

ARCHIVE

An Undergraduate Journal of History

Volume 17, May 2014

University of Wisconsin—Madison

Cover Photo

Title: 19th Century Dorm Room

Created by: William Dudley

Date of Subject: May 1899

Description: A student studies in his dorm room at University of Wisconsin-Madison.

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INTRODUCTION

ARTICLES

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The ultimate compilation of *ARCHIVE* would not have been possible without the guidance of Rich Gassen of DoIT. His fluency in InDesign and endless reserves of patience were critical to navigating the arduous final production process.

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The editorial board would have been lost without the wisdom and guidance of our faculty advisor, Professor John Sharpless. He challenged our conception of the historical process and coached us through the countless nuances of editorial work. Professor Sharpless' wealth of experience was indispensible throughout the semester.

We would also like to thank all the students who submitted their papers for consideration. We received an unprecedented number of submissions this year, making the decision process more competitive than in the past, and the journal one of the most impressive displays of student achievements yet.

- *ARCHIVE* Editorial Board 2014

Letter From the Editor

During my years at Wisconsin, tracing through patterns of behaviors and layers of causalities in written memories kept in me in constant search for all the cultures, ideologies, calamities and triumphs we miss as a result of spatial and temporal limitations. For two years, I was fortunate enough to work with editorial boards of history students who not only shared this fascination with the past, but who understood that such a hobby and profession necessitated a flourishing community of participants.

This year, our shared values fueled an effort that yielded an unprecedented number of submissions from students around the country. We were delighted to discover that students across various disciplines shared an appreciation for the value of historical research. The diverse and large volume of submissions we received this year gave us an opportunity to explore narratives across a wide spectrum of space and time. In the editing process, our team of editors worked closely with authors through questioning the veracity of certain sources and soundness of the arguments derived. In many ways, this year's publication is more than a collection of distinguished writings; it is an exhibition of the rich and complex insights gained when communities of people interrogate notions of the past and assist one another in grappling with uncertain but tangible truths.

While editors, authors, and numerous advisors contributed an immeasurable amount of work towards the compilation of this issue, our vision of fostering an active community for historical discourse would not be complete without our readers. In choosing works for publication, we sought original narratives that would enlighten and inspire further discourse. This issue of *ARCHIVE* includes a historical synthesis of global disease ecology and politics that cautions leaders in disease management, and a spirited argument for the ways in which a single hockey game helped sculpt Canada's national identity. We hope in reading these wonderful works, you too will catch our obsession with reimagining the past and find yourself with an insatiable curiosity towards people and places you'll never see, but are eager to know. If and when such inspiration sparks, turn to the last page of the journal for instructions on how to submit your own work for next year's publication. We hope you enjoy the explorations within the following pages as much as we have enjoyed the journey of piecing it together.

- Laura Luo
May 12th, 2014

Forged in Crisis: The Hardening of a Reluctant Union

A case study of Boeing's engineering union during the corporate crisis of 1969-71

Boeing 747 wing fuselage during final assembly

Louis Whitford lives in Seattle with his family. He is currently in his first year in the Master of Fine Arts in Creative Writing Program at Pacific University.

"Engineers shall not actively participate in strikes, picket lines, or other collective coercive action." - NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers, Section III.e (Provision added in 1965)[1]

In early 2000 Boeing engineers and technicians walked off the job. The strike lasted forty days and nights, hardly a strike of biblical proportions in the annals of Boeing's turbulent labor relations. What makes this strike such a phenomenon is that engineers manned[2] the picket line. "No nerds, no birds," read their picket signs. Boeing's engineers, in the longest and largest professional strike in private industry in U.S. history, showed surprising resolve and solidarity. In doing so, they won a contract with everything they asked for from the largest aerospace company in the world and the leading exporter in the United States.[3] National labor leaders trumpeted the strike as a crucial sign of their ability to organize professional workers. A triumphant Charles Bofferding, the Society of Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace (SPEEA) executive director said, "We're interacting now based on power and respect, and that's where we want to be."[4]

Yet up to the minute they turned their computer monitors off, neatly pushed in their chairs, grabbed their jackets and streamed out the doors at 9 AM on February 9th, 2000, virtually no one believed the engineers would follow through on their threats.[5] SPEEA was viewed as weak and had struggled to maintain a majority of the engineers and technical workers at Boeing as members. Aside from a half-hearted one-day strike in 1993, they never openly raised the specter of militancy in over sixty-two years as a registered union. Unlike their counterpart, the machinist's union, which had a history of conflict with management, the engineers and their union were viewed as stable partners. In fact, the ranks of management were filled with engineers and former SPEEA members, including then chairman and CEO Phil Condit.[6]

So why did the engineers strike? In 1999, Boeing profits rose forty-two percent, yet management laid off thousands of workers. The contradiction between mass layoffs and record shareholder winnings generated anger and class-consciousness even among the strike-skittish engineers.[7] The engineers perceived a shift in company strategy and attributed it to Boeing's 1997 merger with McDonnell Douglas, which they felt had shifted the company's focus from engineering excellence to financial results.[8] This led to the engineers feeling excluded from the decision making process. They believed the new workplace culture, with its relentless focus on shareholders, would gut the engineering soul of the company.[9] Financial, pension, and health care considerations mattered too.[10] The final straw came when their blue-collar peers, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), leveraged a relatively better contract in their recent negotiations than the one offered to the engineers and technicians.[11]

It is clear that there were plenty of reasons to take action, but SPEEA's grievances were hardly unprecedented for a labor union.[12] To understand what made this strike so unique one must first answer this question: Why, as engineers, were they unionized and willing to strike in the first place? Surprisingly, given the wide coverage of the strike, SPEEA's transformation in the early 1970's into a full-fledged union with collective bargaining power is mentioned only in passing in both the academic and popular press.[13] The lone work that focuses on SPEEA in this period is a 1972 masters thesis by Bruce Mork, which details the events of 1969 to 1972.[14] The thesis lacks the perspective of history, however, and maintains that, while the union leadership hardened their stance against management, engineers, given their nature and function within the productive process in aerospace, had no viable strike potential as a group.[15]

This case study will seek to understand how Boeing's engineers came to the understanding that the necessity of collective action, including the possibility of striking, was critical to their futures. To fully appreciate the engineers dilemma it is necessary to begin with a history of Seattle

in the 1960's and Boeing's role in it, as well as the status of its business at that time. Secondly, one needs an understanding of Boeing's unions and their history, including the reasons so few engineers are in unions, and the comparative state of traditional blue-collar and professional unions in the 1960's. Lastly, one must carefully examine the debate that occurred amongst SPEEA's leadership as they faced massive layoffs. If we understood what forces led an ordinarily union-resistant group of skilled professional workers to unionize, an essential precursor to any collective action, we would better understand what factors might lead to a similar uprising today, a subject of great importance to the labor movement and management.

As this study will show, it took a historic event of seismic proportions to shake the union to life. From 1969 to 1971, in what is known as the "Boeing Bust",[16] more than fifty percent, or 7,900 engineers,[17] lost their jobs. Many who remained faced "voluntary" downgrades and continued job insecurity.[18] The unexpected and massive layoffs shocked SPEEA's leadership, who eventually convinced the rank and file that collective action and a more adversarial relationship with Boeing management was necessary to improve their futures in the workplace.[19] The resulting shift in consciousness prepared the engineers to strike in 2000.

A City Blindsided by Global Factors

By 1960 Boeing was so important to metropolitan Seattle that Business Week called the place a "one industry town."[20] At the World's Fair, held in Seattle in 1962, Boeing got a big place on the stage. Civic leaders called the World's Fair *Century 21*, largely due to Boeing's pioneering contributions to science and technology.[21] A sleek elevated monorail was built to whisk many of the ten million visitors to the fairgrounds. At the monorails terminus, the futuristic Space Needle shot skyward like an exclamation point symbolizing Seattle's ambition. The night before the gates opened, a gala celebration for nearly a thousand dignitaries was held in the Grand Ballroom at the Olympic Hotel. Fair president Joe Gandy spoke to the crowd. The Fair "has rekindled civic spirit," he said, "the spirit that built a community out of ashes, that moved hills and spanned lakes and waterways and sent its commerce around the world."[22] Afterward, many of the dignitaries rode the monorail to the fairgrounds and watched the premier of the Boeing Spacearium film.

In strict terms Seattle wasn't a company town, but with over 90,000 locals employed by the company, Boeing dominated the local economy.[23] Boeing jobs accounted for one in every six jobs in the area and indirectly for about two out of six.[24] In 1965, due to a strong economy and the superiority of new jet airplanes, air travel took a sudden jump. In 1966 the U.S. airlines added as much seat capacity as they had possessed in total in 1950. Easy credit and the profit record of jets led to a buying binge by airlines and Boeing's production of passenger jets grew quickly.[25] By the end of 1968, the company had hired another 18,000 employees.[26]

If the Space Needle seemed to point to the future, nothing indicated the city's global reach better than Boeing's 747. Thousands of workers were lured to Seattle to help finish the assembly plant. Completed in early 1968, the 747 plant was the largest building by volume in the world.[27] The first 747 rolled off its assembly line in September of 1968. With production in full swing, Boeing's sales hit a historic high of $3.3 billion in 1968.[28]

By the end of 1969, Seattle would learn the downside of its reliance on a single company that operated in global markets. A global recession, rising oil prices, stagflation, and dwindling military contracts tied to the winding down of the Vietnam war caused Boeing's sales to plummet. Not a single plane order was recorded in over 13 months. In 1969 Boeing recorded its first operating losses in 22 years.[29] Global air travel slowed dramatically and many of the expensive 747's sat unused. In 1969, Boeing laid off 25,576 employees. In 1970 the bloodletting accelerated

and an additional 41,000 people were let go. By the end of 1972 Boeing's local workforce had been reduced from 101,000 to roughly 38,000.[30]

While the city reeled, Boeing's leadership was equally shocked. A Boeing executive explained:

> We foresaw the decline in government contracts in military and space hardware but we did not foresee the drop in the commercial market. The repeal of the tax investment credit came just before the economy started to cool and airlines began to lose customers while labor costs were skyrocketing. We had promised almost instant delivery of airplanes and to do that we had to build rapidly; we were hiring any warm and breathing body we could find. Then the orders were cut back and there we were: all dressed up and nowhere to go.[31]

On I-90, the interstate leading out of town, someone erected a billboard that read, "Will the last person leaving Seattle please turn out the lights." Seattle, with its many homeless and hungry, was referred to as a disaster zone on the senate floor. The area's birthrate fell and the suicide rate rose dramatically. An anti-suicide net was deployed on the Space Needle.[32]

In an ironic gesture, so soon after many of Seattle's Japanese population were interned during World War II, a tanker from Kobe, Japan arrived in Seattle's port in November 1971, filled with food donated for the hungry.[33] Washington State senator Warren Magnuson, who had unsuccessfully sought food aid from the reluctant US Agricultural Department, criticized them, charging, "The hungry people of Seattle are being kept from starvation by mercy shipments of food from Japan while the United States government, in violation of the law, refuses to open its food warehouses to these starving women, children, and unemployed men."[34] Federal food aid arrived shortly afterward.

"Things were real good here the past few years," the manager of the Seattle Unemployment Insurance Office, W.G. Cogdill, said. His office sat in the shadow of the Space Needle. "People weren't prepared for what happened. It came so suddenly and with such a shock, right now they're running scared. You hear them talking to each other in lines and they say, 'I've never seen it so bad.'"[35]

A Portrait of Boeing's Unions

Two unions dominated at Boeing: the engineers' union, SPEEA, and the larger machinist's union, International Association of Aerospace Workers and Machinists, or IAM local 751. While SPEEA was an independent union, IAM local 751 was part of a larger national organization IAM, which was also affiliated with AFL-CIO. The IAM local 751 (IAM) was formed in 1936. IAM struck for the first time in 1948, a contentious strike that began as a wildcat strike, and was further complicated when Boeing's management welcomed a Teamster raid. IAM prevailed, but was weakened. In 1965 IAM struck again over the company's seniority program. In the nineteen-day strike, the local won back the seniority system.[36] By 1968, IAM, known as the fighting machinists, were viewed as the feisty militant union.

In stark contrast to IAM, SPEEA was created as a means of resisting the "proletarianization" of engineers.[37] One engineer, Richard Henning, recalled his experience working at Boeing in the 1940's, "We were petitioning the National Labor Review Board (NLRB) for a separate vote to have our own professional organization completely separate of the shop union. We could not accept the idea of professionals being told how much they could earn and how they were to work on the job by a shop union."[38] In 1944, Henning and about 50 engineers created SPEEA specifically as a response to an attempt by the American Federation of Labor (AFL) to organize all

Boeing tooling, cost accounting, and engine personnel.[39] In an NLRB vote in 1946, the union was approved by a slim majority in a final vote.[40] Engineers' forming NLRB certified unions to avoid the inclusion of engineers in bargaining units dominated by production workers was a common pattern.[41]

While officially registered with the NLRB as a union, SPEEA insisted on referring to itself as an Association.[42] And the label fit. SPEEA modeled its behavior on professional associations such as the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association. In the 1960's, professional associations were major influences on the class-consciousness of professionals, just as unions were a large influence on working class consciousness.[43] Collective bargaining agreements were a formality, as SPEEA membership continued to accept Boeing's offers.[44]

Meanwhile, in the larger union movement in America, blue-collar unions were in a state of relative stagnation or even decline. While the uptick in growth of public employee unionism gave national labor unions new life, "the critical deficiency was their inability to penetrate the white-collar proletariat.[45] Boeing's engineers, while "unionized," had simply established a bulwark to protect themselves from the more militant brand of unionism that national labor leaders advocated.

Unionizing engineers was exceedingly difficult. Many of the reasons were historic. The profession emerged, ultimately, from capitalists' need to improve the production process to stay competitive.[46] This need led to mechanical devices and scientific methods being introduced into the workshop, which led to the birth of the modern engineer. Due to the large amounts of capital needed to fund research and develop new technologies, the industrial corporation emerged as the locus of modern technology in America.[47] Corporations became the habitat of the professional engineer, who necessarily worked at the service of capital.[48] Large modern industry, as Karl Marx wrote, made "science a productive force distinct from labor and presses it into the service of capital."[49]

Beginning with Frederick Taylor's scientific approach to human labor, engineers were soon pressed into management.[50] Business leadership was a natural extension of this, as technically trained managers were needed in modern industry.[51] A scholar of engineering, William Wickenden, noted in the 1930's, that it was "almost always necessary for an engineer to leave the engineering of materials and enter the engineering of people in order to become very successful financially and socially."[52]

In contrast to their blue-collar peers at IAM, few of whom had any college education, the average engineer was male, white, and came from a family in which college education for a male was probable.[53] Engineering schools emphasized the professional character of engineer's work and sought to instill a feeling of identification with management, along with pride in individual performance and creativity.[54]

This emphasis upon management responsibility within the corporation undercut any support for union activity by engineers.[55] In addition, any identification with labor would have blurred the distinction between engineer and mechanic upon which the profession was grounded. Frequently charged with the supervision of the industrial labor force, engineers found labor organizations difficult and disagreeable. They viewed unionism as a measure of mediocrity.[56]

While SPEEA's leaders respected IAM's collective bargaining strength, they saw the strategies IAM used to leverage power as unsavory. Any disdain SPEEA had for hard-knuckled union bargaining was returned in kind by IAM's leaders. An aero-mechanic leader suggested that many who join SPEEA do so not out of solidarity with other engineers or belief in the value of unions, but for reasons wholly consistent with middle-class individualism.[57] Solidarity with ones brethren

on the Boeing floor was the heartbeat of the machinists union.

Nowhere in SPEEA history is there any indication of cooperation with IAM. An IAM leader spoke of how many engineers had handled jobs vacated by striking machinists during a machinists strike in 1965. He expressed bitterness at the "glee" with which many engineers "scabbed" and said he now crosses the street to avoid contact with some persons he has known from childhood who are engineers.[58]

In 1968 Boeing's engineers were justly proud of the success of the 747. Their "anti-union" kept blue-collar unions out of their shop, consistently stressed the mutual interests of engineers and management, negotiated pay raises without the threat of coercive action, and published comparative information about salaries in aerospace.[59] This last service was of particular value as Boeing's engineers believed they would do just fine in the free market; after all, "they were educated, talented, hardworking people whose skills were very much in demand."[60]

But while many Boeing engineers wouldn't have admitted as much, they were what scholars were calling "the new working class" and had more in common with the machinists than they might have admitted.[61] As employees of a large company, and subject to the same profit-minded decisions of shareholders, both the blue-collar machinists and the engineers were cut off from the means of production. But the engineers shared interests, and even personnel, with management.[62] While they tended to side with capital, as opposed to labor, the engineers were in a state of conflict. As market forces pushed them towards the benefits of forming a union, cultural forces repelled them. Under the pressure of the Boeing Bust, these tensions began to reveal themselves.

SPEEA: A Union with an Identity Crisis

By March of 1968, despite its protestations that it was anything like a union, SPEEA had grown into the largest independent professional bargaining association of engineers in the nation, with over 13,000 members. Its major focus was raising educational standards for new engineering graduates, essentially raising the bar of entry to the profession, a maneuver both the medical and legal professional associations also undertook to raise the status of their professions. Jobs were plentiful and engineering salaries, starting at $775/month, were higher than those of all other graduates.[63]

Even during the good year of 1968, given the historic boom and bust cycle of the aerospace industry, the vulnerability of the mass-employed engineer was mentioned. In the newsletter, Bob Anderson, the president of SPEEA, wrote that "for too long, engineers have lived in a half-world - neither professional nor blue-collar, neither management nor labor. Engineers and scientists have less control over their working destiny and security than most machinists, electricians and truck drivers."[64] His concern would seem prescient when the layoff axe fell, and fell again. The engineers would soon learn that SPEEA could do almost nothing for them. Beyond federal and state assistance they had no safety net to help pad the fall.

By August 1968, SPEEA officers voiced concerns about what would happen if there wasn't enough work for all of Boeing's engineering staff. SPEEA's chairman, Rex Hijman, noted that "the supply of engineers for the present Company demand is adequate."[65] But should demand soften, and job losses occur, the chairman cautiously reviewed the union's options: a walk out wouldn't cause short term pain to company. Because the engineers aren't on the production lines the company could live without them awhile, unlike strikes by IAM that stopped production in its tracks. Hence their leverage was lower than that of the machinists.[66] Dismissing any thought of a strike, he emphasized the engineers historic association with management, declaring that "conflict with management is repellent" and "we're not like militant unions."[67]

At the time there seemed little reason to believe demand would soften. By the end of 1968 the company had a record sales year, largely due to orders for the 747. Additionally, Boeing was in competition with Lockheed Martin for a huge contract with the U.S. government to develop a Supersonic Transport (SST).[68] Employment had ballooned to a record high of over 142,000.[69]

On April 29th, 1968, Boeing promoted an ambitious engineer, Thornton "T" Wilson, to president. The engineers were proud that a former SPEEA member was their new president.[70] That joy would be short-lived. In 1969 the Boeing commercial unit did not sell a single plane. The global economy went into a full-blown recession, suffering from stagflation. The rapid sales of the previous three years, along with the sudden drop in the world economy, resulted in a global surplus. Additionally, the winding down of the Lunar Space Program, for which Boeing had designed the Lunar Rover, and dwindling defense spending as the Vietnam War came to a close, resulted operating losses of $14.3 million, the company's first since 1948.[71] T Wilson responded to the crisis by slashing payroll when Boeing's business fell off dramatically. His attitude towards Boeing's employees (known colloquially in Seattle as the "Lazy B")[72] could be discerned from his response at a press conference in the late 1960's. Asked how many people worked at Boeing he responded, "About half of them."[73] Determined to overhaul the company from top to bottom, T Wilson remarked, "The logic is simple. If I don't do it, the board will bring in some ice water guy from outside who will. I might as well be the ice water guy."[74]

When the first round of layoffs hit the engineering unit in April of 1969, the newest hires, generally the youngest, were let go.[75] This was destabilizing, but what caused more alarm was how fast the entire industry was contracting.[76] Many engineers who lost their jobs struggled, as employment options elsewhere were scarce.

SPEEA's leaders, believing the slowdown would only be temporary, advised calm. They pointed to the SST Boeing had been designing. If Boeing won the competition for the large federal contract job security would be guaranteed. A job counseling and placement service was set up, at union expense, to aid those out of work.[77] A strong membership drive was organized, attempting to turn job insecurity into a larger membership.[78]

After a difficult year Boeing was unwilling to accept the growing concentration of more highly paid engineers on the payroll.[79] Many engineers with long service were laid off or downgraded.[80] The internal appraising system used to determine an engineer's present and future value to the company was called toteming. SPEEA's leaders viewed it was a system designed to cut payroll costs by unjustly dropping the value of experienced engineers, typically the most highly paid, so management could clear them from the payroll. In a January 1970 article titled "Happy(?) New Year," Rex Hijman noted several instances in which totem ratings for senior engineers had mysteriously plummeted.[81] A chart featured in Spotlite, SPEEA's newsletter, in October 1971 documented that engineers under age thirty and over age fifty had contributed disproportionately to the overall layoff of 57% of engineers.[82] The perceived injustices of the toteming system became a central focus of SPEEA's energies. More and more senior engineers were let go, including several of SPEEA's leaders.[83] By mid-1970 Spotlite was filled with alarmed calls for the need to band together, claiming that as individuals they couldn't win their fight against a company that no longer valued them.

