “it is unnecessary to mix the affairs of church and state,” going beyond the religious oath to other facets of the relationship.

Henry Dearborn made his belief in separating religion and government most explicit by referencing John Locke: “[I]t was not business of religion to interfere with the civil government.” Paul Dean stated that the delegates must “[l]eave religion to the care of God,” not to the government. Clearly these arguments, which extend beyond removing the religious oath to separating religion and government, help explain how the religious test’s removal may be considered a reflection of increasing tension regarding the separation of church and state.

Arguments that the religious oath should be removed only because it was unnecessary can perhaps best be understood in the context of the other two arguments against the test, in addition to the debates regarding the removal of financial support of churches. These debates reveal ambivalence towards mixing religion and the political process, and the argument to remove the oath because it was unnecessary reflects this ambivalence. Indeed, these delegates, such as S.A. Wells, argued that it was unnecessary for the protection of Christianity because other parts of the Constitution still supported the religion. Although J.T. Austin did not assert that government has a role to promote religion, he nonetheless captured the sentiment of maintaining financial support of churches by stat-
ing, “[The Christian religion] will be maintained and extended… only by the diffusion of knowledge.” Thus, while the religious oath was unnecessary, supporting churches financially was necessary to promote Christianity and morality. But because delegates who believed the religious oath to be unnecessary had reservations about establishment, they sought to have the test removed from the Commonwealth’s Constitution. Furthermore, one must keep in mind that this measure called for taking the initiative to remove what already existed. Thus, one would expect that if the oath really did not matter, the delegates would have been content to simply leave it there. However, because so many of them were not, it suggests ambivalence toward establishment.

**Conclusion**

Within these debates, multiple delegates argued for the removal of the religious oath, primarily because of their discomfort with establishment. Some, like James Prince, expressly stated that they believed that religion and government should be separate. Others, like J.T. Austin, believed that government had no right to restrict potential candidates based on religion. Others, such as S.A. Wells, simply argued that, because the oath was unnecessary, it should be removed. All three arguments reflect, to some degree, an apprehension with the integration of government and religion. Due to this perceptible apprehension, and because of a push to have financial support removed (although it ultimately fell short), I believe that the removal of the religious oath in 1821 indicates a move towards disestablishment that would eventually result in complete separation in 1833.

**Endnotes**

1. Cushing, 189.
2. In this paper I refer to “establishment,” “formal integration,” etc. of religion and government or the political process. The definition of “establishment” is unclear, but I simply mean that religion is integrated into government by way of government codification of religious interests, such as financial support to religious institutions or a religious oath as a requirement of holding office.
3. Cushing, 189.
4. Sehat, 55.
5. Meyer, 191-192
6. Massachusetts Constitution. The oath also prohibits allegiance to any foreign power “in any matter, civil, ecclesiastical, or spiritual,” which was intended to prevent Catholics from holding office.
7. Debates, 176
8. Debates, 178
9. Amendments
10. Webster was ambivalent about removing the oath, but was simply speaking on behalf of the committee that had been assigned to discuss the issue.
11. Debates, 161
12. Debates, 175
13. Parker opinion.
14. Debates, 168
15. Debates, 172
16. Debates, 162-163
17. Parker opinion.
18. Debates, 170-171
19. All quotations are rendered with their original spelling and italicization unless otherwise indicated.
20. Amendments.
21. Debates, 162
22. Debates, 176
23. Debates, 173
24. Debates, 165
25. Debates, 171
26. Debates, 185
27. Debates, 186
29. Debates, 184
30. Debates, 180
31. Debates, 173
32. Debates, 163
33. Meyer, 208
34. Debates, 182
35. Debates, 174
36. Debates, 171
37. Debates, 183
38. Debates, 176
39. Debates, 174
Exploring the Autobahn in the Nazi Era: Aesthetics, Conservation, and Practicality

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Of the ecological footprints left behind by the Nazi regime, the Autobahn might be the most striking. Its expansive construction marked a rare revolutionary change in the German landscape. The Autobahn’s roadways exist to this day, serving as a constant reminder of the Nazis’ impact on nature. Understanding why and how the Nazis built the Autobahn can help reveal the degree to which environmental concerns played a role in Nazi policies. Why were the Nazis so eager to take on such an expansive project? According to historian Wolfgang Schivelbusch, the historical interpretation of Autobahn construction during the Nazi regime has severely shifted. Immediately after World War II, it was convenient for scholars to focus on militarization and suggest that the Autobahn project was simply a means of more efficient mobilization – a way to further the Nazis’ quest for European domination. Later, however, historians began “over-interpreting” the Nazis’ motives, labeling the Autobahn and other initiatives as green projects with conservationist undertones. For example, Anna Bramwell’s highly refuted interpretation of conservation during the Nazi regime revolved around a “green wing” of the party. Similarly, historian William Rollins argued that the actions of Alwin Seifert, the most influential landscape architect in Autobahn planning, were largely consistent with Heimatschutz, Germany’s traditional conservation ideology. To be sure, there were aspects of both conservation and mobilization that lingered throughout Autobahn planning. Yet, as documented in length by historian Thomas Zeller, these two motives were scarcely influential in the actual design and construction of the project. I hope to intervene in this discussion by furthering Zeller’s argument that the Autobahn was not a true effort in conservation. Although the Nazi regime, civil engineers, and landscape architects each held conflicting interpretations, it was aesthetics that played the pervasive role throughout the Autobahn project. An evaluation of primary and secondary documents shows that the aesthetic was the unequivocal driving factor behind the Autobahn – far transcending any potential motives of practicality and conservation.

This essay will address notable developments of the fascist Au-
The Autobahn project, which started in 1933 and lasted until 1941, when the Nazis halted construction due to the growing strains of war. First, it will present brief background information on the Autobahn project and its results under the Nazi regime. It will then explore in detail the three potential motives behind Autobahn construction: practicality, aesthetics, and conservation.

The Autobahn’s Early Developments and Results

To spur motorization and rationalize the Autobahn’s construction, the Nazis vainly sought to mass produce vehicles. In one of his first speeches as chancellor, Adolf Hitler highlighted the need for German motorization. “In the past,” he said, “one attempted to measure a people’s standard of living in terms of track kilometers; in the future, road kilometers for motorized traffic will replace this yardstick.” Fritz Todt, the leading figure and inspector general for the Autobahn, echoed Hitler’s sentiment in 1937, declaring, “in Nordic countries, the increase in the number of automobiles is contingent on the standard of living and income of the Volk.”

In an effort to supplement the Autobahn, Hitler announced the production of the “people’s car,” which was later popularized as the “Strength through Joy car,” in 1934. After a series of delays, production finally began in 1938. The Nazis peddled the development as a major feat – but despite all of this veiling fanfare, the project was an immense failure. As Zeller concluded, aside from military manufacturing, cars were “never produced in appreciable numbers” during the Nazi regime. Given the lack of automobile production, Autobahn construction had further pressure to serve as the strong, lasting symbol of Nazi command over technology. The Autobahn – and importantly, its aesthetic – needed to divert attention away from the dearth of auto manufacturing.

The Autobahn project also reflected the Nazis’ concern with “correcting” existing roadways and the traditional railway system, as well as creating a national monument. German writer and Nazi official Wilfrid Bade commended Hitler’s foresight on road building when he wrote, “[Hitler] also recognized that a radical break
had to occur with the idea that existing roads were sufficient for traffic, that the automobile would require roads built specifically to allow the technology to develop to its fullest potential in terms of horsepower and speed.”

While existing roads were deemed inadequate, Todt provided a scathing critique of the rail system: “I’m very concerned that various routes … do not give the impression of being artificial stretches, as is the case with railroad tracks. On the contrary, people should feel that they are being connected with nature.” Todt and landscape architects deemed the railway to be, according to Schivelbusch, “the main destroyer of the ‘organic’ landscape.” The Autobahn, on the other hand, followed the lead of American parkways, the four-lane roads built for leisure driving. The American parkways utilized sweeping roads, blended into the land, and followed scenic paths, which enhanced the driving experience. The Autobahn seemingly achieved these ends, too. However, as Schivelbusch noted, there was one essential difference: The Autobahn also served as a national monument. The roadway itself was meant to stand out and to be admired; it was not to remain sheepishly hidden.