In addition to a litany of stories of engineers who had been grossly mistreated, the newsletters began to openly debate the merits of a professional association that advocates for the profession and raises its status, and that of a union that advocates for its individual members. The August 1970 newsletter included a column entitled "Are You a Professional?" by then-president Maurice Caldwell, which cited the labor historian Jack Barbash.

> Does a professional become unprofessional when he unites with other professionals for his individual and their common good? The challenge which confronts the professional is this: The dignity, status, and scientific competence that go with being a professional cannot be fully realized unless…the professional has a measure of economic and personal security that can only be secured through effective union organization. Only a union which is clearly a union can do the job.[84]

Stuck in their identity crisis, SPEEA's leaders focused on the sort of work they had done for years as an association, which was to raise the status and wages of their profession. There was a new urgency as it seemed there were more aerospace engineers out of work than with a job, and more were graduating from the nation's universities each year. The oversupply of aerospace engineers became the focus of SPEEA. Efforts to work with legislators yielded results. In February 1971, Washington State Representative Brock Adams reported that, "because of the high unemployment of American engineers, the regulations have been changed so that at the present time no foreign engineers are being allowed entry into this country to work."[85]

SPEEA's next move generated much controversy. In April of 1971 they launched a campaign called Look Before You Leap.[86] At significant union expense they ran full-page advertisements in university newspapers alerting potential aerospace engineers to the extreme overpopulation of the field.[87] The bitterness and hopelessness Boeing's engineers felt clearly shows in the text of a full-paged advertisement in the University of Washington daily late in 1971.

"Why don't they recycle engineers and technicians? Because when you mass produce them, they are cheap enough to throw away and use new ones. Maybe you should be considering a more permanent career opportunity — the risk is high, the pay is low, and rewards are few - when they are done with you, you re just out in the cold."[88]

The maneuver received much criticism, being called "below the belt" by the University of Washington Associate Dean of Engineering Vernon B. Hammer.[89] But bitterness ruled the day in the SPEEA offices and desperate times called for desperate measures.

A Turning Point

By late 1971, SPEEA's identity crisis was over, at least at the leadership level. Convinced that they had to quit acting like a "union in name only", they explicitly embraced the term "union" and the ensuing responsibilities.[90]

Selling the more militant stance to the rank and file would be the challenge. With SPEEA membership hovering around fifty percent and constantly losing members to layoffs, SPEEA leadership launched a membership drive. In the letter kickstarting their membership drive the membership chairman Bob Wood wrote:

> The word union can be defined as the grouping together of individual components to form a united unit. SPEEA, a professional organization, is also striving year-by-year to do a better job for you collectively at the bargaining table. We are therefore, both legally and in actuality, a union of professional engineers and scientists - and proud of it! We no longer feel we should purposely avoid using the word 'union' for fear of losing members. On the contrary, we hope to accomplish just the opposite.[91]

The rough employment situation in Seattle, and continued cascading job losses at Boeing, softened some of the individualism amongst the engineers that had previously been a barrier to

recruiting new members. By October 1971, Boeing employment would reach its nadir, with only 37,200 employees remaining in the Seattle area.[92] The local news was filled with stories of long lines at unemployment offices and collapsing home prices.[93] The national press ran stories about bread lines in Seattle hundreds of people long, segregated between men and women, something that nearly all Americans thought had vanished with soup kitchens of the great depression.[94] Almost sixty-percent of Boeing's engineers had lost their jobs by the end of 1971 and SPEEA could do almost nothing for them.[95] SPEEA's response was to convince their rank and file that by raising the specter of militancy and growing their membership they could change that in the future.

Union leaders identified individualism, which they called the "coonskin cap syndrome," as the stiffest barrier they faced to growing membership. SPEEA's editor, Bob Stedfeld, took this issue on, arguing that engineers don't seem to recognize the fact that the United States is no longer a society of individuals, but a society of groups. Most engineers "react with the rugged independence of a coonskin-capped frontiersman to any suggestion that they should sacrifice individual desires for group objectives."[96]

The semantic and philosophic identity struggle continued. As engineering wages dropped to a level near that of the machinists, the successes that IAM achieved through militant collectivism in securing concessions from Boeing management were frequently cited. Always noted, however, was that in the event that action was necessary, the engineers would use more gentlemanly means than staging a walk out, such as embarrassing Boeing in the press. SPEEA president Maurice Caldwell continued to push against the definitional question of SPEEA's identity in October of 1971, writing, "Only an association which is clearly a union can do a good job for the mass employed. This definitely does not mean that an organization must adopt all the tactics, concepts, and goals associated with the labor unions of the unskilled or semi-skilled worker."[97]

An opportunity to greatly expand membership arose when Boeing's technical staff became interested in unionizing. The underlying tensions between IAM and SPEEA came to a head as they both sought to win over the 3,700 draftsmen and engineers' aids in an NLRB election slated for December 1971.

When the votes were counted SPEEA had won. One Aero Mechanic leader believed SPEEA leaders would learn a lot from having to "dirty their hands with the problems of hourly workers."[98] Another bitter IAM leader suggested that it would be "foolish to look for any newfound solidarity of engineers with technicians…SPEEA simply needs the additional dues dollars to replace income lost to layoffs."[99] While that may have been true, SPEEA's executive board especially wanted the technicians because of their belief that the technicians would impart new energy and militancy to SPEEA. This proved to be true as over seventy-percent of the technicians joined the union, a membership percentage never achieved by engineers.[100]

The union's tougher message and active recruiting, combined with the hard times in Seattle and at Boeing, led to a flood of union applications. On September 25, 1972 a new membership milestone of sixty-percent was reached in the engineering bargaining unit. A SPEEA recruiter quipped, "At SPEEA, Boeing is our most effective recruiter."[101]

By early 1972, SPEEA leadership was actively engaged in new contract negotiations with management. Their new militant stance is evident in the article "No Time to Hide" by Bob Wood, a union leader, who put the struggle into military terms, "Gentlemen, get ready to advance. Staying low in a foxhole just allows the enemy to pick us off one at a time. Retreat and surrender under harassing fire are the marks of an army whose spirit is broken. Your participation in the negotiation input forms the battle plan. Don't fail to remember that it takes disciplined, aggressive soldiers to carry it out successfully."[102]

SPEEA had an aggressive agenda. They sought to revise the toteming retention system, eliminate downgrades, eliminate unpaid overtime, and to allow an agency shop.[103] They also sought protection of SPEEA leaders from lay-offs, which had been a serious problem as vocal SPEEA leaders were frequently laid off.[104] For the first time, behind closed doors, the possibility of striking was cautiously raised.[105] When the contract was settled in October 1972, the terms were favorable to the engineers.

A *Spotlite* column in July 1972 entitled "Fat, Dumb, and Happy" by SPEEA's membership chairman, Don Bowie, takes on the engineering profession as a whole, noting that SPEEA's success at Boeing wasn't being mirrored industry-wide.

> History has shown that individuals normally form a strong bond in the face of common adversity. Our country was formed into a union of states when under English tyranny. The farmers formed cooperatives when the railroads were exploiting them. The medical profession formed what amounts to a closed shop when quacks started to invade their ranks. Labor unions were formed when mammoth corporations replaced the small machine shop…but engineers offer only platitudes on rugged individualism by those still employed and bewilderment by those unemployed.[106]

This would remain true for most professional engineers. But for Boeing's engineers, their "Professional Association" had become a bonafide union, in both name and practice.

Future Implications

As we have seen, it took the historic crisis of 1969-1971 to convince Boeing's engineers that collective action was necessary in a mass-employment situation. Although even after they openly embraced their union, it still took another twenty-eight years for them to actually strike.

Today, thirteen years later, the ramifications of the SPEEA strike are still with us. In 2004, Boeing began work on the 787, known as the Dreamliner, now the best selling commercial aircraft ever. But it is also a plane that has famously suffered long delays and reliability issues.[107] At least some of the troubles evolved from Boeing's attempts to break its reliance on the strong aerospace labor unions in Seattle. In a huge departure Boeing chose to build a commercial jet-making plant for the 787 in South Carolina, a right to work state,[108] and to move many engineers and technical workers there. Boeing also chose to subcontract much of the design of the Dreamliner, taking significant work away from its in-house engineers. Boeing's internal documents showed that these actions would cost the company years in delays and billions in money, but would give the company leverage over its Puget Sound workforce and political leadership.[109]

Based on the evidence in this case study, it seems that even the most unlikely to unionize mass-employed workers can be persuaded otherwise, so long as a serious employment crisis is widespread enough to prevent industry-wide transfers. But today's world is different than the one Boeing's engineers faced in the early 1970's. Is it possible that globalization has made it so easy to move work around the globe, even jobs requiring skilled labor, that companies threatened by the presence of a union will simply move the work to another location? In the U.S. today, the growing trend by Southern States to enact right-to-work laws, and the weakening of union-friendly laws, such as Wisconsin, also give companies a wide array of relocation options. Boeing recently did exactly that when it moved a large number of technical and engineering workers to Charleston, South Carolina.[110]

One group of skilled workers that bears some similarity to the Boeing engineers are the armies of software engineers employed at companies like Microsoft, Amazon, Google, and

Facebook. They are mass-employed, skilled professionals, with little control over their own employment destiny. They are neither labor nor capital, suspended in a contradictory class location. While the industry is booming now, it seems certain that, given historic business cycles, a severe downturn will one day arrive. Efforts to unionize the contract workers at Microsoft have already occurred, although with poor success.[111] Even if tough economic circumstances contribute to the will to unionize, the efforts Microsoft undertook to eliminate the possibility of a union suggest that it won't be easy.

ENDNOTES

1. Mary Cummings and Patricia H. Werhane. "Boeing: To Strike or Not to Strike." (Darden Business Publishing, University of Virginia, 2002), 1.
2. Yes, mostly men; 11% according to a Boeing newsletter; www.boeing.com/news/frontiers/archive/2007/december/ts_sf08.pdf (accessed 12/15/13).
3. Cummings and Werhane. "Boeing: To Strike or Not to Strike." 1.
4. www.kplu.org/post/boeing-engineers-strike-2000-casts-shadow-over-current-talks (Accessed 12/16/13).
5. www.kplu.org/post/boeing-engineers-strike-2000-casts-shadow-over-current-talks (Accessed 12/16/13).
6. David Kusnet, Love the Work, Hate the Job: Why America's Best Workers Are More Unhappy Than Ever. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 178.
7. Dana L. Cloud, We Are the Union : Democratic Unionism and Dissent at Boeing. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2011), 36.
8. Woodruff Imberman, "Why Engineers Strike--The Boeing Story." Business Horizons 44, no. 6, December 11, 2001, 35.
9. Kusnet, Love the Work, Hate the Job, 203.
10. "The Slow Death of Boeing Man." The Economist. March 16, 2000.
11. Song M. Kyung, "Boeing Strike: 75% of Engineers, Technicians Walk Off Job," *Seattle Times*, February 10, 2000, accessed December 18, 2013.
12. The academic literature covers the reasons for the strike and its aftermath adequately. For a thorough investigation of the strike please see both: Imberman,"Why Engineers Strike." And: Kusnet, Love the Work, Hate the Job.
13. In "To Strike or Not To Strike" by Mary Cummings one sentence is given to it ("It was not until around 1970 that SPEEA began to bill itself as a full-fledged union with collective bargaining power.") In Love the Work, Hate the Job, David Kusnet gives SPEEA's early years more attention, a full three pages, but aside from some attention to their quirky formation to avoid being grouped with the blue-collar machinists he breezes through to 1992 when conflict with management led to their one-day strike, with no mention of their transition to a group that openly referred to itself as a "union" willing to strike.
14. This lack of attention is likely due to the gap between when SPEEA began to bill itself as a full-fledged union in 1971 and when it actually went on strike, an act nearly everyone doubted it was capable of. Therefore, few ever took the union very seriously.
15. Bruce Mork, "Boeing Engineers, Their Union, and an Employment Crisis." (Masters Thesis, University of Washington, 1972), 37.
16. T. M. Sell, *Wings of Power: Boeing and the Politics of Growth in the Northwest*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), ix.
17. Mork, "Boeing Engineers, Their Union, and an Employment Crisis", 2.

18. Ibid.
19. While the subject is treated at length in this paper, to prevent any confusion it should be noted that SPEEA was certified as a union in 1946. However, it wasn't until the Boeing Bust that they began to behave like one, or even openly refer to themselves as a union. Their certification with NLRB in 1946 was only done to prevent the engineers from being absorbed by a shop union (ie. blue-collar). They called themselves a professional association and behaved like one. Their relationship with the company was intentionally cordial.
20. Richard S. Kirkendall, "Two Senators & The Boeing Company: The Transformation of Washington's Political Culture." Columbia Magazine. Winter 1997-1998, 38-43.
21. www.historylink.org/index.cfm?displaypage=output.
cfm&playid=72&file_id=2290 (accessed 12/16/13).
22. www.historylink.org/index.cfm?displaypage=output.
cfm&playid=72&file_id=2290 (accessed 12/16/13).
23. The US census lists Seattle's population in 1960 as 557,087.
24. Robert A. Wright, "Seattle's Elusive Recovery; Many Still Jobless In Spite of Area Gains." *New York Times*, September 10, 1972, accessed October 9, 2013.
25. Charles D. Bright, *The Jet Makers: The Aerospace Industry from 1945 to 1972.* (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1978), kindle location 1506.
26. Sell, *Wings of Power*, 26.
27. Robert J. Donovan, "Boeing Key as Seattle Booms on all Fronts." *Los Angeles Times*, Aug 29, 1966, accessed December 9, 2013.
28. E. E. Bauer, *Boeing: The First Century & Beyond.* (Issaquah, WA: TABA Pub., 2006), 213.
29. Ibid.
30. Cloud, *We Are the Union*, 33.
31. Bill D. Moyers, *Listening to America; a Traveler Rediscovers His Country.* (New York: Harper's Magazine Press, 1971), 191.
32. Sharon Boswell, "Lights Out, Seattle." *Seattle Times*. November 3, 1996, accessed October 15, 2013.
33. "Japan Gives Food to Hungry in Seattle; US Finally Acts." *Chicago Tribune*. December 11th, 1971, accessed October 15, 2013.
34. Robert Wright, "Seattle Depression Leaves Families Hungry" *New York Times News Service*. December 15th, 1971, accessed December 18, 2013.
35. Moyers, *Listening to America*, 182.
36. Cloud, *We Are the Unio*n , 31-32.
37. Adolf Fox Sturmthal, *White-Collar Trade Unions: Contemporary Developments in Industrialized Societies*. (University of Illinois Press, 1966), 389.
38. Richard A, Henning, *The Green-Eyed Engineer.* (Emerald City Graphics, Inc, 1988), 88.
39. Mork. "Boeing Engineers, Their Union, and an Employment Crisis," 12.
40. Polly M. Myers, "Shop Traditions: Constructing and Maintaining the Boeing Family at the Boeing Company." (PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 2008), 80.
41. Robert Perruci and Joel Emery Gerstl, editors, *The Engineers and the Social System*, (New York: Wiley, 1969),222.
42. Hijman, Rex. "Gestalt and Identity." *SPEEA Spotlite*, May, 1969.
43. Perrucci and Gerstl, *The Engineers and the Social System*, 226.
44. Bauer, Boeing, 348.

45. Jack Barbash, *The Elements of Industrial Relations.* (Madison, WI.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 52.
46. David F. Noble, *America by Design.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 34.
47. Ibid, 43.
48. Ibid, 34.
49. Karl Marx, *Das Kapital: A Critique of Political Economy.* (Washington, D.C., Regnery Publishing, 2013), 361.
50. The "engineering of people" caught on in the early twentieth century with Taylorism. For more on Frederick Taylor and principals of scientific management see chapter 5 of: Noble, David F. *America by Design.* Knopf, 2013.
51. Noble, *America by Design*. 34.
52. Arthur Donovan, *Engineering in Society*, (Washington, D.C. National Academy Press, 1985), 162.
53. Noble, *America by Design*, 51.
54. Perruci and Gerstl, *The Engineers and the Social System*, 222.
55. Noble, *America by Design*, 51.
56. Noble, *America by Design*, 41.
57. Mork, "Boeing Engineers, Their Union, and an Employment Crisis," 13.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid, 8.
60. Kusnet, *Love the Work, Hate the Job*, 173.
61. Mork. *Boeing Engineers, Their Union, and an Employment Crisis*, 1.
62. Most of Boeing's CEO's were engineers. The ranks of management were also filled with many engineers; Kusnet, *Love the Work, Hate the Job*, 178.
63. Seattle Professional Engineering Employees Association. *The SPEEA Spotlite*. June 1968, 3.
64. *The SPEEA Spotlite.* June 1968, 7.
65. *The SPEEA Spotlite*. September 1968.
66. *The SPEEA Spotlite*. August 1968, 3.
67. *The SPEEA Spotlite*. August 1968, 3.
68. Bauer, *Boeing*, 178.
69. Bauer, *Boeing*, 214. (Note: employment figures vary a bit by source, depending on whether they're referring to Seattle employment figures or internationally. The high of 142,000 is international).
70. *The SPEEA Spotlite*, May 1968, 1.
71. Bauer, *Boeing*, 213.
72. Time magazine, looking back at 1968 from the vantage point of 1980 reported that "Seattle's nickname for the Company was "The Lazy B."; *Time*, April 7, 1980. 52.
73. Edward S Greenberg and Leon Grunberg and Sarah Moore and Patricia B. Sikora. *Turbulence: Boeing and the State of American Workers.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010, kindle location 955.
74. Ibid, 215.
75. Mork, "Boeing Engineers, Their Union, and an Employment Crisis," 17.
76. "The First Signs of a Slowdown." *Time*, May 9, 1969, 93.
77. *The SPEEA Spotlite*. July 1969, 4.
78. Mork, "Boeing Engineers, Their Union, and an Employment Crisis," 18.

79. Ibid, 17.
80. To be downgraded meant to be assigned to a job of lower pay and status. In addition to this occurring to engineers in the engineering department, roughly 1,500 engineers were downgraded from management positions back into engineering (Mork, 18).
81. Rex Hijman, "Happy (?) New Year: Best Wishes to Seven in Particular." *SPEEA Spotlite*, January 1970.
82. *The SPEEA Spotlite*. October 1971, 4.
83. Unlike IAM, which had professional union bosses, SPEEA's leaders were elected from currently employed engineers. IAM membership cost a machinist 4% of their salary. A SPEEA member paid .4% of their salary. With such low dues the union couldn't hire full-time leadership - nor did they want full-time advocates.
84. *The SPEEA Spotlite.* August 1970, 3.
85. Myers, Polly M. "Shop Traditions: Constructing and Maintaining the Boeing Family at the Boeing Company." University of Minnesota, 2008, 69.
86. *The SPEEA Spotlite*. June 1971, 2.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. "Ad Rapping Engineer Degree Hit Colleges Below the Belt." *Seattle Times*. May 30, 1971.
90. Bob Wood, "Do You Want To Belong in a Union." *SPEEA Spotlite*. January 1971.
91. "Do You Want To Belong in a Union." *SPEEA Spotlite*. January, 1971.
92. Myers, "Shop Traditions," 65.
93. "Lights Out, Seattle." *Seattle Times*. November 3, 1996.
94. "In a 5-Year Slump, Seattle Learns to Cope." *New York Times*. March 6, 1975.
95. Mork, "Boeing Engineers, Their Union, and an Employment Crisis," 25.
96. Bob Stedfeld, "The Coonskin Cap Hangup." *SPEEA Spotlite*, January, 1971.
97. Maurice Caldwell,. "The Time is Now." *SPEEA Spotlite*. October, 1971.
98. Mork, "Boeing Engineers, Their Union, and an Employment Crisis," 21.
99. Ibid, 21.
100. This was reported to Bruce Mork in interviews with SPEEA's leadership in 1972; Mork, "Boeing Engineers, Their Union, and an Employment Crisis," 21.
101. Dick Elliot, "60%" *SPEEA Spotlite*. October 1972.
102. "No time to Hide." *SPEEA Spotlite*. April 1972, 4.
103. "The Process Has Started." *SPEEA Spotlite*, October 1971.
104. Mork, "Boeing Engineers, Their Union, and an Employment Crisis," 19.
105. In an interview with SPEEA leaders, their estimates were that iffy-percent of their members would support a strike, whereas two years ago the figure would have been ten percent; Mork, "Boeing Engineers, Their Union, and an Employment Crisis." 24.
106. *The SPEEA Spotlite*. August 1972, 2.
107. Kyle Peterson, "Special Report: A Wing and a Prayer: Outsourcing at Boeing." Reuters. January 20, 2011, accessed September 19, 2013.
108. There are 24 states with "right-to-work" laws, mostly in the Southern United States. The laws are statutes that limit the extent to which a union can operate in the state. The laws are viewed as hostile to unions and make it much harder for unions to gain traction at companies operating in the state.
109. Danny Westneat, "Let's Stop Being Exclusive with Boeing." *Seattle*

Times, November 30, 2013, accessed December 1, 2013.
110. Peterson, "Special Report: A Wing and a Prayer."
111. For much more on this see: Kusnet, *Love the Work, Hate the Job*, Chapter 7.

Chasing Tail:
Mermaids as Emblems of Unfulfilled Desire in the Long Nineteenth Century

Figure 1. A Mermaid (1900), by John William Waterhouse

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Plenty of Fish in the Sea

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conceptions of mermaids appeared across a variety of cultural mediums in Britain, from paintings and poetry to newspapers and satirical cartoons. The works of prominent Victorian artists John William Waterhouse, Edward Burne-Jones, and Frederic Leighton offer a thematic exploration of the ways in which nineteenth-century depictions of mermaids act as emblems and embodiments of unfulfilled male desire.