While supporters credited the Nazi regime for the Autobahn’s realization, significant groundwork for the project was already in place by 1933. Roadway enthusiasts had tried endlessly – and often unsuccessfully – to make strides during the Weimar Republic. Rollins wrote, “The basic route map and many detailed technical specifications were in place by about 1930.” In fact, the Autobahn project actually started in 1926, with the construction of one highway connecting Hamburg, Frankfurt, and Basel. The Nazis only needed to overcome two obstacles to open the floodgate to highway construction: find funding and surmount “the opposition of the German Railways fearing for their livelihood.” The Nazis’ totalitarianism quickly dispelled the latter concern, and they primarily allocated funding to the Autobahn project through savings in unemployment insurance. Considering there were only 2 million private automobiles in 1935, the expansive project was equally expensive – the government expected to spend 600,000 reichsmarks
per kilometer (though the cost quickly rose to 900,000). Nonetheless, construction began shortly after the Nazis took power in 1933.

Although the Autobahn grew at an admirable rate during the first years of construction, the project ultimately went unfinished during the Nazi era. The first finished segment, connecting Frankfurt and Darmstadt, opened to the public in May 1935. With pressure from the Nazi regime due to the Autobahn’s propaganda potential – coupled with little concern for initial funding – planners efficiently erected roadways from 1935 to 1938. However, by the time the war started in 1939, the Autobahn’s development slowed dramatically. From 1935 through 1938, planners completed roughly 3,000 kilometers of the Autobahn. From 1939 to 1941 (when the Nazis suspended all construction due to dwindling resources), they erected fewer than 800 kilometers. Even Hitler noticed the development slowing down toward the end of 1938. Gerhard Engel, a military leader, documented an encounter with Hitler in his diary, writing, “[Hitler] told me he thought the expansion of the Autobahn was proceeding too slowly for his tastes but there was no way to accelerate the process without neglecting the steel and armaments industries.”

The Autobahn’s slow development right before the war – and eventual deferment – rendered the project incomplete; the initial goal of 7,000 kilometers remained elusive. Despite being initial priorities, neither motorization nor the Autobahn ever came to fruition under the Nazis.

Mobilization and Economic Myths in Autobahn Planning

The Nazi regime, as well as some past historians, largely exaggerated the Autobahn project’s practical motives for mobilization, job creation, and economic growth. During and shortly after the war, some academics settled on a simplistic interpretation in which the Nazis eagerly picked up Autobahn planning to aid military mobilization. However, addressing this mobilization myth, popular historian Wolfgang Schivelbusch wrote, “In the past thirty years, as approaches to National Socialism have become more differentiated, a multidimensional picture of the Autobahn project has emerged.”
In reality, much of the delicate planning for the Autobahn was already in the works prior to Nazis’ ascension to power. Further, the unfinished Autobahn was scarcely of help in mobilization efforts. Uwe Oster, deputy chief editor of the history publication Damals, broached this topic: “Using the still connected network for concentrating troops was only a limited option, especially as the motorways were much too far from the fronts, and major troop units continued to be moved by train.”26 Indeed, if the Nazis were to have built the Autobahn simply for military mobilization, it would have made more sense to build roadways straight through Germany, erecting the most efficient routes from point A to point B. Rather, the Nazis needed the Autobahn to be a technological marvel – a triumphant display of German innovation and mastery. Hence, scholarly considerations for other motives have now superseded that of mobilization.

Although Nazi propaganda celebrated the Autobahn’s potential to boost the economy and alleviate unemployment, these motives were also fleeting. In a blatant piece of propaganda published in 1938, Wilfred Bade, the German writer and Nazi official, commended Hitler for identifying motorization and road building as cogs for economic growth:

> But it was not just the tremendous economic potential of motorization that he recognized as essential to guaranteeing Germany’s future in transportation and in competitiveness, he also understood that it would provide effective relief in the fight against unemployment … 27

Yet, the Autobahn project did little to influence unemployment. Todt initially sought an Autobahn workforce of 600,000 people, but employment numbers never surpassed the high of 124,483 workers in 1936.28 In reality, the economy and employment numbers were already growing; although the Autobahn project certainly did not hurt those efforts, there is little evidence to suggest it drastically helped. Zeller concluded that while “Nazi propaganda stressed the
largely overblown effects of road building on the labor market,”
the belief that the Autobahn project mitigated unemployment is
unfounded. With such little economic impact and so few private
automobiles available, it is reasonable to question why the Nazi
regime supported the project until 1941. The answer lies in the
project’s permeating aesthetic appeal.

The Ubiquitous Role of Aesthetics within the Autobahn Project

The aesthetic of the Autobahn – which ranged from its status as
a symbol of technology, application of landscape enhancement ide-
ology, and tourist promotion – was the primary focus for all parties
involved with the project. Civil engineers and landscape architects
were eager to implement their respective views of the aesthetic,
which were rooted in their educational backgrounds. Meanwhile,
Nazi officials saw the Autobahn as a unique visual propaganda tool
and opportunity to display Germany’s technological power. Histori-
an George L. Mosse offered a convincing argument that the aesthet-
ic was deeply rooted in the civil religion of German fascism. This
civic religion, Mosse defined, was “a non-traditional faith which
used liturgy symbols to make its belief come alive.” Although the
Autobahn project was not a fascist invention, the technological and
visual marvel of such an expansive system served as a powerful
symbol for the fascist civic religion.

The Nazi regime was eager to boast about the technological
achievements – and by extension, the aesthetic – of the Autobahn
project. One such accomplishment was connecting previously seg-
mented parts of Germany – the very centralization, as Nazis were
quick to point out, that the Weimar Republic lacked. The Autobahn,
Schivelbusch wrote, “could thus be seen as the concrete equivalent
of a national power grid, a new type of monumentalism whose na-
tional scope dwarfed that of regional projects like the [Italian] Agro
Pontino, and even the [American] TVA.” The impressive scale of
the project alone served as an aesthetic. The roadways, Todt wrote,
“are not smoothly spic and span, not ‘beautiful’ in the current sense
of the term, but willful and definite, if need be, even passionately
moved.” Planners like Todt believed the sprawling concrete roads themselves would strike passersby with nothing short of awe.

Unsurprisingly, sensationalist rhetoric and overt racialization followed Autobahn achievements. In 1939, Todt described the profoundness of the Autobahn:

Motorways can … be built by any nation, but that we should have been the first to span our fatherland with these ribbons of light, and that they are looked upon and felt by everyone in the nation as being throughout a work of National Socialism, is no mere chance.

Todt’s glorification of the project increasingly merged with Nazi rhetoric, as one can see with his inference that the Autobahn was a product of Nazism. Other planners did not necessarily share Todt’s belief in the Autobahn’s bond with National Socialism. Nevertheless, Todt – a member of the NSDAP as far back as 1922 – was the unquestionable leading authority on the project. He went as far as to advertise motorization as a Nordic technology, claiming that the “pioneers in transportation” all “hail[ed] from Nordic societies” due to the “genetic propensity and predisposition” of the Nordic man. Todt extended this racialization even further, stating, “The number of people who own automobiles will be substantially greater amongst Nordic people than it is in territories inhabited by other races.” He saw the Autobahn as a distinctly German monument that not only the German people, but the whole world should revere.

The shared ideology of landscape enhancement indicated a deep concern for aesthetics among all factions of Autobahn planners. The notion of a uniquely German landscape – along with the absence of a “wilderness” perspective of nature – existed in Germany prior to the Nazi regime. However, landscape-enhancement ideologies were able to thrive under a culture of Nazi racialization. Even leading landscape architect Alwin Seifert – often deemed the most environmental of any Autobahn planner – strongly abided
by the ideology of landscape enhancement. “From the very begin-
ing,” historian Karl Ditt concluded, “the ideological concerns of
landscape-enhancement enthusiasts were aesthetic. They regarded
cultivated land as a garden to be made ‘beautiful’ and as ‘orderly’
as possible.”38 Indeed, one can extend this classification to Seifert,
whose fascination with redesigning the landscape was grounded
more in aesthetics than ecological concerns. Seifert believed he was
fit to “heal” ugly landscapes.39 Unlike some conservationists, Seifert
had little interest in protecting land from external intrusion.40 As a
result, his profound interest in connecting nature with technology
made him, in part, compatible with Todt.

For planners, the connection between nature and technology
served as an aesthetic in itself. As Todt phrased it, the Autobahn
was to be the “crown of the surrounding landscape.”41 Even highly
promoted sweeping curves, according to Schivelbusch, were aes-
thetic creations: “[They] were not discreetly hidden – on the con-
trary, they represented a dance performed in concrete.”42 Although
aspects of the Autobahn may appear like efforts in conservation
today, such as its sweeping curves and blending into the landscape,
the planners’ original motivations were grounded in conservation.

To further showcase the aesthetic intersection of nature and
technology, planners attempted to leverage tourism and explo-
roration. Historian Richard Vahrenkamp argued that the “hidden
goal” of Autobahn construction was political propaganda, with
encouragement of travel serving as the main advocate.43 These were
tied together so closely, in fact, that the Ministry of Propaganda
housed Germany’s travel organization.44 Todt, who saw exploration
as an inherently Nordic trait, was one of the leading promoters.
He claimed the Autobahn was an outlet for the average German to
explore previously inaccessible places:

Not everyone can be a Viking … but the automobile puts
even the ‘little man,’ whose genetic inheritance and desti-
ny were insufficient to make a bold conqueror, in a posi-
tion to embark on his own private adventure in explora-
According to Todt, planners accommodated exploration by placing roadside parking and nearby benches in panoramic areas. He wrote, “Mountain range, forest, bush, pastures, hills, lakes draw into view, fall away, call and beckon to the voyager to stop, to stay awhile, to rest and think.” Todt even recommended that travelers set up picnics on the grass right around the Autobahn. Even if motorists did not want to leave the roadways, planners counted “motor touring” – simply driving and observing – as genuine exploration. However, few Germans owned automobiles. Aside from holidays, leisure travel was insignificant during the Nazi regime. In theory, Todt’s call for unprecedented exploration was appealing; in reality, the lack of private motorists in Germany left the roadways largely desolate.

Considerations for Conservation

A central question for modern historians is whether some aspects of Autobahn planning were truly conservationist endeavors. Indeed, initiatives like planting indigenous roadside flora and blending the roads into the landscape could be interpreted as part of a avant-garde, “eco-friendly” mission. However, even with these seemingly “green” measures, conservation was never the primary interest in their eventual implementations. Perhaps there is no greater indicator of conservation’s limited role in Autobahn planning than the roadwork exemption in the Reich Nature Protection Law of 1935.

From its conception, the Nature Protection Law was far more considerate of conservationists in theory than in practice. According to Ditt, the law was supposed to give conservation groups “the right to put conservation orders on cultivated landscapes” and the power to veto landscape alteration decisions. In reality, the institutional power of conservationists was severely limited. When conservationists were contacted, it was often a token act that took place after plans were finalized. Regardless, industrial interests regularly
trumped attempts of conservation.\textsuperscript{50} Indeed, within the realm of the Autobahn, Todt ensured road building was exempt from the Nature Protection Law. In a familiar power move, Todt’s office announced two decrees: the “Decree on Road Building in the Open Landscape” and the “Decree on Protective Forests along the Reichsautobahnen” in 1936 and 1937, respectively.\textsuperscript{51} These effectively excluded conservationists from having direct influence on Autobahn planning. Walther Schoenichen, a disillusioned German conservationist at the time, astutely pointed that Todt simply wanted to “free himself as best he [could] from the regulations of the Nature Protection Law” and “reserve [decisions] as much as possible for himself and staff.”\textsuperscript{52} In addition to inevitable clashes between civil engineers and conservationists, landscape architects also sparred with regional conservationists.

A major rift between landscape architects and regional conservationists emerged in 1939 over an ideological battle at Siebengebirge, a mountainous area within the Rhine. The Landscape Advocates, an architect group consisting of Seifert and fifteen of his handpicked peers, viewed the area as in need of enhancement. This was in opposition to what they perceived as the conservationists’ defense of “outdated” nature.\textsuperscript{53} The major debate at the Siebengebirge revolved around the placement of an Autobahn bridge – which Rhineland conservationists wanted built well north of the mountains, so the subsequent roadway would not disrupt the area.\textsuperscript{54} However, Seifert found the proposed northern route to be visually less appealing from the perspective of an Autobahn passenger. As documented by historian Thomas Lekan, Seifert was less concerned about the aesthetics of the actual region – or any other disturbances – and more fixated on the aesthetics from a driver’s perspective.\textsuperscript{55} While the northern route would have traversed a relatively dull landscape, Seifert planned the southern route to showcase “the Rhine silhouetted by the seven peaks of the Siebengebirge,” according to Lekan.\textsuperscript{56} The preferred aesthetic of the landscape architects simply trumped the wishes of local conservationists. Furthermore, Seifert argued that the area was unnatural anyway, as it did not
contain native flora – which, he believed, invalidated decades of conservationist work put into the Siebengebirge. This secondary argument of naturalization quickly became one of Seifert’s fascinations.

In an effort to retain legitimacy, landscape architects turned their primary focus from meandering roads to nationalism and roadside planting. Seifert used the emergence of plant sociology as justification for bringing back natural flora to the landscape. According to Zeller, “Seifert declared that on the open landscape of the [A]utobahn native plants were absolutely necessary. No ‘non-German’ tree or shrub was allowed to be planted.” Part of the process was to determine which plants would have been present in the areas around the Autobahn if there were no human interference – things, Seifert argued, like pears, cherries, and hazel shrubs. At its face, introducing sustainable indigenous plants around Autobahn roadways seemed like a legitimate environmental conservation effort. However, Seifert’s motive was laced with nationalism and xenophobia. Zeller wrote, “Reintroducing native plants to the landscapes around the autobahn, [Landscape Advocates] argued, was a national task which would enable Germans to rejuvenate themselves as a race based on a healthy soil.” Seifert was not afraid to discuss the overlap of Fascist ideology and native planting. He eagerly noted that “right next to the greatest technical work of all times, the most original landscape will have its home again.” Todt, however, was skeptical about the benefits of a mass reintroduction of native plants. He became frustrated with the cost of extensive flora, as well as what he perceived as unnecessary cluttering of the landscape. Todt preferred open spaces – arguing that only 10 to 20 percent of the land alongside the roadway needed plants – and instituted regulations on the amount of roadside planting. Although he tolerated Seifert’s initiative, it was only under the belief that altering patterns of flora enhanced driving experience. In short, for both Seifert and Todt, native planting was not a conscious effort in conservation – it was an aesthetic. Lekan concluded, “While such landscape-sensitive planning and restorative measures
[like planting native flora] undoubtedly unenhanced the aesthetic appeal of the Autobahns, historians continue to debate their overall ecological benefit." The issue of native planting demonstrates the importance of analyzing not only the results, but also the thought processes behind Autobahn planning decisions.

The shaping of Autobahn roadways also became a contentious debate among civil engineers and landscape architects, with the aesthetic again overriding concerns for conservation. Despite heavy propaganda, sweeping roadways were rare during the first years of construction. Todt did claim that blending the roadways into the landscape was an essential aspect of the project. "The railway has mostly been an alien element in the landscape," Todt noted. "A motorway, however, is and will be a street, and streets are an integral part of the landscape. German landscape is full of character. Therefore, the motorways must assume a German character." In those words, one can sense Todt's notion of the aesthetic – that roadways, if built correctly, are an aesthetic. Thus, Todt commissioned Seifert and the Landscape Advocates to work on the Autobahn. When push came to shove, however, Todt and his civil engineers evaded curving roads until the late 1930s.

Although Todt considered blending roadways into the landscape, he allowed engineers to build straight roads with quick curves during early Autobahn construction. "Since Todt had the power to define what constituted an appropriate roadway," Zeller wrote, "alignment of the early [A]utobahn consisted of straight stretches sewn together with short bends." Lengthy straight roadways aided the Autobahn's quick early construction – even if it meant little consideration for nearby animals and wiping out unique landscapes. Construction also featured careless rock blasting methods to clear land. While Seifert ignored those practices, he lambasted straight roadways – but only in concern for the aesthetic. He wrote, "The straight line is of cosmic origin. It is not from this earth and is not found in nature. No living thing can move itself forward in a straight line." Seifert believed drivers could only view wonders of the landscape by following its natural route. Af-
ter several years, the Landscape Advocates finally convinced Todt to embrace sweeping roads—though it was not due to converging ideology. Instead, Todt and his civil engineers started to calculate cost and safety as redeeming factors of the sweeping design. Zeller wrote, “Compared to the aesthetic qualities so vividly described by the [Landscape Advocates], however, the road-building administration was much more impressed with the cost-saving effects of roads [that] called for fewer bridges and less costly digging.” Additionally, the engineers realized that curves functioned as a stimulant of alertness while driving. Conservation, meanwhile, never served as a driving force behind the implementation of sweeping roads.