In the works of Waterhouse and Burne-Jones, mermaids are manifestations of desire for a female figure to function either sexually or maternally. Three paintings by Waterhouse act as evidence that mermaids are the embodiment of unfulfilled male heterosexual desire, and show both a sexual longing for and fatal fear of femininity, indicative of the late nineteenth-century emergence of the liberated and dangerous New Woman.[1] Burne-Jones paints mermaids not as an expression of unfulfilled sexual desire, but instead as the desire for a mother figure whose absence haunted Burne-Jones throughout his life. Representations of this desire and distress oscillate between the mermaid as a loving, nurturing mother and the mermaid as murderess. This duality of longing and anxiety in both Waterhouse and Burne-Jones speaks to the rapidly changing social climate of the turn of the century, which saw a shift in the position of women from the mothering "angel of the house" Victorian wife, to the more liberated, problematic, femme fatale New Woman.

In Leighton's work, conversely, mermaids function as emblems of a different type of unfulfilled male desire, that of homosexual longing. The impossibility of a consummated love between man and mermaid is not unlike the prohibitions placed upon homosexuality in Victorian Britain, where male-male love was culturally taboo and sodomy illegal.[2] Ultimately, mermaids function as a "safe" medium for artists of the nineteenth century. Their status as a hybrid of both human and Other allows them to navigate the complicated waters of the normative and the dissident and of desire and disgust.

The "Fin" in Fin-De-Siecle: Mermaids in Cultural Context

Edward Coley Burne-Jones, born in 1833,[3] predated Queen Victoria's ascent to the throne by four years, while John William Waterhouse was born twelve years into her lengthy reign in 1849.[4] Burne-Jones and Waterhouse were raised in a firmly Victorian clime, inheriting their culture's values and traditions, including restricting attitudes towards sexuality and gender roles, characterized by a privileging of men over women in almost every context.[5] In the middle of the century, a group of artists known as the Pre-Raphaelites were born of a rebellion against traditional art instruction at the Royal Academy in London, which emphasized idealization and looked to classical sculpture and Renaissance painting as penultimate artistic achievements. The Pre-Raphaelites sought inspiration in the art "before Raphael" and Renaissance idealism, prioritizing truth in depicting nature over all else.[6] The three main artists of this movement greatly influenced both Burne-Jones and Waterhouse later in the century. Therefore, in addition to Victorian values, both artists were final heirs to this Pre-Raphaelite artistic tradition: scholars have named Burne-Jones and Waterhouse the "Last Pre-Raphaelite"[7] and the "Modern Pre-Raphaelite,"[8] respectively. Their positions as late Pre-Raphaelites allowed Burne-Jones and Waterhouse the liberty to draw upon similar sources as their predecessors—ranging from ancient mythology to the works of nineteenth-century poets[9]—but also to push these sources further, both artistically and thematically. They moved from a strict fidelity of nature to a more expressive and loose style of representation, and to a grappling with modern themes, such as the change in the status

of women. Burne-Jones and Waterhouse found in the mermaid the perfect artistic source material; the mermaid figure could be used to wrestle with the ramifications of modernity while simultaneously drawing on two important sources of Pre-Raphaelite inspiration: ancient mythology and contemporary literature.

Traditionally, the mermaid is a half-human, half-fish creature that lives in the sea, or sits on rocks and sings to sailors, luring them to their deaths and earning her mythical breed a second name, that of "siren." However, it is said that a mermaid can transform into a human and earn a soul if a man falls in love with her.[10] This basic ancient myth was appropriated and expounded upon by writers in the nineteenth-century, who capitalized on the mermaid's sexual allure, as well as the tragedy of her contradictory nature. Any human man who could potentially love her and redeem her drowns before that love is realized. Therefore, by the time Burne-Jones and Waterhouse began sketching the mermaids of their imagination around the turn of the century, their literary predecessors had provided them with a rich written tradition to put to paint. Alfred Lord Tennyson, a popular literary source for the Pre-Raphaelites, published a poem called "The Mermaid" in 1830.[11] In 1837, "The Little Mermaid" by Hans Christian Andersen appeared in Danish, with English translations printed in Victorian periodicals, such as an illustrated version in *The English Illustrated Magazine* from 1891.[12] Mermaids were also alluded to in prominent Victorian novels, such as George Eliot's *Middlemarch* of 1871.[13] In these literary examples, mermaids are described as being beautiful and desirable but never attainable, and often, when consummation is attempted, fatal.

However, Victorian literature featuring mermaids was not limited to the fictional. The nineteenth century saw a proliferation of mermaids in popular culture, from evidence in scientific discussions about evolution[14] to satires of current events in newspapers. For example, in a cartoon from the publication *Judy*, a man is shown marrying a mermaid and discovering all of her faults, like spending a lot of time over her hair.[15] However, at the end of the comic, it is revealed that, "nonsense, it was all a dream, which occurred after a visit to the Mermaid [a manatee] at the Aquarium." It is interesting that in a light-hearted comic, just as in contemporary literature, the punch line of the joke is that mermaids are ultimately unattainable, existing only in the realm of dreams, never to be married or sexually conquered by men, even illustrated ones.

The appeal of mermaids to Victorian society is perhaps best encapsulated by an abbreviated quotation from a January 1883 review of Otto Sinding's painting "The Mermaid" in *The Magazine of Art*:[16]

> The Mermaiden is certainly the prettiest and most popular of all the myths of natural history. Half of the sea and half of the land, a lovely woman to the waist and below it a scaled and glittering fish... For centuries past she has exercised a perfect fascination on the popular imagination. You meet her in Homer and you meet her in Tennyson—on the coasts of legendary Hellas and in the waters round the Isle of Wright... she has been seen at the Grosvenor Gallery, with an introduction from Mr. Burne-Jones; and with her counterfeit presentment the mariner is wont to tattoo all parts of his manly form... There is no end to her metamorphoses, and none to her charm. Science has dissected her, proved her impossible, and dismissed her to the limbo of phantasies and delusions... But she holds her ground yet. With her double nature, her prodigious beauty, her romantic associations and capacities, we feel that if she is not true, she ought to be, and that if earth and water are indeed innocent of her society, then so much the worse for them.

This quotation offers insight into the intrigue behind mer-myths. The mermaid is beautiful and impossible, and importantly, she has a "double nature." Therein lies the mermaid's

charm: she is a woman but not, she is sexualized but unable to have sex, she exists in fiction but not in reality, she is a damsel needing to be saved by the love of men but a dangerous siren who lures them to their death. It is the inherent contradictions of the mermaid that make her perfect because perfection is truly attained when something exists only in theory. This duality charges the literature surrounding mermaids, creating a wealth of written material for Burne-Jones and Waterhouse to engage with, from the poetical to the pop-cultural. The most appealing characteristic of these mythical creatures for Burne-Jones, Waterhouse, and Leighton is this duality and the perfection the mermaid figure creates, making mermaids an emblem of impossible and unfulfilled desire and allowing them to work through both personal and cultural struggles.

"Die in their hearts for the love of me"[17]: John William Waterhouse and Unfulfilled Heterosexual Desire

Waterhouse's *A Mermaid* (Figure 1) is emblematic of unfulfilled male desire both in its formal qualities—predominantly in its use of color and vertical lines—as well as its potential reference to Tennyson's similarly titled poem, "The Mermaid" of 1830.[18] The mermaid of Waterhouse's painting is situated much like mermaid of Tennyson's poem: "A mermaid fair / Singing alone, / Combing her hair... With a comb of pearl." Waterhouse's mermaid sits, combing her long hair, with parted lips to suggest singing. This potential initial allusion to Tennyson's work is important, as it later helps in decoding the meaning of the formal elements of the painting, which echo the events of the poem.

The three primary colors of *A Mermaid* help to establish the painting's central figure as unattainable by juxtaposing the mermaid's human and animal qualities, as well as creating a visual point of contention at the figure's groin. The three primary colors of the work are white, blue, and red. White constitutes the parts of the mermaid that are more "maid" than "mer." Her torso, bare breasts, arms, and face all mark her as human. However, as the eye drifts down from the figure's torso, the viewer discovers that the figure is only half a woman: at her hips, blue pigments her skin, and the viewer begins to realize that there are no white legs to match the porcelain of her torso. Instead, the figure's lower half is a large, blue, fish-like tail that coils around her, ending in a fin. The viewer then seeks to discover whether the mermaid is woman in the most essential way and the eye is drawn to the meeting of her human stomach and fish tail, searching for a groin that could place her as human. It is here that the viewer's gaze is halted by a third color, the red of the mermaid's long hair. This combination of complimentary colors—red against blue—serves to draw the viewer into the most contradictory and beautiful area of the painting. The mermaid's auburn hair works to both hide and hint: the proof of any potential sex is covered, but the long locks also form the suggestion of pubic hair. The mermaid's sexual allure is maintained by this suggestion, but the refutation of a definitive species hints at the impossibility of consummating a sexual relationship with the hybrid. This is a pivotal point of contention for the work, as it shows that mermaids, after enticing men with their womanly bare breasts and sensuous hair, have no legs to part, and therefore no vagina to receive the physical manifestation of male desire, the phallus. Therefore, the mermaid can only be lusted after but never had, looked at but never touched.

Waterhouse sets up his mermaid as unattainable, resulting in any desire she elicits to be unfulfilled. This becomes more apparent when the vertical lines of the painting—created by the three rocks around the mermaid—are considered in tandem with the events of Tennyson's poem. In the poem, the mermaid continues to sit alone, singing and asking "[w]ho is it loves me? who loves not me?"[19] Her question is answered by both a "great sea-snake"[20] and "all the mermen

under the sea."[21] These figures are all masculine, with the sea-snake a living phallic symbol, and it is said that these men "[w]ould feel their immortality / Die in their hearts for the love of me."[22] The poem continues, relating the mermaid's flirtations and refutations of the mermen's advances. The mermaid even says, "[f]or I would not be kiss'd by all who would list, / Of the bold merry mermen under the sea."[23] Any physical manifestation of desire or lust by male figures—even mere kisses—in the poem is denied by the mermaid. This flirtatious chase scene translates from the poem into the formal elements of *A Mermaid*, which also hint at a burgeoning frustration fueled by unfulfilled male desire. Aside from the mermaid, the most prominent vertical lines in the painting are those created by the rocks in the fore and backgrounds. The foreground is composed of three large and jagged rocks, rising from the shoreline on which the mermaid sits. These rocks can be understood as phalluses, vertical object jutting into the mermaid's space in the composition. They press in around her, much like the mermen in pursuit of the mermaid in Tennyson's poem. The rocks are hard, erect and masculine in contrast to the softness of the mermaid's body, and the liquid swells of the sea, which is traditionally associated with the feminine. If the verticals begun by the rocks are extended, the lines form the bars of a prison around the mermaid, entrapping her. With phallic rocks claustrophobically closing in all around her, the expression on the mermaid's face can be suddenly read as agitated or uneasy. Even the rocks in the background ensnare the distraught mermaid, the only means of escape is a small gap out to the open sea. This opening, however, is itself in the shape of an erect phallus, suggesting that there is no relief to be had for the mermaid once she becomes an object of male lust.

The frustration of the composition is enforced by the most prominent horizontal line of the painting, that of the shoreline; this line cuts the bottom third of the composition, halving the mermaid, separating her attainable human torso from her frustrating, sexless fish tail. This pictorial dismembering of woman from fish is a manifestation of male frustration at the impossibility of expressing their desire for the mermaid, and ultimately speaks to a greater cultural anxiety over the problematic figure of the New Woman. The New Woman emerged in the late nineteenth century, liberated both sexually and politically. These women were tantalizing in their sexual availability, but threatening in their acquisition of power. The New Woman had access to education, jobs, and suffrage, effectively loosening the grip of complete male domination. The violent, crashing waves of the feminine sea against the masculine rocks in *A Mermaid* is indicative of a turn-of-the-century tension between the sexes.

This tension becomes more apparent when *A Mermaid* is considered in relation to two other works by Waterhouse, both an earlier study for *A Mermaid* and a subsequent, similar picture called *The Siren*, of circa 1901. In Waterhouse's oil sketch, the mermaid sits seemingly in the shallows of the sea, close to the shore but not on land, still firmly in the sea-realm of the feminine. There are no menacing cliffs looming in the distance; the rocks by the mermaid's tail are more round and less phallic and do not attempt to cage her in. The mermaid's lips are not parted in song to lure sailors and she stares absentmindedly. She is alone, non-threatened and non-threatening. Interestingly, this study was created in 1892, about eight years prior to the completion of its related oil painting.[24] With the addition of the menacing, phallic rocks and claustrophobic cliffs, as well as the mermaid's parted singing lips, the later painting could then be read as a reaction to the increasing threat of women over the last decade of the nineteenth century.

A consideration of Waterhouse's subsequent mermaid painting, *The Siren*, is also indicative of a growing cultural anxiety towards women. The setting is much the same as *A Mermaid*—complete with a phallic opening in the cliffs of the background—except there are now two figures sharing the space of the composition: both a mermaid and a man. The mermaid's song

has caused a shipwreck, as evidenced by the sinking mast in the mid-ground and a lone surviving sailor who stares up at the fatal songstress. The man seems to be falling in love with her, as her tail is changing into legs, giving an even more tantalizing hint of a female sex organ where her arms rest. But alas, the man is tangled in the debris from his ruined ship and his death is imminent. Tragically, the man who could potentially love the mermaid invariably drowns before he can fully transform her fishy tail into supple legs and reap the rewards of the freshly de-scaled meeting of her thighs. The man's sexual desire is doomed to be forever unfulfilled and even fatal. In this work, Waterhouse's frustration over the impossibility of sexual union with a mermaid reaches its zenith, also suggesting a growing cultural anxiety about the New Woman. In this painting, the mermaid is even more sexually available, like the New Woman, but she is above the man in the composition, out of his reach. The dying sailor shows the despair of the Victorian man as his easily controlled angel-of-the-house becomes a sexual siren, and because the man will always die before the mermaid's transformation to a controllable female human is complete, the painting also suggests that this New Woman can henceforth never be defeated by men. These three works can be read in progression, from an earlier calm and peaceful study, to the more claustrophobic and anxious final work of *A Mermaid*, to the culmination of Waterhouse's anxiety in *The Siren*, ultimately encoding this triptych-like series with a graver cultural anxiety over the position of women in late-nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain.

The paintings of John William Waterhouse use mermaids as the embodiment of unfulfilled male desire to create a microcosm of the anxiety produced by the New Woman figure at the turn of the century. Another contemporary Victorian painter, Edward Burne-Jones similarly uses mermaids as manifestations of thwarted desire for a female figure. However, in the works of Burne-Jones, mermaids are depicted not as the icon-like objects of sexual desire that Waterhouse paints, but as mothers and murderers.

"[A] dream, well enough"[25]: Edward Burne-Jones and the Mermaid as Mother, Murderer

Four mermaid-centric works by Edward Burne-Jones, predominantly painted close to or during the 1880s, begin as hopeful imaginings of mermaids as mothers, but later turn to brutal depictions of mermaids as murderers, allowing Burne-Jones to grapple with a life-long lack of a mother-figure. Ultimately, these mermaids, like those of Waterhouse, also speak to a larger cultural concern with the shifting position of women in the late nineteenth century.

The earliest mermaid paintings of Burne-Jones both show mermaids as mothers, enjoying the open sea with their children: *The Mermaid Family* of 1878 and *The Mermaid* of 1882. *The Mermaid Family*, in colored chalk and watercolor, depicts a mother-mermaid with three mer-children and a school of fish, swimming under the sea.[26] The school of fish seems to be interacting with the mermaids, like kin or even siblings to the mer-children. In *The Mermaid*, a mother mermaid hoists her baby out of the sea with her, close to shore, to look out at the world above the water.[27] These happy depictions of mermaids with their children speak to Burne-Jones's own longing for a mother. The painter's mother, Elizabeth, died just a few days after his birth in 1833, leaving him alone to be raised by a grief-ridden father.[28] Additionally, Burne-Jones was an only child, so he could not pass his motherless days in the companionship of any brothers or sisters. This childhood lack then explains the depictions of content mermaid families; they are imaginings or dreams of the family that Burne-Jones never had. The mother of *The Mermaid Family* holds a baby in her arms, who stares out to address the viewer, becoming the focal point of the work. This infant—possibly the same one as in the later *The Mermaid*—could be read as a ficti-

tious re-imagining of the artist himself, whose only interaction with his mother was when he was a newborn. Here, Burne-Jones paints himself in stasis, safe in the arms of an imagined mother. Interestingly, Burne-Jones also named a room of his house at Rottingdean "The Merry Mermaid," an old kitchen which he converted into a smoke room; just as in his paintings, Burne-Jones associates things that are traditionally feminine and motherly—like the kitchen—with mermaids, and uses them to seek comfort and joy.[29]

Another mermaid painting by Burne-Jones, titled *A Sea Nymph* of 1881, also has latent references to motherhood. With only a lone mermaid swimming in the sea, this work appears to be more akin to the icon-like mermaids of Waterhouse than the underwater family portraits of Burne-Jones's other mermaid works, but there are two important elements of *A Sea Nymph* that allow this work to be read as an imagining of a mer-mother. First, the lone mermaid is surrounded by four large fish. These fish are not unlike those in *The Mermaid Family*; a mer-child in this earlier work even holds onto a fish in each hand, much like the mermaid in *A Sea Nymph*. These fish can then be read as children, with the mermaid as their mother. Once this mermaid is established as a maternal figure, it is also important to note that both the fish hoisted up by the mermaid and the mermaid's tail break through the painted frame of the picture plane. This ability of the mermaid to permeate the confines of the painting is indicative of Burne-Jones's desire to make his dream-mother a reality, to draw her out of the painted sea and make her flesh. The fugitive figure of *A Sea Nymph* can be tied to a related sketch by Burne-Jones, of 1883, called *The Artist Attempting to Join the World of Art with Disastrous Results*.[30] In this sketch, Burne-Jones draws himself as an artist who attempts to pervade the picture plane of his own work, but merely falls through the canvas, destroying his own work and disappointing himself in the process. The artist cannot break the bounds of art, and the mermaid of *A Sea Nymph* can only do so in two dimensions; any attempt for Burne-Jones to corporeally conjure a mother ends in "disastrous results." No matter how many sketches and paintings Burne-Jones made of mer-mothers, he could never reanimate his long-dead human mother, leaving his desire for a maternal female figure unfulfilled.

The "disastrous results" of Burne-Jones attempting to create a mermaid mother can also be seen in a later mermaid work, *The Depths of the Sea*, painted in 1886 **(Figure 2)**. This painting illustrates a turn in Burne-Jones's depictions of mermaids. Gone are the frolicking mer-children, watched over by their loving mother. Instead, the mermaid has become a murderess, dragging down the corpse of a human man. Burne-Jones's anxiety about the impossibility of fulfilling his desire has, by 1886, driven him to turn against mermaids as loving mother figures, and instead depict them as murderers.[31] Burne-Jones once said of his mother's death, "I don't think it is ever out of my mind what hurt I did when I was born."[32] Haunted by guilt, perhaps the Burne-Jones-as-infant of the earlier mermaid paintings has now become the corpse of *The Depths of the Sea*, sacrificing himself in pursuit of an unattainable female figure and wasting away in the process. Burne-Jones said of the painting that it was "a dream, well enough."[33] This work, like his earlier

Figure 2. Edward Burne-Jones *The Depths of the Sea,* 1886-1887

mermaid paintings, was a dream-like manifestation of Burne-Jones's desire for a mother, but now this dream had become a nightmare in the face of years of disappointment and unending unfulfilled desire.

This dissolution of the mermaid as mother into the mermaid as murderer in the works of Burne-Jones is also indicative of a cultural anxiety about the new position of women in late-nineteenth century Britain. The closing of the century witnessed a change in women from the "angel of the house," a loving Victorian wife and mother, into the New Woman. This change is mirrored in the works of Edward Burne-Jones, whose mermaid paintings move from mothering, an "angel of the sea," to a lethal seductress, symbolic of the femme fatale New Woman.

When *The Depths of the Sea* was being prepared for exhibition at the Royal Academy, the Academy's current president, Frederic Leighton, was called to approve the work. He was taken aback, especially when Burne-Jones told him of his plan to include extra fish in the final composition. However, Leighton later wrote to Burne-Jones that, "on the contrary, I like the idea of the fishes *hugely*."[34] Perhaps Leighton acquiesced after recollecting the fish painted into his own mermaid picture, painted decades earlier in the late 1850s. In this work, Leighton's homosexuality is apparent, indicated even by his own painted "fishes." Mermaids are subsequently representative of a third kind of male desire, not that for a female figure, but that for a male.