**Conclusion**

It is interesting to consider whose aesthetic the Autobahn actually embodied during the Nazi regime. Nazis were eager to resurrect the project due to Germany’s need for motorization, as well as the Autobahn’s potential as a propaganda tool. They used it as a showpiece for German technological superiority; certainly, no previous motorway project surpassed the Autobahn’s ambitions and extensiveness. Its ability to stand as a symbol of strength allowed the project to continue into the war—even when it served little practical purpose. Yet, as a whole, the Autobahn came to encompass the civil engineers’ aesthetic. With Todt at the helm, Autobahn planning worked through the authoritative lens of the civil engineers. Strikingly, Zeller concluded that “the Nazi regime’s total expenses for the landscape friendliness [and the Landscape Advocates] of the [A]utobahn amounted to 800 reichsmark per kilometer in 1937,” which worked out to “exactly 0.08 percent of the overall costs.” Thus, the Autobahn became what the engineers wanted it to be. Unlike landscape architects, who believed the roads should follow and blend into the landscape, the civil engineers thought roadways should be revered—not hidden. After a few years of construction, the Autobahn did start to reflect the landscape architects’ aesthetic with its sweeping roads and native roadside flora, though only when civil engineers deemed it legitimate. Todt and
the engineers embraced sweeping roads only when they saw it as a safety measure. They reluctantly allowed native roadside planting – but it was only under the assumption that it enhanced the driving experience.

Even when engineers did recognize the importance of the view from the road, like the roadside flora, their vision of what the landscape should look like never overlapped with that of the architects. To this end, Zeller wrote, “Whereas the landscape architects stressed an emotional approach to understanding and reading landscapes and roadway design, the engineers promoted a landscape driving experience that was modern only at first glance.”

Furthermore, while holding the misleading title of “Landscape Advocates,” Autobahn architects were more concerned with a traveler’s view of the landscape than actual land conservation – as played out in the Siebengebirge. Even if Seifert and his architects were to have been interested in legitimate conservation, they would have had little sway power to ensure protection.

When some historians, such as Bramwell, argued that a “green” movement existed within the Nazi regime, Zeller was one of the academics who wisely pushed back. Zeller wrote, “It is time to abandon the myth of an exemplary reconciliation of nature and technology in the Autobahn project.” Indeed, the Autobahn was never an endeavor in legitimate conservation. Yet, it seems pertinent to add that the aesthetic – through symbolisms of power and technological mastery, profound and vast roadways, and the molding of a perfectly cultivated “German” landscape – was the overwhelming motive in Nazi Autobahn planning.

Endnotes
7. Rabinbach and Gilman, 669.
13. Ibid., 177-8.
14. Rollins, 496.
15. Rabinbach and Gilman, 670.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid; Rabinbach and Gilman, 670.
22. Ibid.
27. Bade in Rabinbach and Gilman, 672
28. Oster, 41.
29. Zeller in Nye, 220.
31. Schivelbusch, 173.
33. Ibid, 679
36. Ibid, 674.
40. Ibid, 150.
41. Todt, as cited in Zeller in Nye, 229.
42. Schivelbusch, 178.
44. Ibid.
45. Todt, “Nordic Man and Transportation,” in Rabinbach and Gilman, 674.
47. Vahrenkamp, 25.
48. Ibid.
49. Ditt, 161, 172.
50. Ibid, 178.
52. Schoenichen, as cited in Zeller, 116.
54. Lekan, 396.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid, 397.
57. Ibid.
58. Zeller in Nye, 228.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Lekan, 395.
66. Todt, as cited in Zeller in Nye, 224.
68. Zeller, 131.
70. Ibid, 231-2.
71. Seifert, as cited in Zeller in Nye, 225.
73. Zeller in Nye, 226.
74. Ibid.
75. Zeller in Nye, 230
77. Zeller, as cited in Uekoetter, 79-80.
Bowling Lanes and Assembly Lines: Bowling and Economic Development in 21st Century Milwaukee

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Today, “bowling” conjures up images of tackily decorated alleys, the smell of cigarette smoke, the taste of cheap beer and greasy pizza. Perhaps with the exceptions of the 1996 Farrelly Brothers film, *Kingpin*, or the now cult classic 1998 Cohen Brothers film *The Big Lebowski*, the sport has not, in recent decades, inspired large crowds or mass enthusiasm. This was not always the case. Though bowling today is relegated to the occasional weekend entertainment or odd date night, it has only been on the decline in the recreational spotlight since the 1970s.

As historians like Doug Schmidt have shown, in cities like Milwaukee the meager place of bowling in the twenty-first century masks the fact that it was one of the most important urban recreational institutions for much of the 1900s. Bowling’s more recent marginalization in American culture by mirrored in the dearth of scholarly work concerning the historical significance of the game. This is the case in Midwestern cities like Milwaukee, where by mid-century bowling gained widespread popularity within working-class communities. Schmidt emphasizes the importance of European heritage and its diffusion through ethnic networks, particularly in German and Polish immigrant populations, in the growth of bowling in Milwaukee. Describing bowling in a national context, Robert Putnam focuses on bowling’s demise, attributing it to the rise of private entertainment, the breakdown of the family, and the deterioration of civic involvement.¹

To label culture as *the* driving force behind bowling’s rise and fall during the twentieth-century is to downplay the importance of national and local economic development. In fact, local business boosterism, industrial expansion, the growth of organized labor, and the opportunistic expansion of the urban entertainment sector played equally—if not more—important roles in the sport’s expansion. These actors even helped bowling carve a cultural niche for the working class, while also influencing such social changes as racial desegregation. Additionally, while the decline in broader civil involvement may have had a significant impact
on bowling’s ultimate demise, the processes of suburbanization and deindustrialization were also key causes of its decline. Using Milwaukee as a case study, this paper draws on papers like *The Milwaukee Journal* and *The Wisconsin CIO News*, and archival evidence from the American Bowling Congress and the Polish American Bowling Association to prove these arguments.

**The Early 1900s: Local business and recreation for the working-class**

Throughout the early years, it is clear that Milwaukee’s manufacturing industry, small business sector, and working class in general provided the framework for bowling to grow into a recreational phenomenon. From the moment German and Polish immigrants brought the game of bowling to Milwaukee in the early 20th century, the sport was directly linked with the city’s tavern and alcohol industry. Before Prohibition was enacted in 1918, brewing and distilling were Milwaukee’s predominant industries. This led to a large proliferation of bars, taverns, and saloons, which were frequented by European immigrants and industrial workers. These taverns became havens for working-class recreations like bowling; majority of pre-WWII Milwaukee taverns contained a handful of bowling lanes. Bowling became synonymous with the alcohol and tavern industry in Milwaukee. This is evidenced by a large number of organized bowling leagues and teams named specifically after taverns or bars, such as Adam’s Tavern, Hart’s Bar, Martin’s Tavern, and Schlitz Brown Bottle, among many others.

According to Doug Schmidt, European immigrants transferred their tavern culture directly to the U.S., and to an extent, bowling came along with it. In emphasizing the ethnic characteristics of tavern culture Schmidt tends to overlook the fact that tavern owners also employed bowling lanes as a way to compete in the local entertainment and recreation industry. As the previous paragraph suggests, tavern-sponsored teams offered taverns with much-desired publicity in a quickly growing city. Moreover, it was Milwaukee’s expanding industrial capacity at the time that provided
a growing base of consumers for tavern owners.

The effect of Prohibition on bowling’s expansion in Milwaukee also suggests that bowling evolved in close concert with changes in the local economy. When the Volstead Act, or Prohibition, was passed in 1918 making the production and distribution of alcohol illegal on a federal level, it threw Milwaukee’s alcohol and tavern industry into turmoil. Given the strong link between taverns and bowling, one would expect that it halted the rising popularity of bowling. Indeed, up until the repeal of Prohibition in 1933, taverns closed in large numbers, and over 6,000 brewery workers, who frequented the taverns and bowling lanes around their neighborhoods became unemployed. The number of blue-collar workers thinned.

Nevertheless, bowling not only survived Prohibition, but expanded in popularity as Prohibition forced bowling to adapt and reshape its popular image. Without vital support from taverns, bowling proprietors during Prohibition sought to abandon the delinquent image that bowling acquired through being associated with taverns. As a result, the Prohibition era saw a rise in the number of venues exclusively dedicated to bowling such as alleys and arcades.

Some of these establishments, like Langtry-McBride Alleys, became bowling Meccas in the 1920s. Establishments were often named for the proprietor such as Hayer Recreations, Smith Arcades, and Baker Recreations. This strategy of appealing to the working-class family was successful, as participation in organized bowling rose each year in the 1920s, with national participation in league bowling rising from 1,000 participants in 1920 to 5000 participants in 1930. According to the Milwaukee Journal, the Wisconsin Bowling Association’s 1926 state tournament, which was held at Olympic Alleys in Milwaukee, expected a record turnout of between 1,400-1,500 participants. Also, by 1935, Milwaukee had 200 ABC sanctioned leagues, which was the highest per capita in America. The new shape and growth of bowling in the 1920s thus had less to do with the operation of ethnic networks and more to
do with the work of opportunistic entertainment entrepreneurs. These local businessmen crafted bowling to appeal to a wide base of customers that included families and the middle-class. Prohibition gave bowling the opportunity to be transformed into a more respectable form of recreation.