"Part of Your World"[35]: Frederic Leighton, Hans Christian Anderson, and Homosexual Desire

For Frederic Leighton earlier in the nineteenth century, mermaids function as emblems of a different type of unfulfilled male desire, that of homosexual longing. The impossibility of a consummated love between man and mermaid is akin to the prohibition of any expression of homosexual love in the Victorian era. This discussion of homosexuality and mermaids focuses on this work, *The Fisherman and the Syren*, painted by Frederic Leighton from 1856-1858, which shows a mermaid coming out of the sea to charm a fisherman **(Figure 3)**.[36] Leighton chooses to depict the mermaid and fisherman because of his own homosexuality, as evidenced by not only formal elements in the painting but also by Leighton's choice in literary source material. There are several visual elements of the painting that are indicative of homosexual longing. The fisherman's groin is a point of visual fixation: it is both the center of the composition, and contains one of the brightest colors of the work. Also, there is an interesting addition to the lower right-hand corner of the painting, that of two flopping fish falling out of a basket. If these fish are phallic and the basket anal, this part of the painting could be then read as a euphemism for sodomy.[37] These homosexual undertones become more apparent when considered in tandem with the painting's literary source. Leighton's work was originally painted as an illustration to a German poem, "Der Fischer" or "The Fisherman," written by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in 1779. The poem concludes with the following stanza in English translation:[38]

The water rushed, the water rose
And wet his naked feet;
His heart with yearning swells and grows,
As when two lovers meet.
She spoke to him, she sang to him,
His fate became quite plain:
Half drawn by her he glided in
And was not seen again.

Goethe's poem is rife with phallic fixation, from mentions of yearning, swelling, and growing, and most importantly the last two lines, which say that he "glided in / And was not seen again." This, in Leighton's depiction, could be read as one man, the fisherman, giving in to the homosexual advances of another man, the mermaid. However, given Victorian laws and social perceptions, anyone who was found with the physical manifestations of homosexual desire would have been ostracized, or "never seen" in certain social circles again.

Figure 3. Frederic Leighton *The Fisherman and the Syren,* 1856-1858

There is a literary precedence for mermaids representing men yearning for another man, with which many people in the twenty-first century are probably unwittingly familiar: Hans Christian Andersen's "The Little Mermaid." What is excluded from the Disney version of this 1837 story, however, is that Andersen wrote his now famous mermaid myth after being rejected by a man. As discussed by Rictor Nortorn in his anthology *My Dear Boy: Gay Love Letters through the Centuries*, Andersen had a young friend named Edvard Collin, to whom Andersen once said, "I long for you as though you were a beautiful Calabrian girl."[39] Andersen wrote "The Little Mermaid" after Collin married a woman, and subsequently, there are parts of the story that its modern, animated descendent does not show. For instance, the prince marries another woman, and after almost murdering the prince in his sleep, the mermaid casts herself into the ocean and becomes sea foam.[40] Interestingly, the prince makes the little mermaid dress up in male clothing: "He had boy's clothes made for her, so that she could go riding with him."[41] This is an instance of the muddling of the mermaid's gender in the story, which could also translate to painted representations of the mermaid; the mermaid, because she has no definitive sex, can function as either.

In his story, Andersen figures himself as the young mermaid, who longs for a human man so unlike herself that he is unattainable, like a homosexual man would long for a heterosexual man in the nineteenth century, as they would have been worlds apart both socially and in their ability to express desire. Interestingly, the little mermaid, before she has legs, spends much time in the sea, idolizing a statue that looks like the prince. The mermaid's sexual longing manifests in the worship of an art object, potentially just as Andersen would have figured his own story as an expression of his longing for Collin.

Ultimately, mermaids are a "safe" medium for expressing homosexual desire: they are woman enough to masquerade as objects of heterosexual desire, but they are also an Other, or outsider, importantly lacking in female genitalia, so as to allow them to be cast in a different sexual role. However, just as with mermaids representing heterosexual desire, mermaid paintings and stories that illustrate homosexual desire end tragically, either resulting in eternally unfulfilled desire, or violent death, a metaphor for the impossibility of consummating homosexual desire in the Victorian Era.

Chasing Tail

Throughout the long nineteenth century, artists and authors used the motif of the mermaid and her surrounding lore to create unattainable figures and grapple with unfulfilled male desire. In the works of John William Waterhouse, mermaids are icons of impossible sexual

longing and Edward Burne-Jones used mermaids as a means of coping with the loss of his mother during his infancy. The mermaids of both Waterhouse and Burne-Jones also function as microcosms for a greater Victorian cultural anxiety produced contemporary social issues, primarily the rise of the New Woman and decline of the "angel of the house" mother. Frederic Leighton also used the mermaid myth to work through a different kind of unfulfilled male desire, setting up the mermaid as an allegory for homosexual longing. However, quintessential to the mermaid myth is the fatality and futility of any type of union with a mermaid. Mermaid stories did not conclude with the "happily ever after" of other fairytales, just as Waterhouse and Burne-Jones forever lost the traditional Victorian wife and mother to the New Woman at the turn of the century, and Leighton's homosexual desire would have resulted in a social and legal death, or a life alone. The beautiful, tantalizing, and hopeful mermaids ultimately left the desires of Waterhouse, Burne-Jones, and Leighton unfulfilled. All three artists were simply chasing tail.

ENDNOTES

1. This was the crux of my original argument, but during the research process, I discovered a much similar argument in Dijkstra's *Idols of Perversity*, who also argues that mermaids and sirens are representative of the New Woman. I will further and complicate Dijkstra's argument by exploring the works of Waterhouse, whom who he does not mention, and by discussing mermaids in homosexual contexts. Bram Dijkstra, *Idols of Perversity: Fantasies of Feminine Evil in Fin-de-sciecle Culture*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 258-271.
2. Charles Upchurch, *Before Wilde: Sex Between Men in Britain's Age of Reform*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009), 83.
3. Penelope Fitzgerald, *Edward Burne-Jones: A Biography,* (London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1975), 13.
4. Aubrey Noakes, *John William Waterhouse (*London: Chaucer Press, 2004), 14.
5. Elizabeth Prettejohn, *The Art of the Pre-Raphaelites*, (London: Tate Publishing, 2007), 208.
6. Prettejohn, *The Art of the Pre-Raphaelites*, 18.
7. Fiona MaCarthy, *The Last Pre-Raphaelite: Edward Burne-Jones and the Victorian Imagination* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012).
8. Elizabeth Prettejohn, *J.W. Waterhouse: The Modern Pre-Raphaelite*, (London: Royal Academy of Arts, 2008).
9. Tim Barringer, Jason Rosenfield, and Alison Smith, *Pre-Raphaelites: Victorian Avant-Garde*, (London: Tate Publishing, 2012), 52-53.
10. Dijkstra, *Idols of Perversity*, 258-259.
11. Alfred Tennyson, "The Mermaid" (1830), *The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Early Poems of Alfred Lord Tennyson, by Alfred Lord Tennyson*, Project Gutenberg, Last modified October 24, 2012. Accessed October 26, 2013. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/8601/8601-h/8601-h.htm
12. Hans Christian Andersen, "THE LITTLE MERMAID." *The English Illustrated Magazine* no. 99, December 1891, 260-274. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/3457202?accountid=465.
13. In *Middlemarch*, Rosamund Vincy is described as "that perfect piece of womanhood who would reverence her husband's mind after the fashion of an accomplished mermaid, using her comb and looking-glass and singing her song for the relaxation of his adored wisdom alone." George Eliot, *Middlemarch: a study of provincial life*, (Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press Ltd., 2004), 462.
14. For example, a naturalist named Henry Lee published a discussion of mermaids and manatees in *The Leisure Hour*. Henry Lee, "THE MANATEE; OR, THE MERMAID OF FICTION AND OF FACT." *The Leisure Hour, Jan.1877-Oct.1903* no. 1396 (Sep 28, 1878): 619-624. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/3698851?accountid=465.
15. "MARRIED TO A MERMAID." *Judy : Or the London Serio-Comic Journal* (Jul 17, 1878): 27. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/3571477?accountid=465.

16. Otto Sinding, "THE MERMAID." *The Magazine of Art* 6, (01, 1883): 220-221.
17. "And all the mermen under the sea / Would feel their immortality / Die in their hearts for the love of me." lines 28-30 of "The Mermaid" Tennyson.
18. My original assertion that Tennyson's poem inspired Waterhouse's painting is corroborated as a possibility by Elizabeth Prettejohn in her book about Waterhouse. Prettejohn, *J.W. Waterhouse*, 144.
19. Tennyson, line 13.
20. Tennyson, line 23.
21. Tennyson, lines 28-30.
22. Tennyson, lines 28-30.
23. Tennyson, lines 41-42.
24. Prettejohn, *J.W. Waterhouse*, 146.
25. A comment about *The Depths of the Sea* made by Burne-Jones. Fitzgerald, *Edward Burne-Jones*, 211.
26. Art Renewal Center, "The Mermaid Family." Last modified May 04, 2012. Accessed December 10, 2013. http://www.artrenewal.org/pages/artwork.php?artworkid=41502.
27. Tate, "Sir Edward Coley Burne-Jones, The Mermaid 1882." Last modified September 2004. Accessed December 17, 2013. http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/burne-jones-the-mermaid-t00457.
28. Fitzgerald, *Edward Burne-Jones*, 13.
29. MacCarthy, *The Last Pre-Raphaelite*, 396.
30. Caroline Arscott, *William Morris & Edward Burne-Jones: Interlacings (*New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 174.
31. Burne-Jones also depicted a mermaid and a corpse in a roundel called "Grave of the Sea" from his Flower Book, which was posthumously published in 1905, but as I have yet to find a definitive date for the creation of the mermaid roundel, I will not be discussing it in this paper. MacCarthy, *The Last Pre-Raphaelite*, 314.
32. MacCarthy, *The Last Pre-Raphaelite*, 4.
33. Fitzgerald, *Edward Burne-Jones*, 211.
34. Fitzgerald, *Edward Bure-Jones*, 211.
35. The title of a song from the 1989 animated movie *The Little Mermaid*, by Walt Disney Pictures
36.BBC Your Paintings, "The Fisherman and the Syren." Last modified 2013. Accessed December 10, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/arts/yourpaintings/paintings/the-fisherman-and-the-syren-188740.
37. I owe this observation to Caitlin Silberman, PhD student at University of Wisconsin-Madison.
38. Godwin-Jones, Robert. Virginia Commonwealth University, "Der Fischer." Last modified 1999. Accessed December 10, 2013. http://germanstories.vcu.edu/goethe/fischer_dual.html.
39. Norton, Rictor. "Gay History and Literature: The Gay Love Letters of Hans Christian Andersen, Excerpts from My Dear Boy: Gay Love Letters through the Centuries." Last modified n.d. Accessed December 10, 2013. http://rictornorton.co.uk/andersen.htm.
40. Andersen, "The Little Mermaid"
41. Andersen, "The Little Mermaid" 270.

Dilemmas of Global Health: Scientific Knowledge and the Politics of Malaria Control in East Africa (1918-1950)



Species of Mosquito in Africa-1961. Map credit: May, Jacques M.

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The decades immediately after World War II (WWII) beheld political and economic restructurings of the world, and as an intergovernmental humanitarian organization, the World Health Organization (WHO) was part of this new political order. While the organization undoubtedly worked towards the goal of "the attainment of all peoples of the highest possible level of health" in its initial campaign, its actions were steeped in ambiguity. Malaria control was the first global health campaign that the WHO took up in 1947. In British East Africa, the campaign simultaneously critiqued and reified British colonial power. This contradiction flowed from unresolved tensions between the social and technical aspects of disease ecology, combined with the global and regional political-economic contexts in which the WHO was operating. Broadly, the paradox represents the WHO's attempts to navigate the moral and political dilemmas of global health. In navigating these dilemmas, I argue that the WHO focused on social aspects of malariology, but in a technoscientific manner that ultimately *harmed* their goals.

While malaria control was a worldwide initiative, examining its particulars requires a regional case study. As such, I focus on British East Africa in the early 1950s. This setting has added significance in that it witnessed the creation of ecological disease and vector management from the 1920s to the 1940s. I begin our narrative here, examining the centrality of East African environments and ideas in the translation of vector disease management. Following this, I will move into the 1940s to analyze the environmental and economic factors that contributed to the spread of malaria along with the politics surrounding the WHO's funding. After setting this context, I will travel to the WHO's conference in Kampala, Uganda to observe and dissect the ways in which WHO malariologists navigated the contradictions of postwar international health.[1]

Imperial Environments, Empirical Complexities: 1918-1940

The WHO's malaria control campaign in the 1950s predicated itself upon ecological disease management – altering the environment to control disease. As Helen Tilley illustrates in *Africa as a Living Laboratory*, early twentieth century British experiences in Africa's environments produced the conceptual foundations of disease ecology. As a result of such ontological context, disease ecology contained British and African *entangled epistemologies* of environment and disease causation, which included both socioeconomic and biophysical factors. As this co-produced knowledge circulated globally it became accepted as scientific truth, and manifested decades later in the actions of WHO malariologists. Since biophysical variations in the East African environment feature centrally in this story, we shall first view these "imperial ecologies."[2]

The East African region contains significant micro and macro-climatic variation. Spanning the equator, East Africa is subject to frequent rains and stable warm temperatures, which result in biologically dense and diverse rainforests. To the equator's North and South lie the monsoon climates, which receive seasonal precipitation and have distinct wet and dry seasons. Regional macroclimatic variation results in the presence of different disease strains, but East Africa's microclimates, resulting from its variegated topography, drive the subtle diversities of diseases and other organisms. The regional landscape consists of rolling hills and valleys alongside flat grasslands, interrupted and ecologically separated by steep mountains. This erratic landscape creates habitat variation and, by extension, microclimatic species composition. These distinct biogeographies are responsible for supporting separate disease environments in which diseases have coevolved with other organisms, including humans. Over numerous generations, coevolution can result in the development of immunity mechanisms, as is the case for malaria. East Africa's biogeographical

complexity prompted new paradigms through which the British understood the region, continent, and in-turn the entire world.[3]

In their attempts to understand and manage their African Empire, British scientists and colonial officials relied upon rigorous observations of East African environments, which included their human residents. As a result of British observations and field experiments, East African indigenous knowledge of environmental disease management was incorporated into the scientific lexicon. Aspects of East African understandings of disease causation combined with those of the British through interpretation, and in the process features of each group's epistemology were removed. This abstraction, which Helen Tilley terms *epistemological entanglement*, was true for agro-ecological sciences along with medical science. To illustrate the process of entanglement, and the subsequent creation of disease ecology, we will briefly survey the case of East African sleeping sickness from 1918 to 1930.[4]

Sleeping sickness represented a vector-borne illness of British concern and frequent research in East Africa; British game warden and scientist Charles Swynnerton embodies this research in our story. As with malaria, sleeping sickness occurred epidemically in East Africa, was transmitted by insects – tsetse flies – and worried the British because of its negative economic impacts. These concerns came to constitute "the tsetse problem." Just after the First World War – around 1918 – Charles Swynnerton, then living in Tanganyika, became interested in "the tsetse problem." He traveled around the Southern part of the protectorate, venturing into Mozambique to conduct research.

Swynnerton observed the region, recorded his observations, and systematized them into enlightenment science. In his notes, Swynnerton documented not only physical and biological tsetse habitats, but also the Zulu inhabitants' method for managing the fly. Their technique entailed regularly setting controlled fires, which burned grassland and destroyed tsetse habitat. After observing and recording this process of disease management, Swynnerton secured a grant from the metropole to scientifically test the fire-setting management strategy. Swynnerton's tests, the Shinyanga-Kahana fire plots, occurred over an eleven year time period. The studies involved burning set areas of grassland and counting flies and fly carcasses therein. This method of testing was novel in that it occurred in the field, as opposed to a controlled laboratory. Throughout these experiments, Swynnerton translated the functions of indigenous disease management into accepted scientific language – entangling two epistemic traditions. However, the incorporation of newly discovered epidemiological techniques was not without its tensions with bioscience.[5]

Swynnerton's disease management possessed two fundamental tensions with bioscience: the ideology made *non*-reductionist claims and included social as well as ecological factors. Swynnerton's observations of more than twenty species of tsetse fly in the Shinyanga-Kahana tests convinced him that it made little sense to prescribe one solution to them all, since each had a unique set of interactions with local environments. The emphasis on the interdependence of flies and their environments stood counter to bioscience's reductionist focus on individual organisms and indicates a potential inclusion of African healing ideals of *environmental hazard management*. Moreover, tsetse management, because it necessitated overseeing land upon which people lived, required humans and their social relations to be included in the ecological calculus. Though his view accounted for the impact of human land use on the biological distribution of disease, Swynnerton did not incorporate many other East African public health practices into ecology. The British scientific epistemology encoded only functional aspects of indigenous tsetse management and did not necessarily ascribe value to their accompanying worldview. This functionalist use of social medicine led public health campaigns in Africa to look at-times like social engineer-

ing – moving populations in order to manage the social aspects of ecology. Nevertheless, these dual understandings (that human agency impacted tsetse distribution through land use and that an interdependence of factors influenced disease vectors) shaped malaria control's future in East Africa.[6]

Throughout this section I have delved into the dichotomy between British science and East African indigenous knowledge. While such a dichotomy existed *prior to* the colonial process, I have suggested one way in which the contrast blurred – or, as Tilley would put it, the epistemologies entangled – as a result of British and African interaction. Interestingly, in this epistemic blending, popular healers' knowledge did not merge with that of the British. Rather, a semblance of East African collective knowledge became encoded as a result of the rigorous empirical observation undertaken by the British in order to understand East African environments; by extension this led to the recording of the population's broader tendencies. Moreover, as British scientists translated understandings of disease management, the ideas moved from the field-laboratories of Africa into scientific theory. Through the twenties, disease ecology became more widely accepted. By 1933, social dimensions of ecological management began to become academically accepted. The publication of Julian Huxley's seminal text *Animal Ecology*, which included the addition of "human ecology" as one node of an ecological nexus, illustrates this acceptance. Though seemingly esoteric, Huxley's text was likely read by many of the WHO malariologists being trained at the time. Outside of the academy in the thirties, social welfare considerations were being debated within the context of African malaria control.[7]

Along with conceptually grafting landscape management from tsetse flies to malarial mosquitos, the move to scientific theory also heightened disease ecology's tensions with bioscience. Two fractures became particularly apparent. The first division – a result of experiences with tsetse fly control and the recognition of the environmental complexity of Africa – called into question assumed linear ecological relationships. Second came the question of whether or not an organism could be "eradicated." These two ecological uncertainties, in combination with the inclusion of human agency in ecological change, propelled one of the central debates between malariologists in the 1930s: whether malaria should be controlled directly via short-term campaigns to eradicate specific mosquito species, or indirectly through long-term social and sanitary measures. At its 1950 conference in Kampala, Uganda, the WHO built upon these debates and seemingly favored the short-term (eradication) method for malaria control. In order to understand how the discarding of long-term disease management though social welfare came about, we must examine the political and economic contexts in which this action occurred; in so doing we will also explore the reasons for malaria's prevalence in tropical Africa.[8]

Economies of Disease and the Politics of Aid: 1940-1950

As a post-WWII humanitarian organization, the WHO was embedded in the postwar political economy. Furthermore, the WHO's malaria control campaign at times conflicted with the British colonial economic structures that underlay malarial endemicity. These dual political-economic contexts shaped the type of aid provided by the organization and thus are important to the narrative of malaria control in East Africa.

East African malarial causality was simultaneously biological and economic; its limits were spatial and temporal. That is, the disease diffused through labor migration, but without its parasitic biology, labor movement would not have spread the disease. Similarly, export-oriented agriculture produced mosquito habitat, though this would not have led to a malaria epidemic

without the disease being spread by mosquitos. Thus, we must briefly examine the biology of malaria. Space and time limit the spread of malaria, though factors such as the speed with which people move between areas also alters the distribution of disease. The *Plasmodium* parasite produces malaria and spreads through mosquitos that feed upon and carry infected blood between vertebrate organisms. Once inside a host, the parasite remains dormant for 5 to 6 days. Transmission of malaria can only occur within the first two weeks of symptom visibility – the period in which *Plasmodium* can infect and gestate in mosquitos. This window for virus infectivity presents a temporal constraint on malaria.[9]

Two ecological factors spatially constrain malaria-the first being the presence of mosquito habitat. The rate of malaria transmission is contingent upon mosquito density and life-length **(Figure 1)**. Therefore, environments with high amounts of pooled water – mosquito-breeding habitat – stand higher chances of being malarial hotbeds. Inhospitable ecological boundaries, such as altitude and the flight range of mosquitoes (four to five miles) also limit insect distribution. The second spatial constraint on malaria is acquired immunity. African populations that coevolved with malarial mosquitos possess an acquired resistance to the disease. This immunity is specific to certain disease environments and disappears roughly six months after leaving a locality. All this is to say that if a person were to temporarily move out of one ecosystem, become infected with malaria due to a lack of local immunity, and return within a two-week time frame to a mosquito dense ecology, he or she could spread malaria.[10]



Fig 5 —Theoretical infection rates by ages corresponding to various inoculation rates (h). The limiting value for all values of h exceeding 0·005 is 1·0.

Figure 1: Spread of Malaria. This idealized graph shows that the longer mosquitos live, the lower the necessary inoculation rate (with the *Plasmodium* virus) for them to be equally as effective disease vectors. In sum, the longer that mosquitos live the more likely they are to transmit malaria. Source: WHO/Mal/132, September 1955, Macdonald G., *Epidemiological Basis for Malaria Control*, appendix.

The colonial economy in East Africa did just this; it amplified the spread of malaria by driving mass-movement at an elevated pace between disease environments. From the 1920s onward, Mombasa operated as the economic center of East Africa. The labor force tended to migrate from upland Kenya and Eastern Uganda to the metropolis. Disappearing rural jobs, the restructuring of rural land rights, and the opening of urban labor markets, drove this migration. However, the high cost of urban housing forced many poor urban workers to become squatters or migrate to and from rural areas. The construction of the Uganda Mail train from Mombasa to Kampala made this journey easier and faster. The train also carried mosquitos across the ecological bound-

ary of the Kenyan highlands **(Figure 2).** Thus, the colonial land and labor economies stimulated the mass-movement of people and malaria. Moreover, the Uganda Mail shortened travel time and carried mosquitos, effectively mixing disease environments.[11]



Figure 2: East African Train Routes. We can see not only the Uganda Mail in the North, but also trains running through Tanganyika. Likewise, the grey areas are marked off for the infamous groundnut scheme in the country, an example of the expansion of bare soil for agricultural development. These groundnuts were to go to Britain in order to make peanut oil. Source: British Information Services, *Not Just Peanuts: The Story of Britain's Great Agricultural Experiment in East Africa* (New York: British Information Services, 1948) pp.7.

In addition to driving labor migration, East African economies spread malaria through their emphasis on export-oriented agriculture in the early-to-mid twentieth century. In most instances, colonial agriculture required large plantations of monoculture cash crops, which often constituted corn, cotton, or coffee. When the fields were being plowed for planting they contained large amounts of bare soil. Because of East African soil's characteristic impermeability in heavy rains, bare fields provided ample mosquito breeding grounds. Additionally, smallholders on the export market were pressured to increase production, intensifying plowing and harvest time, and increasing mosquito habitat in ways similar to plantation agriculture. The scale and intensive clearing required by export agriculture created large amounts of mosquito breeding habitat.[12]

In the postwar era, export agriculture reigned supreme, but it grew tensions with malaria control. As in the colonial economy prior to WWII, export-oriented agriculture continued through the postwar period as the leading paradigm for development. We may note that the British goal of agricultural development and the WHO goal of reduced malaria appear incompatible. Since export agriculture increased mosquito breeding grounds, controlling malaria required controlling agricultural development. In order to navigate the politics of this decision, the WHO sought to reconcile malaria control and agricultural development through insecticide use.[13]

The landscape management approach to malaria created in the 1920s and 30s had a new technological companion by the 1950s: DDT. This chemical, a synthetic chlorinated compound first used as an insecticide in the forties, became heralded as the solution to malaria worldwide. During WWII, DDT was wildly successful in keeping malaria – previously a significant cause of wartime mortality – at bay in the South Pacific islands. Following this WWII experience, DDT and other organochloride chemicals were applied mostly as larvacides to mosquito breeding areas in Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya. This monotypic landscape management strategy may

appear to run counter to the earlier complex view of disease ecology, but it is *not that conceptually different* than prescribing controlled grassland burning for tsetse flies. While DDT does not distinguish between environments, as do grass-fires, the WHO often provided the caveat, "in the absence of local experience to the contrary…" when discussing DDT. This statement attempted to leave open malaria control methods that were more responsive to ecological complexity. The conference also expressed some unease about using DDT because of the potential for mosquitoes to evolve resistance to the chemical, but the concern was overridden by the urgency of malaria prevention. While not wholly technical, DDT-based landscape management possessed significantly less of a social focus than previous strategies; DDT required fewer land use considerations than fire management. Crucially, the use of the chemical allowed the WHO to delicately navigate the British emphasis on agriculture-driven development and thus conclude that malaria control and intensive agriculture were compatible; DDT was, we could say, a political bargaining chip.[14]

The chemical, however, was not without its costs, which proved both monetarily and politically expensive. In 1953, the cost of DDT and its counterpart BHC used for residual house spraying in Tanganyika was $162,638 alone. This is significant because residential spraying was the least used method of chemical malaria control, consuming far less DDT than environmental larvicides. Much of the funding for these pesticides, and for the WHO itself, came from the United States. This resulted in the creation of some political strings. One stipulation of the United States government – for both the Truman and then Eisenhower administrations – was a focus on technical as opposed to social medicine. The United States did not want to be promoting anything resembling to socialism – which it viewed social medicine as being – because of the ongoing Cold War humanitarian contest between it and the Soviet Union. Regardless of the basis for the United States' stipulations, they required the WHO's campaign to mainly focus on a technical type of medicine. The WHO's campaign nonetheless had social undercurrents.[15]

Before examining the malaria control campaign, let us recap the story so far. The idea of environmental disease control came into being during the interwar period in East Africa, largely as a result of colonial empiricism in a diversity of environments. This emerging method of landscape management hybridized African and British ideas, as demonstrated by its increased social orientation. The medical methodology approached human interactions with a birds-eye view of "human ecology," a method that had not yet been incorporated into the understood ecological complexity of Africa. Environmental disease control developed tensions with biomedical science by proposing the interrelatedness of environmental factors, including the role that humans played. Moving through WWII and into the postwar era, technical biomedicine largely trumped socio-environmental malaria management. The technological and political contexts of DDT, Cold War competitive humanitarian aid, and the colonial political economy all shaped the decision for technoscientific malaria control. The term technoscience refers to applied life sciences – i.e. ecological disease management – that *privilege* the use of complex technologies, therefore creating a class of technical experts and *excluding non-experts* from making knowledge claims. Here we should note the movement of ideas from the East African field laboratory into scientific acceptance, and again to international contestation. Similarly, let us note the ways that these ideas were shaped by their political, economic, and technological contexts. Despite hopes to the contrary, the technical experts planning the application of DDT were not *by any means* engaged in an apolitical activity.

The Dilemmas of Global Health: 1950

Despite the technological cures for malaria espoused by the WHO, the management strategies of malariology contained social ideas at their core. As such, the WHO's 1950 conference

witnessed a tension between social and technical malaria management, which took place under the rhetorical mobilization of 'complexity'. Combined with pressures from the political economy of humanitarian aid, this ideological tension ruptured in a paradoxical reification and critique of colonial rule. To unpack this contradiction I examine the WHO's 1950 conference on malaria in Kampala, Uganda. I am aware of the danger in ascribing political consequences to discourse in a conference, since discussion often deviates from practice, so I will only speculate on the material implications of the conference. I conclude that in navigating the dilemmas of global health, the WHO focused on social aspects of medicine in a technoscientific manner that ultimately harmed their goals of improving human wellbeing. One of the key ways this occurred was through notions of economic development.

The WHO reinforced colonial political and economic structures in two ways. First, the organization took for granted and thus legitimized postwar metropole-driven development, and second, the WHO perpetuated global power inequalities by not consulting indigenous East Africans when making decisions about malaria control. These actions are permutations of ideas of ecological complexity that harken back to East Africa the 1920s.

One of the most centrally held tenets held at the conference was that of African development. The WHO Deputy Director in opening the conference stated the organization's rationale:

> It is true that the peoples of Africa south of the Sahara are still in an under-developed state insofar as degree of civilization and cultural and social development are concerned. But, on the other hand… Africans have benefited over many decades from technical and scientific expertise of very highly developed countries.[16]

While we cannot know the degree to which this statement was political – colonial officials were listening to the address – it shows that the WHO did not contest metropole-driven economic and technological development at the conference. The address went on to recommend that the conference investigate "…economic progress, independently of sanitary intervention," as a prophylaxis for malaria. We may think it strange that the WHO, a medical organization in the 1950s, discussed economic development at a malaria conference. However, as Randall Packard notes, malaria control and eradication were part of a larger vision of postwar development. We have seen this theme previously in our narrative with the WHO's attempt to reconcile agricultural-driven development and malaria control. Throughout the conference, the attendees saw malaria and economic development as interlinked, concluding, "The economic effects of [malaria] mortality produce a social condition which is incompatible with economic health."[17]

By suggesting that economic development was necessary for African wellbeing the WHO reinforced colonial authority. As Fredrick Cooper points out, "development" was a means by which the British sought to update their hegemony in the postwar era. They hoped to increase political and economic rights for colonial subjects, but in a tightly controlled fashion. Thus, by accepting aims of economic development but *not clarifying what type of economic development*, the WHO endorsed the colonial model. Though we may easily criticize the organization for not challenging these ideas, we must recall the context in which they were operating. Lest we forget, the WHO needed colonial support to successfully run its malaria campaign in East Africa. Focusing on economic development in combination with scientific landscape management seemed a compromise that satisfied internal tensions among malariology, as well as increasing human wellbeing *in the aggregate*. However the WHO, by using the unspecific rhetoric of "economic development," did not attempt to change the political economic causes of malaria; rather it worked around, and therefore reinforced, them.[18]

The WHO also supported colonial rule in East Africa by recapitulating power inequalities. None of the attendees of the 1950 conference in Kampala, whether malariologist or otherwise, were indigenous Africans. Even those representing African countries were colonial officials. In this way, the conference perpetuated existing power inequities by disallowing East Africans to have a say in what happened to their land. The rationale for excluding the indigenous population grew from the notion that the ecological complexities contained within malariology were too difficult for them to comprehend.[19]

Ideas of complexity and economic health were contained within the broad valance of disease ecology, created in East Africa during the 1920s. As explained in the first section, a key reason that British officials vigorously observed and recorded East African environments was to understand their complexities. Notions of intricate environments continued throughout the WHO malaria control campaign. The conference report attempted to document the interactions of critical mosquito vectors in order to properly manage them in relation to varied ecologies. Similarly, malaria transmission became encoded in sophisticated statistical models (cf. Figure 2). While these models existed as tools to understand the complicated spread of malaria, they also served to enforce expert technical knowledge and bar Africans from decision-making. Furthermore, the idea of considering economic health as intertwined with malaria stemmed from disease ecology's understanding of complexity. This concept grew from the "human ecology" encoded into disease ecology from its beginnings. Malariologists possessed some understanding of the interconnectedness of diseases and economies, and thus supported development as a social medicine for malaria. A confounding, and ultimately detrimental, aspect of the rhetoric of complexity is that it privileges 'birds-eye' views of populations, rather than the individual lives of those that the WHO sought to help. Moreover, this use of disease ecology possesses two ironies. First, methods for managing complex ecosystems, *co-created by East Africans and British*, were used in the postwar era as a reason to, discount African claims to knowledge and also to exclude them from *actual* decision-making power. Second, the broad valence of social health––encompassing economic health––was used in ways that were detrimental to East Africans' wellbeing. However, the WHO *did* notice that the economy impacted malaria distribution.[20]

The WHO used notions of the economy to subtly critique British colonial power. Particularly, these implicit criticisms related to the labor and agricultural economies:

> In some of the higher altitudes in Kenya malaria follows man. His presence, the work he undertakes, often causes the formation of *A. gambiae* and *A. funestes* breeding places, *together with the extensive movement of population groups* carrying parasites, all created the conditions favorable to the epidemics which appear from time to time, with all their serious consequences.
>
> The case is entirely different when, as sometimes happens, populations have lost their immunity and return to malarial zones. *The Copper Belt areas workers in Northern Rhodesia are a case in point; they often present very grave symptoms when they return to their place of origin after a more or less prolonged stay in the mines*, where they are not infected. The same applies to persons who stay for a long time in towns or other places protected from infection. (Emphasis my own)[21]

Criticisms of colonial economies are only alluded to in the passage above, as was the case with the rest of the speeches at the conference. Furthermore, critiques were not directed at any specific organization or individual, but rather at the mobility of Africans *writ large*. The organization's hesitancy to ascribe a direct social cause to the disease likely stemmed from tensions pres-

ent in malariology. While the discipline recognized socioeconomic factors as impacting disease, its technoscientific aspects forced WHO malariologists into a position of scientific objectivity. Thus, we enter the dilemmas of global health.

Navigating The Dilemmas

The dilemmas of global health were – and are – simultaneously moral and political, and though present in malariology from the outset, took on new meaning in the postwar era. In short, the WHO needed funds and political goodwill to operate in East Africa, but in order to receive support they had to endorse a more technoscientific approach. This predicament was one heard earlier in disease ecology: does one address health problems in the short term, using technical fixes, knowing that there will be political will? Or, does one take a longer-term social approach to health that involves political and economic restructuring, knowing that there will likely be political resistance? These basic dilemmas took on new urgency with the scale of postwar global health. While the interwar era beheld these debates, colonial authorities ultimately coordinated vector disease control on local scales. As such, they involved some human interaction with people that they, albeit paternalistically, aimed to help. In the postwar era, the WHO only possessed a 'view from above', which led even the social aspects of their health campaign to be technoscientific.[22]

The organization's solution to the issue of labor migration is an apt place from which to synthesize the WHO's navigation of the dilemmas of global health. Rather than address the structural causes of labor migration:

> …the conference [felt] that mass movements of non-immune or semi-immune populations to the malarious areas *should be supervised* in order to prevent consequences… (Emphasis my own)[23]

Interestingly, this solution is both social and technoscientific. Surveillance is a fix to the spread of malaria, and even represents a birds-eye view of the disease's 'human ecology'. However, in seeking to control the complexity of malaria dispersal, the WHO viewed human populations in the same light as disease vectors. Both were merely factors needing to be controlled to slow the spread of malaria. With mosquitos, the solution seemed to be DDT, with East African populations it seemed to be surveillance. Furthermore, the objective position the organization took on the international political stage had profound political implications on more localized scales. All of this represents a strange permutation of the initial ideas of disease ecology, which occurred from on-the-ground observations of human and environmental complexities. It is thus worthwhile to reflect on the reasons for these changes.

Through this story there has been a delicate interplay between ideas of disease and the environment, political economies and technology; each factor impacts the others in unforeseen ways. In this narrative, we have watched the perplexing circulation of East African indigenous knowledge over the course of roughly 30 years. We have seen it removed from the field laboratories and the intimate connections between colonial scientist, local environment and East African individual, and enter into scientific abstraction. In this process, the knowledge moved from the field to become a proverbial view from above, represented by Huxley's 'human ecology' node. We observed this method of managing malaria grapple with, and become shaped by, the politics of global health. Both the politics of funding and the political economies of running a disease campaign in a foreign country altered malariology. The WHO navigated this context by taking a paradoxically political position of objectivity, illustrated by the case of proposing surveillance – a removal of liberties and therefore *power* – of East Africans in the name of controlling malaria.

We have also seen the ways that the introduction of DDT allowed malariology to navigate the politically charged dilemma of economic development in an intensely technical way. Throughout, we have also seen the political implications of the tensions between the social and technical nature of ecological disease control. It is this history of malaria control that allowed the WHO to simultaneously critique and reify colonial rule in East Africa in its attempt to navigate the dilemmas of global health.

While we could conclude our journey with that, I would also like to suggest a lesson to be learned from the WHO's navigation of the political and economic realities they faced. The organization occupied a morally ambiguous position throughout this narrative. While it aimed to improve the health of people, the organization made many compromises along the way––choices that ultimately controlled malaria at the cost of East African wellbeing. This stemmed from the WHO's engagement with East Africans as statistics and economic actors – *not as individuals*. Global health campaigns require compromises to be made; such is the nature of the dilemma. However, by giving equal consideration to the lived realities and daily experiences of those that they seek to help––recognizing them as the valuable *human beings* they are, and not as disease statistics to be cured, eradicated and solved––these campaigns can begin to navigate the moral and political dilemmas with less ambiguity.[24]

ENDNOTES

1. On the highest possible standard of health, see the main objectives of the WHO: Kelly Lee, *Historical Dictionary of the World Health Organization*, (Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, 1993) pp. 281. The organization defines health as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." For a discussion on this global political change in regards to Africa see: Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940: the Past of the Present* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). For a discussion on African colonial development, see chapter 3 (pp. 39-65) of this book, on international development, see chapter 5 (pp. 91-131). In this paper I use the terms bioscience and technoscience interchangeably. What I mean by technoscience is, in effect, applied bioscience that is heavily contingent upon technology (defined in a broad sense to include mathematical, chemical, and economic technologies) and thus upon technical experts.

2. Much of this first section leans heavily into the research of Helen Tilley, See: Helen Tilley, *Africa as a living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problems of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011) pp. 186-197. I do not intend to reify the concept of "African traditional knowledge," but rather I use the term vernacular knowledge in reference to a form of understanding and managing the world that is distinct from Enlightenment scientific ideas. I set up the dichotomy as such in an attempt to understand the ways in which two different approaches to understanding the world mixed together. For a discussion of the problematic nature of "indigenous knowledge," and likewise "colonial science" (another morass I attempt to avoid), see: Tilley, *Africa as A Living Laboratory*, pp. 10-11. I take the term "Imperial Ecologies from Peder Anker's book by the same name, which details British documentation and ordering of its colonies environments.

3. For an overview of African macro and microclimates see: James C. McCann, *Green Land, Brown Land, Black Land: An Environmental History of Africa*, 1800-1990 (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1999) pp. 10-19. The diversity of flora and fauna in environments results from Liebig's law of the minimum, an ecological principal that states that growth in environments is not

controlled by the amount of resources but rather the amount of limiting resources. Thus, in a biologically rich environment species adapt so that different limiting resources control their growth––prompting a larger number of smaller populations. Further discussion of Liebig's law and population: Michel Danger et al., "Does Liebig's Law of the Minimum Scale up from Species to Communities," *Oikos* 117.11, November 2008, pp. 1741-1751. Some of the mentioned disease environments' borders can be seen for the case of mosquitos in figure 1.

4. On empiricism of the British in Africa and knowledge translation, see: Tilley, *Africa as A living Laboratory*, pp. 186-197. On the recording of culture along with the nature see: Megan Vaughan, *Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness*, (United Kingdom: Polity Press, 1991) pp. 33-35, and 50-53.

5. For a more detailed account of Swynnerton's story see: Tilley, *Africa as A Living Laboratory*, pp. 186-197.

6. On the fire experiments and ecological complexity, see: Ibid, 197-199. Swynnerton's African assistant, Swedi bin Abdallah –not Swynnerton– discovered that the multiple species of tsetse fly. Similarly, another one of Swynnerton's African assistants managed the test plots and increased the land being tested by gaining support from local leaders –an example of the social nature of field science and land management. On the reductionist tendencies of bioscience, see: Arthur Kleinman, "What Is Specific to Biomedicine?" in *Writing at the Margin: Discourse between Anthropology and Medicine* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 27-29, and 36-37. On environmental hazard management in African medicine: John Janzen and Edward Green, "Continuity, Change, and Challenge in African Medicine" in *Medicine Across Cultures* ed. by Helaine Selin and Hugh Shapiro (New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), pp. 15-16. For Swynnerton's discussion of social relations and disease distribution, see: Tilley, *Africa as A Living Laboratory*, pp. 197. For the fusion of social medicine with biomedicine in Africa, and the occasionally resulting social engineering: Ibid. pp.204. Tilley discusses the use of social medicine as a justification for African resettlement campaigns. For a discussion of the false dualism of nature and society in Western thought see: Neil Smith, *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space* (Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1984), pp. 10-20.

7. For a discussion of the type of African knowledge encoded, see: Ibid. pp. 215-216. Tilley points out that the process of knowledge translation "bridged a gap between technoscience and ethnoscience." For a discussion on the diaspora of ecological knowledge and its acceptance in the academy, see: Ibid. pp. 198-208.

8. On the questioning of linear assumptions of ecological relationships and debates between malariologists: Ibid. pp. 209-211.

9. For a historical account of malaria's spread and temporal limits on infection, see: Randall M. Packard, *The Making of a Tropical Disease: A Short History of Malaria*, (Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), pp. 23-24, and 36.

10. For a more detailed biological assessment of malaria and its spatial limitations: Ibid. pp.20-29. Malaria is also limited by mosquitos' propensity for feeding on humans. However, *Anopheles gambie*, the predominant mosquito in East Africa fed on human blood with regularity. On the flight range of mosquitos (*A. gambie* and *A. funestes*) see: World Health Organization/Malaria series of OFFSET Documents (1947 - 2000) (henceforth WHO/Mal)/54, October 10, 1950, Dr. Botha de Meillon, *Species and Subspecies of Vectors and Their Bionomics*, pp. 4 and 8.

11. On land rights and labor migration from Uganda, see: T.B. Kabwegyere, "Land and The Growth of Social Stratification in Uganda: A Sociological Interpretation," in Bethwell A. Ogot, *Hadith 6: History & Social Change in East Africa* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1976)

pp. 120-127, and 133. On migrant labor in Mombasa, see: Karin K. Janmohamed, "African Laborers in Mombasa, c. 1895 – 1940," in Bethwell A. Ogot, *Hadith 5: Economic and Social History of East Africa* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1972) pp.163-166, and 170. I am unclear as to when the Uganda Mail was constructed, but I do know that by the 1940s it was operational between Mombasa and Kampala. Similarly, I do not know if the prices were affordable to Ugandans/Kenyans, but regardless of whether-or-not they were taking the train they were migrating. On mosquitos and trains, see: WHO/Mal/54, October 10, 1950, Dr. Botha de Meillon, *Species and Subspecies of Vectors and Their Bionomics*, pp. 9.

12. Uganda is a notable exception to plantation agriculture, as colonial land laws in this protectorate stipulated small land holdings. For a discussion on this and the economic pressure on smallholders, see: Kabwegyere, "Land and the Growth of Social Stratification in Uganda," pp.122-124. On East Africa's agricultural landscape see: Ibid. and Tothill, John Douglas ed., *Agriculture in Uganda* (London: Oxford University Press, 1940). Particularly see the chapters on cotton, corn, and coffee. Agricultural development was central to the postwar plan for the colonies, the most infamous example of which is the Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme (see figure 5). Agricultural developments such as the groundnut scheme were highly mechanized, opening up and compacting bare soil on which water would pool to create mosquito habitat. On plowed ferraltic Soils collecting water, see: McCann, *Green Land, Brown Land, Black Land*, pp. 12; and WHO/Mal/54, October 10, 1950, Dr. Botha de Meillon, *Species and Subspecies of Vectors and Their Bionomics*, pp. 10-11. On the abundance of ferraltic soils in East Africa, see: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 1996, Eric Rose, *70 FAO Soils Bulletin*, Chapter 11.