The years immediately following Prohibition saw even more industry involvement in bowling as the large revived breweries aimed to re-associate themselves with the sport. Cognizant of the fact that bowling emerged out of the Prohibition era with a clean image, post-Prohibition Milwaukee breweries like Blatz, Pabst, and Schlitz sought to establish a more respectable image for their products as well. They accomplished this by becoming bowling sponsors and boosters. Sponsorship often took the form of funding the travels and daily expenses of specific teams in exchange for the team being named after the brewery. For instance, one of the more successful Milwaukee bowling teams before the end of WWII went by the name of “Pabst All-Stars.” To the brewing industry, bowling rose above mere recreation.

The wealthy individuals who owned these factories played a significant role in boosting the sport, while also attempting to use bowling as a way to foster better work relations. The men that led the behemoth Milwaukee brewing industry such as Friedrich Pabst, and the Uihlein brothers supported bowling and made it more accessible to the public. These two industry leaders built large and expensive recreational centers for the public in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and both included bowling lanes. While due attention must be paid to the men’s German heritage, the ability to create such large facilities and subsequently provide bowling for the public, was only possible due to their brewery wealth.

Large breweries and taverns also put on tournaments, and covered bowling alleys with their advertisements. These efforts helped breweries recover from their demonized image during Prohibition, while also providing the financial means for bowling and bowling alleys to expand their appeal and popularity. Teams like the Pabst All-Stars reached celebrity-like status and drew fans
to the sport. The numbers of casual and organized bowling leagues continued to rise in Milwaukee and nation-wide.\textsuperscript{12} Ironically, while the temporary demise of the brewery industry during Prohibition led to the sanitization of bowling’s image, the resurgence of brewing turned the sport into an even more popular and more commercialized form of recreation for the public.

Still, the tavern industry was not the only part of Milwaukee’s economy that influenced bowling. Some major factories in the city belonged to manufacturing titans like Allis-Chalmers, Maynard Steel, and Briggs & Stratton.\textsuperscript{13} Geographically, the wards and neighborhoods where these factories existed contained many venues for bowling. The working-class employees of these factories were not all of European descent, and even as the percentage of European immigrants in Milwaukee dropped from 31% in 1900 to 14% by 1940, bowling participation in the aforementioned wards grew.\textsuperscript{14} Heavy industry in Milwaukee provided a concentration of working-class individuals that turned to bowling for recreation.

Similarly, industry giants like Julius Heil, from the Heil Electric Company, and Charles Maynard, from Maynard Steel, both became important actors in the history of bowling boosterism. Both men backed successful bowling teams that adopted their name. In the case of Heil’s bowling team, five of the members would go on to be inducted into the National Bowling Hall of Fame.\textsuperscript{15} Industry giants brought bowling to the city’s attention, and this was especially the case when bowling matches involving the Heil or Maynard Steel teams were placed on the first sports page of the \textit{Milwaukee Journal}.\textsuperscript{16} Heavy industry not only provided a population for bowling, but it also helped to publicize the sport to the public.

At the same time, smaller local industrialists were attempting to popularize the sport. For instance, Abe Langtry, the man responsible for bringing the American Bowling Congress (ABC) headquarters to Milwaukee, was a business-oriented proprietor. Langtry initially worked as a salesman for the Northwestern Fuel Co., before becoming Milwaukee’s largest bowling proprietor and the games professional figurehead.\textsuperscript{17} Ultimately, the working-class
employees of these industry moguls provided a base of support for bowling, but the actions of wealthy individuals helped to provide sponsorship and space that was widely accessible and respected.

The professionalization of bowling that the ABC brought to Milwaukee helped to foster a surge in organized bowling leagues and tournaments, and by 1924, nearly 17% of the population of Milwaukee was involved in bowling. Small business leaders throughout Milwaukee also backed tournaments and headed leagues. For instance, local proprietors A.L Wirtz and Terry Harpke headed the High Life Bowling League in 1910. This trend also continued later into the prewar period with the rise of bowling alleys, recreation centers, and arcades. The people behind the organization of Milwaukee bowling all had business-related motives.

Even ethnic organizations like the Polish American Bowling Association relied on small business. The Polish American Bowling Association (PABA) was an organization that required proof of Polish heritage in order to bowl in tournaments or to acquire membership. Therefore, the PABA is an example of European ethnicity inciting bowling within the city. Yet, as the organization's records showed, a common heritage was not enough to guarantee high levels of participation, and instead, PABA often appealed to the local business community to be boosters, sponsor or put together teams. For instance, a 1930 letter from PABA's treasurer, John Schultz, to local businesses in Milwaukee implored businesses to yield teams for the Third Annual Polish American Bowling Association National Tournament. Schultz stated that PABA needed about 100 more teams, and that he wanted “each and every business man in the Polish communities to enter a team or two.” Thus, the tournament could not have succeeded if it were not for an ample population of local businesses and their employees.

This dependency was a consistent trend in PABA's history. Meeting minutes in 1927 conveyed that the organization's main mode of advertising was posting fliers on local businesses’ windows, and continued into the 1940s where records state that
a majority of active teams were business booster teams such as Interstate Sporting Goods, Ogden Pharmacy, and the Maternowski Builders. Overall, the PABA’s relationship with the business community is a microcosm of the bowling-business connection in Milwaukee during the prewar period. When alleys, taverns, or arcades were not near a large factory, non-ethnicity related leagues and ABC sanctioned events similarly relied on business booster teams. Announcements in the Milwaukee Journal for the beginning of league season for the South Side Business league appeared as early as 1910. Ultimately, cultural heritage was not enough to sustain the popularity of bowling in Milwaukee. Local businesses supplied participants and funding, while also advertising the sport.

In the early 1900s, bowling began its popular rise in Milwaukee with backing from industry, business, and the working-class. This intimate and local connection would evolve beginning in the New Deal Era, when bowling would become a nation-wide phenomenon.

**The New Deal and Beyond: Labor, the bowling boom, and deindustrialization**

Bowling became a national sensation in the mid twentieth century, and the sport became ever more commercialized and wedded to economic development. Despite WWII, bowling remained prominent in Milwaukee thanks to working-class women and older working-class men. Organized labor also came to become a large supporter of the game and its eventual racial desegregation. Thus, bowling became a symbol for social change. By the late twentieth century, deindustrialization gradually eroded bowling’s working-class base and popularity. These years emphasize how bowling both rose and fell in conjunction with economic development.

Beginning in the New Deal years before WWII, organized labor became a large and influential supporter of bowling. Government-supported unions fostered participation by encouraging union teams and leagues, in an effort to boost employee solidarity. One
prominent organized labor conglomerate in Milwaukee was the CIO, or Committee of Industrial Organizations. Originally formed as an alternative to the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1936, and forming officially in Milwaukee in 1937, the CIO contained delegates and members from over 58 smaller industrial unions. By the end of WWII, CIO, United Automobile Workers (UAW), and AFL unions represented over 125,000 working-class citizens in Milwaukee. Organized labor was a significant part of life for working-class citizens to say the least.

Recognizing the importance of the sport to its members, the CIO held bowling in high regard, even in the organization’s early years. The CIO put out a publication dedicated to recent CIO happenings entitled *The Wisconsin CIO News*, which was published in Milwaukee. As early as 1938, the publication covered recreational programs that the organization helped to sponsor and create. In the April, 1938 edition, the *CIO News* reported on the start of the CIO league bowling season, along with mentioning how the local Milwaukee Allis-Chalmers factory union group would head the Wisconsin CIO “summer recreation program,” which included fielding bowling teams and organizing union-specific bowling leagues. In addition, separate from the ABC, the Wisconsin CIO began to hold an annual bowling tournament in the late 1930s, which often saw high numbers of participants and large rewards. These tournaments continued throughout the war years and into the postwar period. Therefore, organized labor not only reinforced the existing trend of working-class participation in bowling, but the CIO especially intensified the fervor surrounding the sport. By embracing the city’s love for bowling, the CIO was able not only to foster a closer relationship and garner loyalty from its members, but also boost the participation of the sport by encouraging the creation of more teams and leagues.