13. On the prevalence of export driven agricultural development, see: Joseph Morgan Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007) pp. 145, and 205. On the reconciliation of agriculture and insect control in WHO rhetoric see: WHO/Mal/69, January 1951, World Health Organization, *Report of the Malaria Conference in Equatorial Africa*, pp. 45. The organization also suggested coordination between health and agricultural departments, but the little instruction it provided on this coordination involved insecticide use.

14. For a discussion of DDT as the silver bullet to malaria (especially from the American point of view) coming out of WWII, see: Edmund Russell, *War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from World War I to Silent Spring*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) pp. 160-175. There were concerns about DDT use, but given the alternative of malaria these concerns were assuaged for the US military and eventually WHO. For a discussion of malaria control methods and their frequency of use, see: WHO/Mal/69, January 1951, World Health Organization, *Report of the Malaria Conference in Equatorial Africa*, pp. 45-48. Though DDT certainly appears to be a one-size-fits-all solution, the WHO's view was slightly more nuanced and they explored various composures of the chemical. Similarly, DDT application still required interacting with local populations in order to spray houses.

15. Statistics for Uganda and Kenya were not as complete as those for Tanganyika, otherwise they too would have been included, for the statistics see: *Information on the Malaria Control Program in Tanganyika*, WHO Chief of the Malaria Section, 27 June, 1955, pp. 4-5. WHO/Mal/126-8-13; for a detailed account of exorbitantly expensive malaria control in West Africa see: Webb, James L. A. JR., "The First Large-Scale Use of Synthetic Insecticide for Malaria Control in Tropical Africa: Lessons from Liberia, 1945–1962," *Journal of the History of Medicine and the Allied Sciences*, V.66, No.3 (2010) pp. 351–359. On the Cold War politics of the WHO's funding, particularly in American foreign policy: Packard, *Making a Tropical Disease*, pp. 145-149. The Truman admin-

istration operationalized an anti-socialist health foreign policy agenda through the Truman Doctrine of containing the spread of communism, often through humanitarian aid. I speculate that the USA also possessed a vested interest in maintaining the British economic structures that caused malaria, as they needed Britain's economy to grow for postwar reconstruction. The investigation of this hunch is slightly beyond this paper's scope.

16. For the full transcript of the WHO Deputy Director's address, see: WHO/Mal/69, January 1951, World Health Organization, *Report of the Malaria Conference in Equatorial Africa*, pp. 18-23. The Deputy Director of the WHO spoke directly after the British governor of Uganda.

17. For discussions of economic health within the WHO, see" WHO/Mal/60, October 1950, G. Macdonald, *The Economic Importance of Malaria in Africa*, pp. 15. On Malaria as one tool in the development toolbox, see: Randall Packard, "Visions of Postwar Health and Development and Their Impact on Public Health Interventions in the Developing World," in *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* ed. by Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 109-110.

18. On development as a means by which to update colonial power, see: Cooper, *Africa since 1940*, pp. 38-40. Cooper also observes that this developmental model was harder to control than initially thought. Given more time I would examine the ways that the WHO fit into this, unintentional, fracturing of colonial power in East Africa. However, this requires observing the lived realities of Africans and WHO malariologists, and is thus slightly beyond the scope of this paper in its current form.

19. For the list of conference attendees, see: WHO/Mal/69, January 1951, World Health Organization, *Report of the Malaria Conference in Equatorial Africa*, pp. 2-5. While the conference did have dignitaries from African colonies, they appear to be colonial officials and not black Africans.

20. For the WHO's attempt at a comprehensive list of mosquito interactions, see: Ibid. pp. 31-41. For statistical models of malaria transmission, see: WHO/Mal/132, September 1955, Macdonald G., *Epidemiological Basis for Malaria Control*, pp.16-20. Figure 4 was drawn from this document. I am slightly uneasy about the idea of economic health as a continuity from interwar disease ecology. More research regarding ideas of vector control in the 1930s and ideas of vector control in the 1950s is necessary to complete validate this argument.

21. WHO/Mal/69, January 1951, World Health Organization, *Report of the Malaria Conference in Equatorial Africa*, pp. 42-43.

22. The WHO too coordinated their malaria campaign on regional levels, and those involved in carrying it out did have more personal interactions with East Africans. However, these interactions are beyond the scope of this paper, as I seek to understand the way by which the WHO organizationally navigated the dilemmas of global health. Given more time and more accounts from the malariologists deployed by the WHO I would like to look into the ways in which the on-the-ground campaign differed from and matched up to conference debates and decisions.

23. Ibid.

24. Some may note that I have managed to tell the story of malaria control in East Africa without mentioning the campaign's actions or East African's views. Moreover, this story focuses on faceless organizations and not the individual actors who made up these groups. I have taken the birds-eye view of which I am so critical. Given more time though, this history could be told with a focus on the lived experiences of East Africans and members of the WHO enacting the malaria control campaign.

Ginseng's Wisconsin Roots: The Growth of an Industry

American ginseng grown under wooden shade in a Monk Ginseng Garden in Wisconsin

Emily Nelson discovered the fascinating topic of Ginseng in Wisconsin during a research fellowship with the Wisconsin Oral History Project. She is pursuing a bachelors of art degree with a history major and has a special interest in 20th century American history. This paper was recently awarded the Baensch Prize for best essay on Wisconsin history.

Mentions of a ginseng trade appear sporadically in the history of Wisconsin, usually as a side note or a quirky afterthought. The root could take credit for being an attractive resource to entice settlement, a lucrative product during hard times, and one of the oldest items in American global trade. Instead, characteristic of its elusive nature to grow deep in hardwood forests, ginseng escapes the notice of even the communities which prosper still from its sale. It is hard to blame them; ginseng is grown exclusively for export to Asian buyers. In place of personal use, Wisconsinites have played vital roles as Shang hunters and Progressive Agriculturalists to create a unique culture surrounding the acquisition and challenge of ginseng.

The Divine Herb

Chinese folklore established ginseng as a 'divine herb' able to cure any ailment thousands of years before Jean Nicolet set paddle into the Great Lakes. Over 5,000 years ago, a fleshy root was pulled from the loamy soils of Manchurian forests and gained the same reputation. In the third century, Emperor Shen Nung emphasized its divinity in the first Chinese Pharmacopeia by recording ginseng as the most potent, harmless remedy in existence.[1] Such potency was reserved for a select royal few not only by law but by an outrageous price tag. Oral transmission carried tales of immortality and mystic powers with the centuries until the weight of ginseng was matched in silver. Harrison Garman, one of the earliest 'Ginseng historians,' drew a popular Chinese saying to describe this phenomena: "ginseng cures only allow you to die of starvation."[2]

Popularity led to over-harvesting, requiring external sources to meet local demand. Trade in Korean ginseng began in the third century AD, after intense diplomatic agreements; however, this source ran dangerously low as the twelfth century approached.[3] The luck of timing in European technology and scholarly Enlightenment placed Dutch merchants and Italian explorers in the area around the time of concern. The lure of ginseng could not escape international exposure, being lauded in Marco Polo's travel reports and in Ogleby's "Natural History of China." Experiments with ginseng specimens in scientific circles began when the Dutch East India Trading Company transported "canna" to Europe for observation.

The Royal Society of London records and correspondences document British fascination with ginseng from 1666-1788. In the first volume of its journal, *Philosophical Transactions*, it referenced ginseng as the highest regarded herbal restorative by Chinese physicians.[4] In 1679, Dr. Andrew Clench conducted experiments proving its value for relieving upset stomachs and fatigue, though was unable to reveal any *divine* qualities.[5] Regardless, the Royal Society had made a pledge to distribute its knowledge to the world. A letter from a Jesuit missionary in Manchuria, Father Jartoux, describing ginseng and its environment was printed in the 1714 volume of *Philosophical Transactions*.[6] Jartoux speculated that ginseng may grow in similar climates found in the New World; specifically, he mentioned the French territories in Canada. Fellow missionary, Father Joseph Francois Lafitau, took Jartoux's hypothesis on a search mission with a band of local Natives to scour the area near Montreal.[7] After confirmation from Chinese experts, it was announced that the divine root could be added to the list of valuable natural resources in North America.[8]

Shang Hunting

It is difficult to conclude whether Native Americans regularly consumed ginseng prior to European contact. The majority opinion of tribes in the eighteenth century appeared to be that ginseng was a source of profit. French traders contracted Canadian Natives to gather wild ginseng that they would then re-export to the Far East for double the profit. The French-Chinese partner-

ship ran its course after a streak of unregulated gathering in the mid-1750s. The French had been disqualified from the game; the Native Americans remained active intermediaries for British colonial settlements. Ginseng gathering flowed down the American Appalachia region following trends of over-harvesting and the trading posts that continued to pop up. Dutch merchants bartered hardware, trinkets, and rum with Natives near Albany in exchange for precious ginseng.[9] Colonists joined in gathering wild ginseng and had affectionately been named as "sang" or "shang" hunters by the end of the eighteenth century.

Shipments of ginseng laced together lasting commercial ties between America and the Far East. Colonial trade in ginseng irritated already tense political feelings with Great Britain over taxed trade. Captain Samuel Shaw, the first United States consul to China, summarized the situation: "The Americans must have tea, and they seek the most lucrative market for their precious root ginseng."[10] Ginseng played a crucial role in building trade ties beyond Europe for the United States following the American Revolution. John Astor, American Fur Company mogul, financed the first direct shipment of American goods to the Far East in 1782 with barrels of ginseng in its keep. Two years later, the ship *Empress of China* set sail once more with the American root as its primary cargo. Export records dating back to 1821 reveal that ninety-five percent of American ginseng was destined for Chinese ports.[11]

The fur trade opened Wisconsin to reap her riches; immigration of the nineteenth century ensured her role as a place of industry. Communities depended on utilizing the natural resources as a stable means of income. Shells of mining towns and trading posts were destinations for farming families pouring in from Europe. Ginseng remained a conversational piece in discussing Wisconsin's future. In 1853, the *Wisconsin State Journal* stated, "Lead and Ginseng are the only articles of real importance we export to China."[12] Regions of discovery followed a northward trend, moving with settlement patterns and as wild supplies ran low in the south. Written records set approximate dates of discovery across the state: Green County in 1845, Sauk County in 1847, Vernon County in 1854, Pierce County in 1859, Dunn County in 1860, Menomonee County in 1864, and Marathon County in 1877.[13] Gatherers commonly sold their ginseng to local druggists or entrepreneurs, who would ship bulk quantities of dried, wild ginseng to East Coast port cities.[14]

Ginseng provided means of comfort to many through an economic depression of the 1850s and 1860s. A century later, *The Appleton Post* recalled, "A self sufficient man could always go out and earn his bread and beans with ginseng roots."[15] It became something of a tradition for families to spend their spare time scouring woodlands for the camouflaged root. Little equipment was necessary for shang hunting: a mattock for digging, a sack for collecting, and a lunch for energy. Should an individual hope to profit in ginseng without the physical investment, he would employ laborers. In 1860 Dunn County, for instance, men and boys received six cents per pound and were known to dig almost thirty pounds a day.[16] Though statistics on early Wisconsin trade are scarce, ledger books recording shipments of $40,000 in 1858 and $80,000 in 1859 show how profitable trade could be.[17]

Once ginseng's hiding places were found, eager harvesters usually drained wild supplies. A 1905 Wisconsin law attempted to remedy this by prohibiting collection of ginseng between January 1 and August 1. It was a difficult law to enforce and gathering continued largely unregulated. Citizens of the town of Hamburg lamented on ginseng's fate,"it was gathered up year after year, until it was all harvested, and wild growing ginseng has almost entirely disappeared."[18] The demand for ginseng continued to grow; by 1875, China was importing over 60,000 pounds annually.[19] Wisconsinites, with an air of confidence in their green thumbs, directed attention to the possibility of growing fields of shang.

Ginseng in the Garden

"..and both of us could make our fortunes,
too you know the heathen set a sight of store by sang,
for charms and doctor-stuff and sech."[20]
-Poem submitted to *Special Crops Magazine*

Techniques for cultivation expanded on precedents set by Chinese and Europeans ginseng gardens. Rudimentary instructions on how to transplant roots had been recorded in the fifteenth century Chinese pharmacopeia, though large scale cultivation was not seen until gardens were already thriving in America.[21] Across the seas, members of the Royal Society also managed coax transplanted roots to thrive in household gardens.[22] A ploy went poorly when traders attempted to pass the European ginseng as Manchurian grown, harming the status of both foreign ginseng and growers, causing interest to dwindle. Concerning American cultivation, Objibwe Natives are credited with first replanting berries obtained from wild ginseng.[23] If they had managed a successful crop, the knowledge was lost with the seasons.

Wisconsin progressive agriculturalists in the nineteenth century hypothesized that ginseng could be mass-produced like common field crops. However, ginseng requires conditions which replicate its natural conditions: well-drained soil, shaded coverings, and time to mature. The formula was discovered in the 1870s by Abraham Whisman of New York, though his achievement met little fanfare in the press and remained largely unknown. Greater commotion followed the New York publication of George Stanton's circular in the 1880s. Stanton unveiled the secrets to his shang success, which sparked a so-called 'Ginseng Boom' along the Eastern states. Word of mouth and newspapers carried the news westward to Wisconsin. In August 1901, the *Eau Claire Leader* enticed readers by claiming, "ginseng can be as easily cultivated as any other garden plant in almost any kind of loose, rich soil…"[24]

Such optimism hid the high cost of planting stock, long maturing period, and picky markets which came with ginseng. If a grower did stumble upon the right combination of shade and soil, ginseng took seven years to mature and could not be replanted in the same plot.[25] The price of their product was determined by Chinese grading on its "naturalness": non-uniform shape, dark in color, natural method of growth, and rough texture. Though Wisconsin growers benefitted from tax exemption, cultivated roots were worth far less than pure, wild shang. Real fear existed among growers that prices would become even more depressed if the Ginseng Boom flooded the market. Though unrealized, wariness to new growers remained an undercurrent every time headlines brought in a new wave of get-rich-quick-schemers.

Marathon County marked the center of the ginseng world for twentieth century Wisconsin growers. Antigo's Mr. J.W. Zahl had conducted some of the first experiments to cultivate American ginseng in the late 1880s.[26] A century later, dozens of growers dotted the landscape; two operations, the Koehler and the Fromm, stood out in particular. Wausau's J.H. Koehler, who first concerned himself with ginseng cultivation in 1901, was known as the "Father of the Wisconsin Ginseng Industry."[27] Curiosity quickly turned to obsession; within the decade, Koehler had set up three enormous ginseng firms and authored guides to ginseng.[28] Koehler was not afraid of cooperating with his fellow growers and served as president of both the Wisconsin Ginseng Grower's Association and the American Ginseng Association. At these meetings, Koehler spent his time on the floor urging others to work together through difficult times and to invest in agricultural research.

The Fromm operation, with the largest ginseng garden for most of the industry's history, was more seen than heard. Ironically, their entrance into the ginseng world in 1904 had been intended as a side project to support their dream of a silver fox farm. The four Fromm brothers had kept their early experiments to themselves, wary that initiation would breed unmanageable competition nearby. Seasons were spent carefully manipulating planned beds to duplicate the natural shading and soil texture of a hardwood forest. Desperate after disease took out most of the crop, the Fromms' were forced to join forces with the nearby ginseng association. Constant experimentation improved the quality and quantity their gardens produced. The operation became so large that hired labor crews were hired for the Fall harvest season, with dormitories constructed on property for regular employees.[29]

It takes ginseng seed to produce roots and this was, unsurprisingly, given the suspicion most growers harbored for others, a rare product to locate.[30] A medium was needed to bridge the distance between growers, not only for seed but to discuss grower struggles and possible solutions. *Special Crops*, a ginseng specific agricultural magazine started in April 1902, printed market reports, articles, and advertisements relevant to growers. A 1906 article reported that the ideal way to treat blight was in a Bordeaux mix, specially mentioning *Pyrox* and continuing to advertise similar products in succeeding issues.[31] Chemical dependence for ginseng gardens continues to be characteristic; growers would be lost without insecticide or fungicide in their tool kits.

The great diversity of American climate provided too much variety in terms of advice for *Special Crops* readers to sift through. Gardens ranged from the coast of the Atlantic to the edges of the Mississippi River and the landscape was hardly consistent. The lack of government assistance made it difficult to regulate interstate commerce of seeds. Irritation at poor quality and infected products pitted growers against each other and *Special Crops*. In 1911, the "Wisconsin Seed Clique," made of ginseng veterans, accused seed distributers for the latest round of disease in Wisconsin gardens.[32] Led by Koehler, those growers proposed that restrictions be placed on interstate ginseng trade and stricter qualifications set for *Special Crop* advertisers. Blame was partially placed on ignorant, new growers. Koehler's circular, *Wisconsin Ginseng Gardens*, had been meant as a beginner's guide to techniques, materials, and industry threats.[33] Even though it was filled with garden saving tips, the guide was, as Koehler put it, "not selling like hot cakes."[34] Information spread easier using more direct means and took a route other industries had tread before them.

Wisconsin Ginseng Grower's Association provided annual meetings to connect growers spread throughout the state. The proceedings of the Wisconsin Ginseng Growers' Association meetings from 1910-1914 included presentations from university scholars, Q&A sessions with top fellow members, access to top buyers, and security services, among others. At the request of Wisconsin congressmen and growers, an investigation of blight was undertaken by Professor Herbert Whetzel at the University of New York. Whetzel presented his findings through a series of lectures and revealed proven ways to prevent plant infections and how to manage diseased beds. During this time, a controversial Oregon law required the ginseng gardens in its territory to be destroyed if they were found with blight. Growers in Wisconsin were reassured from Whetzel that destruction was unnecessary; blight was not an annual disease, meaning that infection one year did not carry over to the next.[35] Other key note speakers, big names like Erich Fromm and J.H. Koehler, spoke on how to improve crop yield and quality. It was something of an annual tradition to tour a thriving garden and inquire on the practices of its growers. At the first of these tours in 1910, John Burnett brought 75 eager members through his Antigo garden, lauded as the most valuable in the state.[36]

Ginseng gardens were vulnerable to more than elemental threats: robbery was hardly prevented by wooden fences. Thieves pried on beds near forest edges and boxes of seeds that had been buried underground to retain moisture. A single robbery brought major loss; in one case $300 worth of roots were taken from a Shawano garden.[37] The hand of the law did not lend itself to growers as there were no criminal statutes on ginseng thievery even in the early twentieth century.[38] The Association responded by purchasing five dogs, which proved a poor defense, to combat thievery and by lobbying local politicians. All growers felt the sting of the real 'thieves' in the industry: East Coast middlemen who purchased their ginseng at mediocre prices. The 1911 and 1913 Association meetings made this a special topic of interest, but few solutions were found. Zahl dampened hopes to bypass the middlemen, "I have exported ginseng [directly] to China and it is a very slow business."[39] Several decades would pass before direct trade was established between Wisconsin and China.

The War Came Hard

The market with China had always been an up and down cycle of fluctuating demand and rocky prices. It was never certain how a global event would impact foreign trade and the two World Wars had surprisingly different impacts. World War I actually increased the number of imports and the value of ginseng entering Chinese ports, encouraging more growers to enter the market. By 1920, prices had nearly doubled to $10 per pound with Wisconsin as the leading producer in the United States.[40] The average price for ginseng in the decade of 1920-1929 was high at $12.70 per pound for high-quality roots.[41] Export statistics obscure the reality of the ginseng situation at home. It was not a time of outrageous prosperity; the elements brought frustration that multiplied in disputes between growers.

During a decade of stable prices, growers struggled to produce healthy gardens and retreated from the industry to cut their losses. The Wisconsin Ginseng Growers Association's membership went from 100 members in 1919 to having no record of a meeting in 1921.[42] In another series of letters to *Special Crops* in the Fall of 1922, Koehler claimed that failure to regulate interstate trade had cost his ginseng company around $100,000 in lost profits.[43] His accusations were against ignorant Wisconsin buyers and deceitful out of state seed salesmen who were destroying the industry. A virulent wave of blight was the nail in the coffin for scores of gardens new and old. According to one account, the town of Antigo alone lost approximately 30 sizable gardens, with just two active in comparison by 1924.[44]

Some gardens may have been tempted to convert to easier crops, but not those with heavy investment in elaborate shading and several acres already planted. Fromm's operation was the picture of large scale investment; while suffering the same problems as others of the time, they expanded their cultivation to eleven acres in 1924.[45] When disease struck, small sections were tested with new bed designs or chemicals to save the health of the garden. Wartime labor shortage was filled by teenagers and housewives in the harvest seasons. An alternative was turning to innovation, such as transforming a potato digger famously into a harvesting machine.[46] The year 1926, which had brought low yields elsewhere, rang with headlines announcing the brothers of Hamburg had made a record sale of 12,273 pounds of ginseng for a total of $107,388.75.[47] The Fromm operation was the leading producer of American ginseng in the world as a result of their constant adaptation.

In 1930, a group of invested Wisconsin growers banded together to form a million dollar Ginseng Cooperative with a goal to keep the profits in their pockets. Headlines around the state saw its birth as a state victory; *The Capital Times* reported, "Even Ginseng Farmers Cooperate in

Wisconsin."[48] More than a blatant observation, it was the acknowledgement that actions by ginseng growers were comparable to the Wisconsin dairy and tobacco industries.