Before the CIO’s positive impact on race relations and bowling can be explained, it is important to note that Milwaukee’s bowling population was diverse in the prewar and postwar years. Furthermore, Milwaukee did have many non-white and non-
European bowlers. One of the most famous non-white bowling teams on Milwaukee’s south side were the African-American Bronzeville Bombers, named for a predominantly black sector of Milwaukee. African-American bowling teams and leagues did exist, but they were often organized independently or through a local YMCA, and the teams were forced to use segregated facilities and organizations such as the National Negro Bowling Association. In addition, there are photographs of Hispanic bowling teams in working-class neighborhoods, which often were organized around a local Church or tavern. Also, the CIO News reported about Chinese bowlers fighting against discriminatory practices in the 1940s. Finally, the Milwaukee Journal even noted the existence of the “Indian Bowling League” as early as 1910. These examples suggest that participation in bowling was not regulated to white European immigrants, but crossed racial lines and existed anywhere working-class conditions existed.

Therefore, the most important impact the CIO had on bowling in Milwaukee, was not just that it encouraged participation, but that the organization actively fought for the racial integration of league bowling and tolerance in general. While historians like Schmidt continuously characterize Milwaukee’s working-class by its European heritage, bowling equality within this population was granted through the joint efforts of organized labor and non-white, non-European citizens. Milwaukee’s professional bowling circuit was segregated until 1950, because the ABC had it written in its rules that African-Americans or any other non-white race could not participate in any of its sanctioned events. This effectively excluded the non-white bowling population of Milwaukee from entering the most prolific and important bowling tournaments.

In response, the Wisconsin CIO recognized that its membership was racially diverse, and it wanted to respect the fact that many of its non-white members enjoyed bowling and should have equal access to participation. This stance directly conflicted with the ABC’s stance, and in the late 1940s, the CIO decided to pressure the ABC to desegregate its constitution. In 1946, the Milwaukee CIO
staged its first desegregated and non-ABC sanctioned tournament, which included 75 teams. However, the battle intensified in the 1947 issues of the CIO News. In a January article, entitled “Sports and Democracy,” the CIO stated that it did not support the ABC’s segregation, and that in an effort to prove that “the union was carrying on the fight” for racial equality, the Wisconsin CIO was going to host a large non-ABC affiliated tournament in Milwaukee, in 1947. The tournament would be held on a non-discriminatory basis, with non-white bowling teams competing against white bowling teams, in both the male and female fields. Thus, the ABC was implicitly portrayed as an enemy of working-class solidarity.

Subsequently, in the spring of 1947, the tournament went ahead as planned and was largely attended. When the ABC did not change its policy, the CIO increased its anti-ABC rhetoric and even threatened to “discontinue all union sponsored bowling in the ABC,” unless the policy was changed. As mentioned earlier, unions covered nearly 150,000 working-class citizens in Milwaukee, and the possibility of losing participation of those workers and the money from unions was too much to bear for the ABC. The events in Milwaukee and similar efforts in New York finally forced the ABC to desegregate on a national level in 1950. The Wisconsin CIO’s pressuring of the ABC to desegregate was a historically significant event in the postwar years, and it occurred with the help of white, European working-class citizens, but mostly because of the joint efforts of unions and non-white, non-European bowlers.

Apart from organized labor, bowling in Milwaukee continued to thrive during WWII as industries fielded teams of older players and also actively encouraged women to form teams. The sport’s broad age appeal and ease of accessibility allowed the sport to maintain its base of popular support in Milwaukee even while the city was swept up in WWII. Older bowlers like “Veteran Max Sokol” were still commanding first page sport headlines in the Milwaukee Journal in 1943. Additionally, records in this paper also show that companies like Heil Electric and Husting’s Prints continued to sponsor and foster marquee bowling
matches. However, Milwaukee’s working-class, especially older people not fighting in WWII, also belonged to fraternal inner-city organizations like the Moose and Elks clubs. Right beside bowling scores from industrial or business-related matches are announcements concerning the “Milwaukee Moose Association bowling league” and the “Milwaukee Elks Association bowling league.” Business and fraternal organizations continued to work in tandem to promote bowling.

Notably, bowling’s growth could not have been sustained during the war years without the proliferation of women’s industrial leagues. While women of European descent had been involved in organized league bowling for decades in the Women’s International Bowling Congress (WIBC), ethnic culture was overshadowed by WWII working-class women’s decision to utilize bowling as a form of workplace socialization. As young men volunteered and were drafted to fight overseas, they created openings in vital wartime industrial plants and in their place, women filled the factories, not just in Milwaukee, but everywhere around the nation.

Following the pattern that their male predecessors set before them, industrial women looked to bowling as a form of after-work socialization. Women across Milwaukee participated in factory leagues, and formed teams around their assembly-line jobs and union membership. The number of women participating were so prominent that newspapers had to devote more space to cover women’s league scores than ever before. During the three to four years that America was involved in WWII, bowling in Milwaukee was able to thrive because segments of the working-class like older men and women retained a commitment to the sport.

During the 1950s and 1960s, postwar economic prosperity transformed the prewar inner-city working-class into a new suburban working-class. As families fled to the suburbs around Milwaukee, they brought bowling with them, expanding the scope of the sport’s popularity. Due to postwar indirect welfare measures by the American government, such as the GI Bill, and subsidized home mortgages, many industrial lower-class men who
left for the war were able to come back to subsidized college loans and the ability to own a home.\textsuperscript{43} Granted, these benefits really only extended to white men, but the men and their families that frequented bowling alleys in Milwaukee’s inner-city, moved to new suburbs outside of the city. Milwaukee suburbs like Wauwatosa, West Allis, and Brookfield saw an influx of population during the 1950s and 1960s, and since then, 90\% of Milwaukee metropolitan growth has been suburban growth.\textsuperscript{44}

Suburbanization was a nation-wide trend and it coincided with a surge in bowling’s popularity. In fact, 50\% of all American suburban shopping centers contained a bowling alley by 1960.\textsuperscript{45} In terms of organized league bowling, men’s membership in the ABC climbed from 30,000 in 1950 to 80,000 in 1960. Membership in the Women’s Bowling Congress mirrored this trend, going from 10,000 to 40,000 in that same decade.\textsuperscript{46} Still, bowling was not only limited to professionals. The general public developed a love of bowling, with 20 million Americans stating that they were active in bowling in a 1954 \textit{Sports Illustrated} survey.\textsuperscript{47} Bowling had cemented its appeal among the entire population, and not just the inner-city European immigrants of the early 1900s, and as cities and the working-class expanded outward, so did the popularity of bowling.

One reason why the suburbs became wedded to bowling was that the ABC branded bowling in a way that reflected the new middle-class’ values of wholesomeness and civic duty. Still headquartered in Milwaukee, a 1955 ABC publication entitled “60 Years of Bowling with the ABC,” boasted of its 35,000 registered Church leagues, and it also claimed that bowling deterred “juvenile delinquency.”\textsuperscript{48} In addition, the ABC connected bowling to local business or industry to middle-class values by claiming that bowling “[taught] the lessons of democracy and sportsmanship through upwards of 20,000 business and factory leagues.”\textsuperscript{49}

Similar to the Prohibition era, where bowling was forced to change and clean up its reputation, the rise of the suburbs was an opportunity for bowling to once again reshape its image. This time in order to survive outside of the inner-city alleys and taverns, the
ABC and bowling alleys in Milwaukee and nation-wide co-opted the new middle-class’ American ideals and presented the sport as part of the American dream. As Robert Putnam stated in his work *Bowling Alone*, league bowling became a way for the new middle-class to create new relationships, connections, accumulate social capital, and foster civic participation in new and growing suburban communities.\(^{50}\) Bowling intensified its family-friendly image, with some establishments providing daycare centers and cribs, so the whole suburban family could partake in the recreation.\(^{51}\)

Prior to WWII, bowling was a primarily working class, industrial, and urban-centered sport. Yet, the postwar years saw that same working-class turn into a suburban middle-class which valued American ideals and socialization, which bowling embodied.

Nationally, the suburban bowling boom coincided with the growth of bowling as a big business. With hundreds of thousands of active bowlers in Milwaukee and millions nation-wide, large-scale corporations like Brunswick, which produced bowling accessories like shoes, balls, and apparel, now had a mass market at their disposal.\(^{52}\) In 1960, Brunswick company owner B.E. Bensinger heralded bowling as a “billion dollar industry,” pointing to the combination between accessory sales, league dues, and tournament fees.\(^{53}\) Postwar bowling became a profit-seeking industry in its own right. In publications like *Bowling Magazine*, pages were not just filled with league scores, stories about tournaments and individuals, but they were also filled with advertisements. These included Brunswick-brand bowling balls, “pro grip hand conditioner,” and advertisements from the Milwaukee-based “Bowling Products Group,” that built mechanical pin-setting and ball-return machines.\(^{54}\) Bowling was a thriving commercial industry.