East Coast middlemen had been a constant headache as the mediators between Wisconsin growers and Chinese consumers. Wisconsin ginseng reputedly sold in Shanghai markets for $27 per pound; New York merchants only offered growers $3.75 to $4 per pound. A quality garden required a good deal of financial and physical investment and ginseng growers did not feel this was being taken into account. The Ginseng Cooperative was projected to handle nearly 100,000 pounds of dried root annually between Wisconsin growers and Chinese buyers.[49]

The Depression hit Wisconsin by rising unemployment and stagnating the local economy. Ginseng could have provided a source of external cash flow, as it had in the 1850s, if the Japanese invasion of China had not limited American imports. Going in to World War II, these occupiers placed a monopoly on Manchurian ginseng and hoped to isolate the market by cutting out American varieties.[50] The average price of ginseng wavered before crashing dramatically as low as $3.62 per pound in 1933.[51] Grief continued through the 1940s Chinese Civil War as the communist government spurned capitalist economies, even those who would bring them precious ginseng.

The industry responded by turning inward to intrigue American consumers with wild claims and flashy advertisements. Newspapers and drug stores exaggerated ginseng's foreignness and medicinal reputation. Ginseng infused merchandise appeared in a variety of products including ginseng ice cream, chewing gum, and even toothpaste. Advertisements claimed that any ailment, from old age to respiratory problems, was treatable with just a taste of shang.[52] Somehow, America failed to embrace ginseng into their culture of consumerism and products lasted only as brief fads.

Without a market, little reason remained by the 1940s to throw money at association fees and pricey seeds. In 1936, *Special Crops* printed its last issue for its remaining audience, effectively cutting off interstate communication among growers. The short lived Cooperative bowed out after several seasons of blight outbreaks and rapidly diminishing participation. Exports of American ginseng in international trade dwindled to less than a thousand pounds from 1940-42.[53] Local articles referred to ginseng as a 'hobby' crop or as oddities in communities.[54] Shang's lofty position as Wisconsin's green gold and valuable natural resource was a tale from the past. Only the most invested gardens remained. The Fromms', for example, kept their unsold ginseng crops in large granaries with faith that better markets lay ahead.[55]

After the 1949 Communist victory in China, leader Mao Xedong issued the reinstatement of traditional medicines that had previously been outlawed. China was more dependent on American ginseng than ever: the Korean and Chinese Civil War had since destroyed many of the Asian ginseng gardens. By 1951, the average going rate for dried American ginseng was $17.57 per pound.[56] Demand outraced supply, encouraging prices to resume their legendary numbers, but there were few growers to enjoy the price hike. The 1954 United States Census recorded just twenty-one acres of planted ginseng, divided among five growers.[57] Three dozen Marathon County landowners in the 1960s set up ginseng gardens with speed nostalgic of the Ginseng Boom. Fromms' farm remained the largest single producer in the country. American ginseng acreage had swelled to three hundred acres, two hundred of which were located in Marathon County with half belonging to the Fromms'.[58]

Global politics had finally, for the most part, favored ginseng. A famous trip by President Richard Nixon to China in 1972 re-strengthened global trade ties and ushered in a new era for the ginseng industry. The 1970s welcomed several waves of Southeast Asian immigrants fleeing from political persecution after the Fall of Saigon. The Hmong refugees found the opportunities gin-

seng offered inviting and quickly made a home of Marathon County. Increasing grower diversity prompted a tenfold increase in Wisconsin growers from 1970-1983, establishing the state as the leading producer of American ginseng in the world.[59]

Ginseng arrived in Wisconsin after a long journey and after its value was determined. A culture instead developed around the economic opportunity in shang collection and cultivation. The spirit of the ginseng industry was characterized by constant trial and error and innovation. Interwoven into these themes are notes of dependence on relationships in the community and with nature. Whether picked from a hiding place among the hardwoods or being coaxed to life in a specially prepared bed, ginseng has managed to latch itself to the lives of Wisconsin inhabitants. Perfectly matched in stubbornness, the Wisconsin spirit and elusive ginseng is a timeless combination.

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Writing the Libyan Story:
Qaddafi and the Construction of the Nation through the Popular Revolution

Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi shortly after the Libyan coup in 1969.

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Following a coup d'etat in 1969, Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi commenced a 40-year nation-building campaign in which Libyan society and culture confronted and internalized contradictions of modernity and traditionalism within the context of a rapidly changing economic and political system. Qaddafi endeavored to construct a distinct Libyan nationalism, reflective of traditional elements of society and culture, in order to create a modern, viable state modeled in his revolutionary vision. By co-opting the traditional rural, tribal culture into a broader national conception of the tribe with him as its leader, Qaddafi sought to both entrench his position as ruler and facilitate implementation of his modernizing policies. While the elements of the nation-building campaign appear dichotomous, Qaddafi believed that a distinct Libyan nationalism, embodying both modernity and tradition, was possible by decolonizing the mind and revolutionizing society.

Literature, particularly the short story, served an important function in Qaddafi's campaign because of the deep roots storytelling had in the people's psyches and its inherent personification of both old and new. Consequently, the short story served as a space whereby elite officials and intellectuals engaged in the ongoing project of 'imagining' the nation by attempting to reflect or influence a nuanced construction of a distinctly modern and traditional national culture and identity.

Qaddafi's Revolutionary Vision

On September 1, 1969, Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi led a group of young army officers in a successful coup d'etat that overthrew the Western-backed monarchy.[1] From the outset, Qaddafi portrayed himself and his movement as 'of the people,' and interpreted the public's initially positive response to the coup as a mandate for his vision of a radically altered nation. Adopting the title 'Leader of the Revolution,' Qaddafi promised to chart a new path for Libya built upon the, "principles of freedom, justice, unity, modernization, and socialism."[2] In early public speeches he focused on the need to triumph over the backwardness, exploitation, and repression, which had marred the former monarchy's political and economic policies.[3] As chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), Qaddafi moved to solidify control of the revolution by reducing tribal and regional power. Consequently, he appointed loyal officials and implemented policies and institutions geared towards diversifying the economy and reducing dependence on foreigners.[4] Despite initial public approval, Qaddafi faced resistance from long-standing institutional and societal structures that challenged his ability to implement his vision for the nation.

Imagining the Libyan Nation in a Fragmented Society

The success of Qaddafi's national project was challenged by a Libyan society that was both disconnected from its past and lacking a framework with which to interpret the rapid changes confronting it following the discovery of oil. At its independence in 1951, Libya was considered the poorest nation in the world.[5] Following an educational mission in service of the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Benjamin Higgins described Libya as a, "prototype of a poor country…the bulk of the people live on a subsistence level…where agricultural expansion is severely limited by climate conditions."[6] But with the discovery of oil in 1959, Libya's economic fortunes began to change dramatically and the nascent state quickly became the fourth largest exporter of crude oil in the world.[7] The oil boom inspired an influx of migration to urban centers in anticipation of higher wages and an improved economic situation. By the late 1970s, nearly one-third of the population resided in the capital, Tripoli.[8] However, the monarchy was largely unprepared to meet the challenges of rapid economic growth. Subsequently, develop-

ment was erratic and urban centers experienced massive housing, transportation, and food shortages.[9] Inconsistent and inequitable living conditions, coupled with the absence of traditional societal connections, resulted in the disenchantment of recent urban migrants toward government policies.[10] With the failure of the monarchy to match their desires and expectations still fresh in their minds, the population was largely disillusioned and doubtful that a new government, even a revolutionary one, would succeed in improving their living situation.

This disillusionment regarding government and modernization was compounded by a tradition of decentralized rule among the people and the absence of a distinct conception of a Libyan identity. While the traumatic colonial experience under the Italians did provide Libyans with a shared sense of suffering and strong anti-imperialist sentiment, unified statehood proved elusive.[11] Libya's complex history of foreign intervention and occupation, combined with the country's geographical landscape, resulted in the emergence of largely autonomous regions-Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan, each with distinct power dynamics and identities.[12] Reflecting the fragmented nature of Libyan society, the nascent state took the shape of a federalist monarchy under the rule of a King.[13] The majority of Libyans continued to organize around regional or tribal identities with a weak sense of a central Libyan state even after independence in 1951.[14] Thus, the idea of a unified, central, and sovereign government was hardly a deep-rooted phenomenon by the time Qaddafi came to power. Consequently, he faced opposition to gaining the authority and legitimacy he needed to successfully construct his vision of the Libyan nation.

Qaddafi's Popular Revolution and the People's Connection to the 'Nation'

In light of the perpetuation of decentralized rule and individuals organizing around tribal identities, Qaddafi acknowledged the need to engineer a base of unified support to implement his policy changes. In an attempt to lend the legitimacy and authority needed to entrench the revolutionary government in society, Qaddafi launched the 'Popular Revolution' in 1973.[15] Recognizing that the process of nation-building was not explicitly confined to the political and economic spheres of the state, Qaddafi created the Popular Revolution to function as both a political and cultural movement based on populism.[16] With this policy, Qaddafi hoped to undermine traditional leadership by inserting new political institutions that crosscut tribal boundaries, and co-opted the rural, tribal culture into a broader, national conception of the tribe with him as its leader.

Qaddafi attempted to link the hinterland and the revolutionary government through the creation of political institutions known as Popular Committees and People's Congresses. These institutions were designed to politicize the rural population in the revolutionary government's political system and weaken the authority wielded by traditional, rural elite. Qaddafi feared the largest source of opposition would come from the rural elite whom he believed viewed him--and his modernizing policies--as a threat to their power and authority.[17] As a means to engender support for him and the government system, the majority of the members elected to the new political institutions were from rural areas, with the rest divided evenly between Bedouin, a predominantly desert-dwelling Arab ethnic group, and urban populations; but from less prestigious tribes and families, changing the character of local leadership. Although the new political institutions achieved a modicum of success in mobilizing the people in the governmental process, the perpetuation of tribal ties and regionalism prevented Qaddafi from gaining the broad base of support he needed. Qaddafi worked to fix this by personally advocating the end of regional and tribal political allegiance, saying, "in order to preserve national unity…regionalism should also on no account be allowed to grow after today."[18] However, kinship ties and aversion to centralized

government persisted. As a result, Qaddafi began to devote more attention to creating a cohesive, national culture and identity as a means to legitimize the scope of the government's political and societal control.

Qaddafi began to foster the development of a collective identity that was rooted in the people's historical traditions and values, but would enable both Qaddafi's and Libya's emergence on the global stage. To do this, Qaddafi endeavored to co-opt traditional kinship and tribal ties and customs in support of his regime. In 1976, he began utilizing rhetoric salient to the rural population, promoting an "indigenous pastoralist society" as the foundation of a pure Libya.[19] This "bedwanization" policy devalued urban culture and encouraged the proliferation of rituals based on tribal values.[20] Qaddafi's conception of the universality of kinship and tribal ties became evident in his treatise, *The Green Book*, when he wrote: "The tribe is a family, which has grown as a result of births. It follows that a tribe is a big family. Even the nation is a tribe, which has grown demographically. So the nation is a big tribe." [21]

By asserting the importance of lineage and kinship, he sought to claim attachment to the values held by the majority of the population. As evidenced by a 1973 survey, the majority of Bedouins interviewed cited attributes such as, tribal affiliation, kinship, wealth, and religiosity as the necessary features for leaders.[22] Thus, Qaddafi portrayed himself as a Bedouin tribesman by highlighting his humble background in an effort to cast himself as 'one of the people,' and therefore someone who shared the values and customs of the hinterland society.[23] He articulated the idea of statelessness in his writings: "Human society is or should be based on the family and kinship: humanity is natural embodied in the individual, in the family, not in the State, which is alien to it. The state is an artificial political, economic, and occasionally military system, bearing no relation to humanity."[24] By placing the family unit at the center of society and imagining the tribe as a nation, Qaddafi attempted to utilize the symbolic importance of tribe and family as a source of control and mobilization, linking national authority and the public.

Qaddafi endeavored to entrench his position as leader of the 'national tribe' by gaining the broad-based support of the hinterland population through employing an ideology steeped in Islamic traditions and presenting himself in the image of a Bedouin tribesman. This, and references to heroes of imperial resistance, effectively linked his regime to the collective memory of anti-colonial resistance. Qaddafi believed that vestiges of imperialism on mentality and state structure needed to be destroyed through the Popular Revolution's efforts to truly decolonize the mind and purify reactionary elements of society. Lacking the former King's religious legitimacy, Qaddafi adopted religious tropes and portrayed himself as a purifying revolutionary coming from the desert to liberate the Libyan people. Religion initially took on political connotations in Libya with the founding of the Sanussi Order, a religious movement that grew into a de-facto state in pre-colonial Cyrenaica, and formed the base of support for the post-colonial monarchy.[25] In the absence of a connection to the Sanussi Order, Qaddafi desired to make his regime seem both an extension of the past and a permanent entity by attaching it to religion. Acting in his role as revolutionary guide, Qaddafi proclaimed that the Quran should steer the population towards the creation of a just society. He combined his charisma and power with an Islamic archetype in an effort to formalize his role as guide of the revolution, and undertook a campaign to 'purify' mosques and preachers infiltrated by a reactionary, oppressive mentality.[26] Notably, most of the 'purification' occurred in mosques located in cities where Imams were generally more vocal in their critique of Qaddafi as a religious leader.[27]

The Challenges of Modernization in the Urban Environment

Qaddafi focused on creating an inclusive national identity molded in the image of the hinterland for a myriad of economic, political, and ideological reasons, but the most pressing issue was the growing voice of dissent among urban dwellers. Because of their close proximity to the pitfalls of rapid urbanization and economic growth due to a government unprepared to meet the challenges, the city population was more critical of the Qaddafi regime and its Popular Revolution than in rural areas.[28] Lured by the promise of jobs and wealth, migrants were met with a much different reality than the one they had imagined. Thus, they experienced both external and internal hardships as their traditional conceptualization of identity clashed with rising expectations and modernizing forces.[29] Qaddafi believed it would be easier to gain the support of the rural, tribal population because the government's nation-building policies and the destabilizing results of rapid economic growth were gentler in small towns and desert oases than in the cities.[30] Also, it proved easier to persuade those living in isolated communities that the government represented their best interests through the valorization of family and kinship ties as a source of control and mobilization.[31] Therefore, he worked to undermine the growing political and economic power of urban dwellers by increasing the political and economic participation among the rural population. To convince rural dwellers of his intention to uphold traditional ideas and values, and prove that he would not abandon Libya for the West, he articulated the idea of statelessness in his nationalist rhetoric.

The Short Story and the Construction of the 'Nation'

The revolutionary government utilized literature to aid the cultural component of the Popular Revolution in the ongoing process of constructing the nation because it provided a symbolic space to shape and influence the creation of a national identity and culture. Literature was an effective medium to propagate the government's definitions and conceptions regarding the abstractions of Libyan nationalism because of its dual role as both reflective of society and a promoter of culture.[32] In literature, politics and culture intertwined in the quest for a collective, coherent national identity that simultaneously modernized and connected to the people's immemorial past. The Libyan short story illuminates this process of 'imagining' nationalism as it provides a nuanced view of what symbols and rhetoric mattered to Libyans during a time of great political and socio-economic upheaval.[33] Further, the age-old tradition of storytelling gave language a suggestive power beyond its immediate and lexical meaning, extending its influence throughout the changing social and political spheres.[34]

The Libyan short story developed as a conscious interaction with Western culture, although its form has roots in the classical narrative style found in oral folk tale storytelling. In the midst of the pivotal domestic events occurring in the latter half of the 20th century, Libyan authors took on the role of conscious, guide, and teacher as society struggled to rationalize what it meant to be 'Libyan.' While early literary pieces resembled traditional folk tales, with the predominantly stereotypical characters illustrating popular values, realism became the dominant form of the short story by the 1960s as society increasingly dealt with the seemingly opposing forces of modernism and traditionalism.[35] Because realism mirrors the contemporary society in which it is written, the short story offers a unique means to examine society's response to societal upheaval, and offers invaluable information about the values, norms, and expectations of society. During the 1960s, the short story often served as a form of protest because its brevity allowed the author's passion to generate a visceral response in the reader.[36] The low level of output during the 1970s and 1980s, despite an increased ease in printing thanks to Qaddafi's state-subsidized publishing houses,

suggests that the revolutionary vision and zeal of the 1960s was channeled or repressed to serve his revolutionary vision.[37]

Qaddafi as a Writer: Short Stories and Revolutionary Rhetoric

Qaddafi recognized the increasing influence the short story had over Libyan society due to an expanding educated populace, and as a result he employed the medium to influence the national project's trajectory in keeping with his vision. Qaddafi himself wrote a collection of stories entitled the Escape to Hell, which touched on a wide range of issues facing society upon his assumption of power, such as: mass migration, unemployment, feelings of alienation, and a widening divergence between the people's ambitions and the harsh realities of life in the city.[38] Acknowledging these issues in his story *The City*, he bemoaned their negative effect on the individual and the nation as a whole. Rather than drawing attention to the failures of his regime to provide a framework of support for the people, Qaddafi shifted the blame for society's ills to the city itself. In *The City*, Qaddafi reflected on urban life and the damage it inflicted on communal traditions, calling it a, "cemetery for social ties."[39] He wrote that anyone living in a city was separated from their traditional social linkages to family, land, and culture. Because the city separated individuals from their natural communities, they lived a, "worm-like [existence] where man [lived] and [died] meaninglessly."[40] Thus, the city became a place where no one cared whether you lived or died, where, "men and cats [were] equal."[41] While Qaddafi acknowledged the superficial attraction the city presented to outsiders because of its seemingly glamorous cosmopolitan trappings, he contended that urban dwellers were caught up in a perpetual cycle of consumerism that stripped them of their freedom and humanity.

Qaddafi's piece revealed the great changes society was undergoing due to the influx of oil revenues. His focus on death and dehumanization displayed the pervasiveness of the fear that oil extraction was draining Libya of its traditional customs and modes of living, which would eventually spell disaster for individuals and society alike. Despite these concerns, the city continued to draw people to it in pursuit of economic gain, which proved increasingly out of reach. Through his short story, Qaddafi attempted to cast blame for Libya's problems on the structure of the city itself as the reason for society's ills. *The City's* critical stance towards urban centers and the valorization of rural life reflected the Popular Revolution's dual function to mitigate the power of Qaddafi's opposition, both the rural and urban elite, and to promote the idea of a unified Libyan nation by bolstering the hinterland culture under his authority.

Qaddafi's own experience with short story writing was seemingly contradictory because just as he portrayed himself as 'one of the people' immersed in tribal values and customs, he simultaneously engaged in activities generally viewed as 'Western' in origin and reserved for the intellectual elite.[42] Qaddafi's dichotomous persona highlighted the dynamics between Libya's traditions of imperial resistance and a rapidly changing economy that manifested as ambiguous conceptions of modernity and traditionalism in society.

However, upon closer inspection, the duality of Qaddafi's character revealed a more nuanced performance in society that saw him maintain, at least initially, relationships with all societal groups to position people within the process of 'imagining' the nation. He demonstrated this ability to move between modern and traditional constructs through statements given to clarify the confusion surrounding the construction of individual and national identities. In one instance, he argued that a distinction needed to be made between the, "revolutionary intellectual who serves his country [and] that of a reactionary intellectual," to suggest that the most important aspect of identity was loyalty to the state, which could be achieved primarily through veneration of

Qaddafi as the guide of the revolutionary state.[43] In the dynamic social system Qaddafi worked to create, modernity and traditionalism were not mutually exclusive, and therefore, the intellectual, urban entity was not to be universally deviled.[44]

Because education had only recently become widely available, those who were engaged in the production of short stories at the time of Qaddafi's ascension to power generally were from elite backgrounds and possessed deep connections to both the city and Qaddafi through employment in the government.[45] Subsequently, these elites used literature as a form of cultural production to promote the ideology of the Popular Revolution and reveal the interactions between the personal and political during the tumultuous period following the 1969 coup.

The 'City' as a Counter-Revolutionary Force

The themes and realist approach of short stories written before the period of sanctions in the 1980s reveal the Libyan elites' preoccupation with societal issues prevalent in the changing society and their evaluation of the effect on individual loyalties and identities. From its independence, the Libyan state and society was plunged into a perpetual state of turbulence. No sooner had it gained its independence than it experienced a rapid, painful transition from a majority nomad, rural population to an urban majority under the rule of a dominant, central figure. Reflecting this, the themes of the Libyan short story primarily centered on politics, nationalism, and socioeconomic conditions.[46] While authors employed a variety of motifs such as, alienation, loss of community, relation, and relationship between land and people, the focus was mostly on the people's historical struggle to attain freedom from occupiers.[47] Libyan short story writers suggested that only through collective effort could society assert an identity strong enough to obtain individual aspirations and freedom from exploitation at personal and national levels.[48]

Just as government policy favoring tribalism and agricultural pursuits was in contradiction with economic trends towards urbanization and modernization, so too were societal ambitions for a better life in urban centers increasingly contrasted with the harsh reality of city life, as unemployment and alienation ran rampant. At odds with both the space around them and themselves, urban dwellers attempted to reconcile modernizing forces with their traditional upbringing and rising expectations with reality. Kamel Hassan Maghur's *The Old Hotel* alluded to this struggle for individual identity within a transitory, ambiguous national identity.[49] The story opened with Miloud Ben Suleiman arriving in Tripoli in search of shelter and food after fleeing his dead-beat town, Zwara.[50] Before long, Miloud shed all outward traces of his past life as he, "forgot Zwara, forgot his pain, the men, women, and stares of contempt."[51] However, following his professional success, Miloud grew nostalgic for his old life and began to find the atmosphere of the Old Hotel increasingly suffocating. Miloud's relationship with a Jewish woman, Rubina, began to aggravate him as he craved the women from his hometown since, "Rubina's porclein flesh didn't appeal to him anymore."[52] Feeling as if his life lacked meaning, Miloud set his sights on a different woman who eventually cheated him out of his money, propelling him to return to Zwara, never to return to the Old Hotel again.