With growth continuing well into the 1970s in Milwaukee, bowling’s popularity depended on local business, industry, and Milwaukee’s working and suburban classes. Bowling became financially self-reliant, with proprietors and accessory companies taking the lead in pushing the sport’s popularity and commercialization. In addition, bowling also commercialized
through the medium of television. In Milwaukee especially, the mass popularity of weekly programs like *Bowling with the Champs*, transformed bowling into a spectacle in addition to a participator’s sport. Complete with commercial breaks, and banner advertisements from Brunswick and others lining the set and bowling alley, programs like *Bowling with the Champs* emphasize how much of a commodity bowling had become by the late 1960s.\(^{55}\)

The industry connection was still strong in the postwar years, but by the 1960s, bowling itself had emerged as a subsector of urban and suburban economies.

To be clear, the traditional connection between big industry, local business, and bowling in Milwaukee did not fade with suburbanization. While the days of the PABA begging local businesses for teams to fill out a tournament roster were gone, Milwaukee’s biggest tournaments still adopted the names of industrial heavyweights and inner-city industrial employees continued to socialize through bowling. As suburbanization began in the early 1950s, local businesses like Victor’s Gaskets of Milwaukee were still creating their own leagues and teams. In the Victor Gasket league, teams were separated by occupation, as the seal aids, shims, corkers, maintenance, gasketeers, and oil seals all had their own teams, each of which competed against fellow employees.\(^{56}\) Victor’s Gaskets employees had their entire relationship to bowling defined by their industrial employment.

This league is one example of a trend of inner-city industry providing a base of support for bowling that began in the prewar years and continued in force through the postwar years and until the late 20\(^{th}\) century. Also, as in the 1920s and 1930s, small businesses continued to have a strong influence on the participation in organized bowling. In 1964, “Milwaukee’s Palm Garden bowling team” was a team of women competing within the Wisconsin Women’s Bowling Association, and their namesake originated from a prominent restaurant in Milwaukee, who was also their sponsor.\(^{57}\) Local Milwaukee industry and business still served as the inner-cities core base of support for bowling after WWII.
Other than tournaments, large companies continued to sponsor televised bowling tournaments and Milwaukee teams. While the Heil Electric Company and Pabst All-Star teams had faded out of existence by the 1970s, new companies took their place. Membership in the ABC and WIBC in Milwaukee actually peaked in 1980, with over 100,000 bowlers belonging to Milwaukee leagues. Companies like Firestone further popularized the sport in this era. As evidenced by coverage in _The Milwaukee Journal_, they sponsored a nationally televised bowling tournament called the “Firestone Tournament of Champions,” that was held in Milwaukee every year. This tournament was widely attended and drew decent television ratings even as late as 1986, over a decade after most of the rest of the country’s fascination with bowling had ended.

Companies also continued to sponsor specific teams, which served as a form of advertising for the company who paid for the uniforms and expenses of the teams. From the photograph collection of Earlene Fuller, a Milwaukee native that was active in the Wisconsin Women’s Bowling Association, it is evident that there was a Coors All-Stars Bowling Team in Milwaukee in 1985, and then revived in 1988 as the Coors Light All-Stars Bowling Team. While more impersonal than the company sponsorship of the prewar years, large industrial sponsors continued to provide a financial basis and commercial support for bowling teams and events that allowed the sport to continue to thrive in greater Milwaukee.

Despite its rise, bowling in Milwaukee was not immune to the larger structural and economic transformation during the late 20th century. Largely due to deindustrialization, the sport’s popularity declined as Milwaukee’s working-class economically suffered and heavy industry became increasingly absent. “Deindustrialization” refers to the nation-wide shift from large-scale industrial manufacturing to a more service-based economy in the 1970s and later, which resulted in the closure or relocation of many factories in the Northeast and Midwest. Bowling saw a noticeable decline in participation and popularity as the industrial working-class
dwindled, despite the constant presence of a European heritage and culture. The effects of deindustrialization and the subsequent economic turbulence hit inner-city Milwaukee employees hard, regardless of heritage. In the late 1970s and 1980s, famous companies like Briggs and Stratton, American Motors, and Schlitz Brewing company either closed their factory doors or downsized by outsourcing job overseas. In 1987, Allis-Chalmers, one of the most active industrial companies involved in organized bowling leagues, declared bankruptcy. Deindustrialization deprived bowling of its typical industrial conduits.

The loss of the industrial presence depleted the active base of bowlers in Milwaukee, by increasing the joblessness rate of the city and financially forcing people out of organized and recreational bowling. From 1970 to 2000, the joblessness rate for all demographic groups in Milwaukee increased, rising from 26.3% to 47.3% for African-Americans, from 16% to 21.4% for Whites, and from 19.6% to 37.3% for Hispanics. On a structural level, the longest standing working-class base of support for bowling in Milwaukee was uprooted from its traditional lifestyle, either due to unemployment or adaptation to the service-based economy. Importantly, the social aspect of the Milwaukee working-class factory, as seen with Victor’s Gaskets, was diminished with every factory closing. Deindustrialization placed new obstacles in between bowling and Milwaukee’s working-class.

The relationship between deindustrialization and the decline of Milwaukee’s bowling scene manifested itself in the closing of local alleys, a drop in participation and popularity. Bowling alleys like Byerly Bowl, which drew most of its participants from the nearby Allis-Chalmers factory in West Allis during the prewar and postwar years, encountered financial troubles in the 1980s as the surrounding factories increasingly laid off workers. In 2000, the owners had to sell. This trend of bowling establishments located near industrial centers closing near the end of the century was rampant throughout the city. Alpine Lanes in west Milwaukee closed in 2000 due to financial troubles. In 1994, northern-
Milwaukee establishment Milshore Bowl, which drew from nearby American Motors and Golden Guernsey Dairy, closed in 1994, with the owners stating, “all the factories were gone and they weren’t being replaced.” The trend did not stop as central’s Zach’s Burleigh Lanes, and the south side’s Celebrity Lanes both closed down in 1994, citing financial difficulties due to a lack of membership. In 1994 alone, Milwaukee lost 114 operating bowling lanes. Overall, the demise of good-paying, unionized factory work meant that bowling had become unaffordable for most inner-city residents. After 1980, participation in bowling began to decline 10% every year. In total, between 1980 and 2005, national membership in bowling leagues fell by over 6 million, and the number of bowlers in Milwaukee leagues fell to 18,200, coinciding with the period of deindustrialization.

Finally, in addition to losing people, places, and money, bowling did not preoccupy the Milwaukee’s public attention like it once had. From the 1920s to the 1960s, bowling often commanded first-page sports headlines in *The Milwaukee Journal*. However, as early as 1974, bowling scores were confined to a small box on the bottom of the sports page, or headlines were relegated to the fourth and last page of sports news. Instead, *The Milwaukee Journal* focused on the Green Bay Packers, Milwaukee Brewers, and the Milwaukee Bucks. Even NASCAR, tennis, and the PGA were placed before bowling scores in 1986. Meanwhile, the city population rich in European heritage and culture focused more large-scale, national sports leagues. People’s ability to participate decreased during deindustrialization. Robert Putnam attributed this to a decline in local voluntary associations. Multiple factors caused fewer people to socialize through bowling. The rise of the working-class and its evolution led to the bowling boom, but the deconstruction of that same class of people caused a rapid decline in the sport’s popularity.

Ultimately, bowling in Milwaukee has not disappeared. Bowling alleys in the area still exist, because bowling has a national legacy of being an integral staple of traditional American recreation. Bowling has left a cultural imprint on Milwaukee and
its inhabitants, regardless of race or ethnicity. Overall, the narrative of bowling helps understand the history of Milwaukee and its ebbs and flows. The modern-day bowling alley in Milwaukee is not an outdated occasional Friday night stop for teenagers or gathering place for out-of-shape middle-aged men, but it is a living relic of the special relationship between Milwaukee’s economic evolution and the everyday citizen, a relationship that allowed a game that a few European immigrants brought over and played to expand into a city and nation-wide phenomenon.

Endnotes
10. Schmidt, *They Came to Bowl*, 74.
12. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
36. Schmidt, *They Came to Bowl*, 151.
38. Ibid.
40. Janik, *A Short History of Wisconsin*, 86
44. Schmidt, *They Came to Bowl*, 210.
49. Ibid.
52. Bosker et al, Bowled Over, 94.
55. Schmidt, They Came to Bowl, 30.
58. Schmidt, They Came to Bowl, 168.
62. Ibid, 151.
63. Ibid, 151.
65. Schmidt, They Came to Bowl, 17.
66. Ibid, 171.
68. Ibid, 207.
70. Putnam, Bowling Alone, 245.
Book Reviews


Erik Larson is the celebrated author of four New York Times bestsellers including *In the Garden of Beasts* and *Devil in the White City* and he has just launched another work of dramatic non-fiction, *Dead Wake: The Last Crossing of the Lusitania*. Larson’s histories contain literary imagery usually reserved in fiction novels, love and war, glamor and tragedy, x. This is a book that begs to be read in a single sitting and, if not for the wealth of details and facts, it could be.

On May 1, 1915, the Lusitania departed the safe, neutral shores of New York bound for Liverpool with a cargo of 1,959 passengers. Only 764 would make it to England. The ship sailed through a war zone; German U-boats waited in the depths of the North Atlantic looking to target Allied ships. William Thomas Turner, the Lusitania’s captain, placed full confidence in the superiority of his “Greyhound” liner and in the usual terms of war which protected civilian ships from attack. Turner did not count on German U-Boat captain Walther Schwieger of the Unterseehoot-20 and his drive to scouge the ocean of any in cohorts with his enemy. The ship, unlike the superior Titanic, sunk in just 18 minutes after a strike from a German torpedo.

In the secretive Room 40, British Admiralty had tracked Schwieger’s every communication and could pinpoint him at almost anytime. Room 40 did not share their intelligence on the proximity of the U-boat to the Lusitania with the Cunard passenger liner commanded by Turner. A man who had just escaped from the loss of his wife is soon presented with the news that 128 American citizens on the Lusitania had been killed by a Schwieger torpedo. Woodrow Wilson spent months in mourning and avoiding entering the World War One, but now he had the decision to declare war made for him.

Dead Wake presents the glamor of the Lusitania voyage against a backdrop of international warfare. With every chapter, character,
and mile Larson explores, the reader is tantalized with the inevitability of tragedy. The authentic passion and personal lives of the passengers grips the reader by presenting them as undeniably human on a ship that is presented as a work of genius and divinity.

Previous works on the sinking of the Lusitania have focused on the event and its aftermath, for example, Diana Preston’s *Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy*. Larson instead focuses most of his writing on the passage of the Lusitania, the missions the German U-Boat captain Walter Schwieger undertook prior to his historic torpedo launch, and the struggles of Present Woodrow Wilson to balance his personal and political lives leading up to America’s entrance into the war. Many have asserted that the second explosion from the sinking could be explained through a conspiracy theory, but Larson avoids this approach. Instead, we are presented with the bare and undeniably true accounts of the liner’s passengers, crew, and world leaders who helped seal its fate.

As in his previous works, Larson’s ability to swing between different sets, such as Room 40 and the Lusitania, is flawless and guides the reader through his tale. Larson presents the blissful ignorance of the passengers of the Lusitania next to the very informed Room 40 and then to the motives of Captain Schwieger in U-Boat 20. The passengers of the Lusitania are brought to life as Larson chooses a select few to highlight. One of these, the profile of Charles Lauriat, a Boston bookseller with a rare copy of a Charles Dickens novel, is so well researched and crafted that one yearns to read a book solely on his adventures.

Erik Larson’s craft in popular narrative nonfiction can engage the senses of readers of any discipline. Those with an interest in World War One politics, maritime, or popular culture would find joy in *Dead Wake*. For readers just learning about the war or who know little about the Lusitania, the book is an excellent and entertaining introduction. It is a book one could mistake for fiction, written with such precise details and vivid language. The facts are presented in such a way that Larson is able to give his analysis and conclusions on their implications to the event without the reader
understanding they are reading a scholarly thesis.

Emily Nelson


Samuel J. Watson's *Peacekeepers and Conquerors: The Army Officer Corps on the American Frontier 1821-1846* is a thoroughly researched and well written companion to his previous work *Jackson's Sword: The Army Officer Corps on the American Frontier 1810-1821*. Both pieces delve deeply into the evolution of the American Officer Corps in the years leading up to the American Civil War. In *Peacekeepers and Conquerors*, Watson argues that the American Officer Corps changed from showing restraint on the battlefield to incorporating restraint in their own ideals of personalized honor. This transformation left it in a fundamentally different position in its affairs dealing with foreign entities, white settlers and its militia counterpart. This transformation was driven by three factors: the professionalization of the officer corps through increases operational autonomy, a shift from missions of conquest on the frontier to peacekeeping operations, and the sheer complexity of social interactions while deployed to the American Frontier.

While somewhat limited to the twenty years of 1821-1846, Watson organizes *Peacekeepers and Conquerors* primarily along chronological lines with occasional digressions into topical discussions that span the entire existence of the American army, hitting on major themes of “responsibility, accountability, subordination, institutional isolation, and operational autonomy” within the development of the Officer Corps. Highlighted by the complexities of the Northwestern and Southeastern Frontiers, Watson’s regional focus links the major themes to the dichotomy between officers deployed, the Native American populaces, and antagonistic white settlers. Watson contends that Officer Corps became frustrated by white settler’s needless violence and because they were forced to
act on behalf of said settlers led to frustration. Watson weaves the Officer Corps’ frustration on the frontier along with their desire to distinguish themselves from the more aggressive frontier militia into a Frederick Jackson Turneresque narrative about the standing American army. Watson argues it is not so much the movement of the army in the direction of restraint and peaceful discourse with Native Americans that motivated the conquerors to become Peacekeepers; rather, circumstance of the frontier’s complexity was the driving factor.

Through numerous examples during the Black Hawk War of 1832, The Second Seminole War of 1836-1842, and the Mexican American War, Watson depicts the American Officers as successful in their peacekeeping role. Relying on accounts of paternal sympathy, romantic ideals, and sheer frustration with excesses in white democracy, Watson declares the American Officers to be the best representative of peaceful removal of Native American tribes during this period. While it was the historiographical approach to generally group the militia and American Officers into one singular category, Watson convincingly shows that this is a fallacy. In nearly all conflicts depicted in Peacekeepers and Conquerors there is strong evidence to differentiate the militia’s actions from those of the Officers in nearly all areas of military action. Drawing on interactions with Natives, to logistics, to discipline, Watson shows that in a short time, regular officers made this distinction on purpose and to their benefit, both on a personal and national level.

Watson’s extensive primary research into private papers and records of the American Officer Corps provides the reader an incredibly well documented window into the realities and frustrations faced daily by all those involved. While occasionally prone to longer digressions, Watson makes his points clearly and guides his readers through various stages of his argument. This piece represents a welcome addition to existing scholarship in this area of history making a unique contribution to the study of frontier dichotomy in the early 19th century.

John Wendt
Editor Biographies

Alex Aaron
Alex is a sophomore majoring in History with a focus on early U.S. political history. She hopes to someday attend law school and study constitutional law. She plans on spending her summer doing archival research.

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Serra is a senior majoring in History and Art History. Her studies focus on Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Serra wants to continue her studies in graduate school.

Deanna Endres
Deanna Endres is a junior double majoring in Political Science and History. Her academic focus is American and European history in the 20th century. Deanna also works as a history tutor for high school students in Madison. After graduation in 2016 she hopes to attend graduate school and work towards her dream of becoming a history professor.

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Maren is currently a sophomore double majoring in Geography and History with a focus in U.S. History. Next year, she will be working in the History Department office. She hopes to continue her studies in graduate school for Historic Preservation.
Editor Biographies

Brita Larson
Brita Larson is a graduating senior studying zoology and history. She served as the chief font connoisseur on the ARCHIVE board. Her research interests lie somewhere between the realms of science, history, communications and gender and women’s studies. Before she returns to graduate school, she will spend a semester abroad chasing as many historical locations as possible.

Emily Nelson
Emily is a graduating senior studying history. While at the university, her time has been divided between researching Wisconsin history and working as a tour guide at the Wisconsin Historical Museum. Following graduation, Emily will continue working in the education department at the museum and plans to pursue a career in public history.

Megan Ness
Megan is a graduating senior studying history and anthropology. After graduation, Megan hopes to pursue a career in museum studies before attending graduate school for archaeology. Her research interest lie in childhood archaeology, particularly the ways in which children contribute to society economically.

John Wendt
John is a graduating senior studying history and criminal justice. During his time here, John had the pleasure of working at the UW Archives with the Oral History Program. John has also recently completed his senior honors thesis regarding issues of honor and masculinity in the nineteenth century American office corps. John hopes to pursue these interests further in graduate school.
Cover Photo

**Title:** Barbara Hughes with gorilla skeleton  
**Created By:** Gary Schulz  
**Date:** April 1954  
**Description:** Anthropology student Barbara Hughes poses with ‘Gorgeous George’ the department gorilla.