A pioneer of the Libyan short story, Kamel Hassan Maghur began his professional career as an advisor to the State of Tripolitania under the federalist monarchical system before working his way to the Supreme Court in 1970.[53] Maghur was also directly involved in the majority of the political machinations of post-revolutionary Libya by serving in numerous positions, including Ambassador to the United Nations, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Head of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Companies before his death in 2002.[54] Maghur's short story, *The Old Hotel*, dealt with themes of Libya's social issues and attempted to instill recognition of the impor-

tance of a coherent national identity that mobilized all Libyans in service to the state. As Maghur was actively involved himself in promoting the Libyan state to the public abroad, he understood the importance of a strong domestic conception of nationhood that would resonate with the modern, international community.[55] Because of Maghur's close connection to the center of power, he engaged in promoting Qaddafi's Popular Revolution through his literary works during the early years of the Popular Revolution in order to maintain his own influence and power in the tenuous upper echelons of government.

Maghur did not romanticize city life, although he was from a cosmopolitan background. In *The Old Hotel*, Miloud lost his sense of purpose and became corrupted by the greed and materialism portrayed as omnipresent in the city. The way Miloud forgot his past symbolized the loss of identity in an urban setting. This reflected the confusing and challenging environment that city life presented for rural immigrants who found themselves feeling out of place in the city's bustling streets. Maghur drew attention to the way life in the city clashed with both the expectations and traditional backgrounds of migrants, which prevented them from conceptualizing a coherent personal identity, let alone a unified notion of Libyan statehood. Maghur's writing suggested that, like Miloud, migrants were left drifting without a past and lacking a meaningful future.

In keeping with Qaddafi's nation-building project, Maghur alluded to the negative and destabilizing entity of the city as the source of the failure of government policies in order to usher in a new, revolutionary Libyan economic, social, and political system. He implicitly connected the city to foreign powers through the detailing of the relationship between Miloud and Rubina. However, Miloud began to feel increasingly suffocated, viewing their relationship with distaste. In this manner, Maghur implied the linkage between foreigners and city dwellers as a corruptive force. With Miloud's return to his rural home, Maghur propagated the idea that a national and individual identity grounded in traditional, collective values was necessary to stave off the harmful, disorienting effects of imperial forces symbolized as ever-expanding urban centers.

Return to Rural: Traditional Life as the Heart of the Nation

Ramadan Abdalla Bukheit's short story, *The Quay and the Rain*, explored the idea of cleansing the mind of the vestiges of imperialism to internalize the distinct Libyan identity propagated by Qaddafi's Popular Revolution.[56] Bukheit was a frequent contributor to newspapers, and was also a government employee at the Department of Training and the General Electricity Board in Benghazi. Characteristic of authors in the Arab world, he was a significant force in the development of public consciousness.[57] In *The Quay and the Rain*, he portrayed monotonous city life as stripping inhabitants of their humanity and freedom. Through his story, he promoted the purity and sovereignty found in rural life as a means to weaken the pull the city had on the minds of Libyans. In the story, the protagonist, Khalifa, moved from the hinterland to the city in search of one of the good jobs that he had heard so many rumors about in his hometown. He managed to find employment unloading supplies that were used to construct the, "massive structures in town, buildings that filled him with awe every time he walked past them."[58] As hard as he worked, Khalifa barely had enough money to feed his family. He began to feel that the cement with which he worked had, "morphed into these oppressive creatures, incubi that returned the favor by squeezing the breath from him, making him feel insignificant by comparison."[59] Khalifa reaches his breaking point one morning and moved his family back to their home in the desert. Despite the state of disarray the neglected house was in, the entire family was ecstatic upon returning and immediately began fixing it up. As rain began to fall, Khalifa's wife called for him to come inside, but he insisted on washing before entering the home because he wanted to enter as a "clean man."[60]

Despite oil revenues, the average Libyan in the city suffered from underemployment or unemployment and faced great difficulty in providing basic necessities.[61] As migrants met a much different reality than the one they had imagined, they experienced both external and internal hardships as traditional sense of identity clashed with rising expectations and modernizing forces. Only a select few seemed to have benefited from the oil boom, while the rest of the workers toiled away at the bidding of the elite. Alluding to the inequity of city life, Bukheit portrayed the urban center as an oppressive, monolithic structure that sucked the life out of its inhabitants. Emphasizing the city as symbolizing death, the protagonist, Khalifa, noticed luxury cars speeding past him "as if fleeing ghosts" on his walk home from work.[62] This implied that to gain material success in the city, one had to relinquish their soul to the high-rises stretching into the blackened sky. Bukheit portrayed Khalifa's "return to the land" as liberating to further underscore the corruptive, oppressive nature of city life.[63] The rainfall upon Khalifa's return to his traditional home signified a purifying act. By returning to the land, Khalifa cleansed his soul and mind of the corrosive effects of city life. In contrast to the city, the rural environment symbolized purity and cleanliness by Khalifa's act of washing away the lingering effects of city to avoid infecting his home.

Through the lens of both a government official and intellectual elite, Bukheit examined the effect of modernizing forces and the transitory socioeconomic environment on the individual. The economic slowdown and harsh reality of city life as unemployment and corruption skyrocketed caused the population to look back to their past out of the nostalgic belief that they preferred village life to modernization.[64] Bukheit reflected this sentiment in his short story by portraying the city as stripping individuals of their dignity and depicting village life as idyllic. The early stages in the construction of a "nationalistic" culture employed colonialism as the backdrop against which the politics of cultural recovery and national remembrance could take place. This framing of societal ills as stemming from colonialism gave credence to the idea of a need to cleanse the society from its imperial vestiges, just as Khalifa symbolically did at the end of *The Quay and the Rain*. A lack of traditional communal ties and rising economic disparity stood in stark contrast to Qaddafi's socialist ideology, and led to the notion that the city was essentially counter-revolutionary and harmful to the nation. Thus, Bukheit's *The Quay and the Rain* wasis both reflective of society and propagateds the dogma of the Popular Revolution in an attempt to influence the mentality of the people. The function of the short story as a means of cultural reflection and production helpeds to explain its perceived role on the part of the intellectual elite and government officials in authenticating and explaining the process of 'imagining' the nation.[65]

Nation-Building: The Personal Becomes Political

Through short stories, the authors exposed the ensuing identity struggle that was entangled in larger societal questions about what constituted Libyan identity. The content found in Libyan short stories around the time of Qaddafi's Popular Revolution demonstrate that the process of constructing nationalism was more than a simple binary contradiction between modernity and traditionalism, but that discourse on family, Islam, freedom, and consumerism was often blurred in constructions of both personal and national identity. Individuals who did not constitute a monolithic entity, but were similarly trying to fashion their own identity and role in the national project, fervently debated social and national issues. Qaddafi embodied this complex identity construct because even as he presented himself as a Bedouin tribesman who promoted traditional, rural culture as the pure foundation on which Libya stood, he utilized modern, 'Western' tools of cultural production to further his revolutionary, modernizing agenda. The control of the revolu-

tionary government over the political and socioeconomic spheres in the process of nation-building created a highly politicized society that spilled over into private life as individuals struggled to reconcile their construction of self with the construction of the nation.

Because revolutionary policies failed to resolve persistent socio-economic issues, Qaddafi became increasingly repressive in his desire to control the trajectory of the 'imagining' process. Even as he disseminated ideas of democracy, freedom, and equality, his governance adopted similar exclusionary and marginalizing methods as the harsh imperial policies of the past.[66] His uneven policies failed to develop an all-encompassing, inclusive identity that was able to unite both the urban and rural societal elements under his rule in a way that was meaningful and participatory. While it was relatively simple to declare statehood, it proved much more difficult to mold the nation-building campaign into something that the people could absorb into their imagination and inner self without it seeming false or forced.[67] Qaddafi's policy of "bedwanization" within the larger Popular Revolution platform contradicted the socio-economic changes that were becoming increasingly widespread as urbanization continued unchecked. The inability to initiate major reforms in response to changes provided for a rigid political system and conflicting societal dynamics that did not live up to new expectations.[68] This gap between the people and government policy undermined the gains achieved by the regime during the 1970s and alienated the people.

Imagining a New Nation in a Post-Qaddafi Libya

Qaddafi's conception of the Libyan nation in rural, traditional terms was not reflective of these larger societal shifts. Although the people feared what a loss of traditional customs and modes of living would mean, they were more concerned about being unable to provide for their family, which was becoming a common occurrence due to the regime's inability to meet the material needs of the population. Subsequently, Qaddafi's regime failed because, in the process of constructing nationalism, it alienated wide segments of the population due to exclusionary policies that did not resonate with the changing population, rampant political economic inefficiency, and corruption. Therefore, instead of developing into a purified, revolutionary society united under Qaddafi, the Libyan people increasingly voiced their opposition to the regime. This growing discontent culminated in the 2011 revolution that saw the Libyan people overthrow Qaddafi. With the nation in their own hands, the people must now chart their own national project, one that reconciles their diverse past and propels them into a future as a stable state.[69]

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Kimberly-Clark and the Village it Left Behind



Panoramic overview of the Kimberly-Clark paper mill in Kimberly, Wisconsin featured in the July-August edition of Cooperation, *1952.*

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Company towns are a well-examined topic in historical literature, but a gap exists in the description of the "end" of company towns. Life can be organized around a particular company that provides paternalistic guardianship, but as the company leaves, important changes occur. American Historian Hardy Green provides a useful framework with which to analyze the end of company towns by dividing the companies who founded these towns into two distinct types – those who exploited workers for their own gain and those who sought to create utopias for their workers. Green makes his argument about the effects on workers in towns under the guardianship of a company but neglects an important closing act to the story: the process of the changes a town might undergo when the company moves on. As the United States continues to grapple with a steady loss of manufacturing jobs that has closed mills, the problem of the transition from single-employer company town to a more modern economy has never been more important for academics and policy-makers to understand.

In 1888, Kimberly, Clark, and Company, founded in nearby Neenah, Wisconsin, sought to expand its production of paper products and formulated an ambitious plan to achieve that expansion. The company already operated several paper mills along the Fox River near Lake Winnebago, so the new mill was to be built further upriver in a mostly unpopulated area.[1] The company acquired all of the farmland adjacent to the banks of one side of the river as well as the water rights, constructed a large mill, and built and sold houses to the first workers.[2] The new town was named after one of the founders of Kimberly-Clark, John A. Kimberly.[3] The village of Kimberly grew up around the mill, and the company defined the success, culture, and identity of the people who lived there.

The Fox River Valley was an ideal place for the production of paper in the early twentieth century: lumber and clean water were abundant, the river banks of the Fox were well-suited to building large factories, and the location easily serviced the growing markets of the Midwest, where New England manufacturers would have faced high transportation costs.[4] By the middle and latter parts of the twentieth century, conditions had changed. Cheaper transportation, greater feasibility of global trade, cheaper labor, and reduced importance of proximity to rivers all made Kimberly a much less attractive place to produce paper products.[5] In addition the company's focus shifted from magazine and newsprint commodity paper to more profitable consumer brands.[6]

Public annual reports from the 1940s through the 1980s illustrate Kimberly-Clark's expansion into international markets and shifted focus away from the production facilities that were once their primary revenue-generators. Regular newsletters, known as *Cooperation*, grant insight into the lives of the employees of particular mills, and there are lengthy sections on Kimberly in all of the early editions, from the 1940s until about 1960. Around that time the focus began to shift away from the detailed reports on individual mill towns to broad descriptions of the company's "corporate culture" and detailed stories about their prized consumer brands—a telling change in itself. Together, the external archives of the Appleton *Post-Crescent* and the local *Cooperation* newsletters tell a story of how the town and the corporation coexisted by examining the linkages that defined the village and what changed when the company left town.

Changes in trade conditions altered the lives of the members of all types of communities. In the case of the Village of Kimberly and the Kimberly-Clark Corporation, the coexistence of town and company was the defining feature of each for a long time. This link had a large effect on the company and an even larger effect on the people who worked and lived in the village. Changes arose in nearly every aspect of life for the people of Kimberly, and for the company, as they developed to keep up with a rapidly progressing world. By definition, it is not possible to draw a universal conclusion from a case study, but there is a lesson about change in American business

in the twentieth century in the interaction between the Kimberly-Clark Corporation and the village it created.

Kimberly came about as the result of an expansion project that Kimberly, Clark, and Company founded in 1872. The town allowed Kimberly-Clark to enter the growing industry of paper production for newspapers and books that had become more popular with rising literacy rates.[7] The company built their first mill in Neenah, Wisconsin, on the banks of the Fox River, which provided the power and freshwater needed for production. Paper manufacturing was in the midst of a shift from rag-based pulp to a more efficient wood pulp in the 1870s, and the Fox River Valley's proximity to lumber in northern Wisconsin and upper Michigan proved valuable.[8] Railroad networks connected the mills to customers in Chicago, Milwaukee, and the rest of the Midwest.[9] Incorporated in 1880, the company began to investigate opportunities to expand production capacity and continue to grow after investing in several smaller mills in Neenah and neighboring Appleton. The company eventually planned to build a new, state-of-the-art mill downriver from Neenah in the unpopulated wilderness.[10]

The project was the new company's most ambitious venture at the time: a large mill and an accompanying town, built from scratch. In 1889, Kimberly, Clark, and Company raised an additional $900,000 in stock – more than doubling the stock in the company at the time – to purchase a large tract of farmland along the Fox River.[11] The setting was ideal because the river's flat banks allowed for cheaper construction than the steeper banks of other rivers. To recruit workers for the mill, the company created a town by building roads, a hotel, and sixty houses, some of which it sold and some of which it rented.[12] Empty lots were also made available for sale. The new town was advertised on posters as a "25-minute ride from Appleton," offering the opportunity for the employment of seventy-five families, as well as extra farmland nearby and prospects for proprietors of a drugstore, general store, and blacksmith shop.[13] The new mill was the company's largest and most technologically advanced. The area, which had been known by the few local farmers as the Cedars, was renamed after John A. Kimberly.[14] As a direct result of opening the mill, the company secured an exclusive deal for newsprint with the *Kansas City Star*.[15] The village itself was incorporated by the state of Wisconsin in 1910.[16] Over time, the town and the mill would become a center of pride as well as technological innovation for the company.

Over the next half century, the Kimberly mill was a focal point of its company's operations. After a fire in 1903, the mill was rebuilt and transformed for printing book and magazine paper instead of newsprint.[17] In 1914, a scientist and engineer named Ernst Mahler travelled to Germany and used a technique he learned there to implement a new production method at the Kimberly mill, which eventually led to a doubling of production capacity.[18] The Kimberly mill added a lab in 1925 where researchers worked on new products and tested their viability on machines there.[19] The Kimberly site was an important center of innovation and manufacturing for Kimberly, Clark, and Company.

Just as the Kimberly mill was the company's laboratory for manufacturing processes, the village of Kimberly was a laboratory for a different kind of business operation in its treatment of workers. Kimberly-Clark's approach there shared characteristics with what has been called "welfare capitalism," or "industrial paternalism." The company, in good faith, set out to provide its workforce in Kimberly with public services. In motivation and practice, however, it maintained the secondary motive of keeping workers happy enough that they would not unionize.[20] In addition to the initial offering of affordable housing, Kimberly-Clark built a baseball field and grandstand in 1910, a public clubhouse and gymnasium in 1923, and a public swimming pool in 1930.[21] The company set aside land for parks and eventually turned over these facilities to the village

government. Management also worked through mill councils, or "company unions," to address the concerns of workers and settle disputes over wages and benefits.[22] The plan was successful through the 1930s, but the Kimberly mill eventually created a local affiliate of the Employees' Independent Union and collectively bargained a contract in 1939.[23] Thereafter, Kimberly-Clark continued to play a role in the community but did not make the notable public investments that it had before, when it had a more controlling role in the village.

In 1952, the village of Kimberly was in the prime years of the post-war economy. That year serves as an archetype for daily life in the town. In 1952, Kimberly-Clark published the bi-monthly newsletter, *Cooperation*, which reported on the company as a whole and contained sections on specific goings-on in each mill town. A feature story in *Cooperation* in 1952 provides some details about the Kimberly mill's activities.[24] Each day the mill consumed 10 million gallons of filtered water, 60 acres of trees, and 300 tons of coal, and produced glossy paper that, combined, could have stretched 120 inches wide and 1,000 miles long. The mill employed 1,500 people, and over half of all wages were paid to residents of the Village of Kimberly and their families.[25] The Kimberly mill's writing staff for *Cooperation* included Editor Betty Darling and 14 contributing writers, 13 of whom were men.[26] The six newsletters published in 1952 provide insight into life in Kimberly and the role of the corporation in the lives of the workers. As the September-October issue of *Cooperation* stated in a feature story on the village of Kimberly, "Perhaps nowhere is there more of family pride apparent than at the Kimberly mill and the village because both are linked so closely together."[27]

In their respective company towns, American businesses in the early part of the twentieth century often provided workers with benefits above and beyond their wage, regularly taking on paternalistic attitudes toward their workers. *Cooperation*'s main sections highlighted messages from Kimberly-Clark management and revealed the priorities of the company. True to the archetype, these priorities tended to be paternalistic and, at times, patronizing. As a whole, *Cooperation* articles usually emphasized safety measures, personal financial planning and explanations of Kimberly-Clark employee benefits, the history of the company, and acknowledgement of loyal, long-term employees. In the January-February edition, an item carefully rationalized a new feature in the newsletters – political editorials advocating certain outcomes.[28] Throughout the year, editorials appearing on the final page encouraged employees to support political candidates that favored Kimberly-Clark's best interests.[29] These positions included balanced government budgets, low inflation, cuts in government spending, and elimination of wasteful spending and corruption in the government. Employees were encouraged to do their civic duty by voting, and were urged to contact their representatives. A convenient box listed the representatives from each mill town, so if a Kimberly worker wanted to contact their senator, they could easily find information for men like Senator Joseph McCarthy or Senator Alexander Wiley.[30]

Similarly paternalistic was Kimberly-Clark's presentation of financial issues to its workers. Included in the July-August *Cooperation* was a summary of Kimberly-Clark's worldwide activities for the past year.[31] It contained much of the same information as the company's Annual Report issued at about the same time, but it is notable for its presentation.[32] It assumes that the workers reading it are unable to understand the figures presented and re-purposes the report with cartoon drawings and written explanations in a question-and-answer-like format. The report is indicative of not only Kimberly-Clark's good intentions, but also of its view of its own workforce.

If the news reported in *Cooperation* in 1952 is any indication, life in Kimberly generally revolved around work and recreation, and the workers cared about what was going on in the community. A typical Kimberly edition of the newsletter included news about employee anni-

versaries and retirements – and the accompanying parties – as well as familial news concerning engagements, marriages, children, and grandchildren.[33] Regular reports also appeared on the results of the athletic contests hosted by the Kimberly Recreation Association, which was established in 1945 to organize sports and activities outside the mill.[34] Articles provided readers with news about sports like softball, baseball, basketball, hunting, archery, and bowling. The village also fielded teams that competed in statewide leagues, and the mill fielded teams that competed against other Kimberly-Clark mills. The members of these teams often had a significant overlap and were known throughout the state for their athletic prowess.[35] Judging by the amount of attention given to these activities in *Cooperation* and the description of large crowds at games, these events were important to the culture of the town.

A telling connection between the village and the mill arises in regard to how closely each edition of *Cooperation* covered the relationship between the mill and the local schools. Each month gave significant attention to the public Kimberly High School, including news about sporting events and teams, clubs, and social events like dances.[36] The regularity and depth of news about education display how concerned the mill workers were with what was happening at the school. The practice fostered a sense of pride and connection among students who saw their name or picture in their parent's company newsletter. In the March-April issue, an article appeared about a large group of Kimberly educators visiting the mill for a presentation. Public and parochial school teachers visited, evidenced by half the attendees being men wearing suits and the other half being nuns dressed in traditional attire.[37] The intergenerational link between the mill and the school solidified the connection between the two in the community.

The continuing effects of Kimberly-Clark's investments in the community are also showcased in the newsletters. The most important of those investments was the large banquet hall and gymnasium constructed on the mill grounds, always referred to by employees as the clubhouse, which served as the main communal meeting place. The May-June issue tells of regular meetings, held at the clubhouse, where the company hired women of the local Presbyterian Church to cook 55 pounds of chicken for workers to eat while management gave detailed presentations on topics varying from personal financial management and company benefits to Kimberly-Clark products and brands.[38] Other months mention weddings, send-off parties, safety milestone dinners, and bridal and baby showers that were held at the clubhouse. The clubhouse was also important for less glamorous reasons; in hard times it always had a source of running water for families to take showers.[39] The clubhouse was the cultural center of life in Kimberly, and the name Kimberly-Clark was on the building.

In the next two decades, Kimberly-Clark struggled with the demand for profit in the midst of tougher competition and inconsistent macroeconomic conditions. The company grew in size and expanded into international markets and diversified its holdings. Despite its growth, however, it did not achieve the profitability necessary to satisfy shareholders. At the same time, new technology changed the ideal setting for paper production. No longer was proximity to a river an important feature when a large, flat mill could be built in a low-tax southern state.[40] With lower transportation and communication costs, being located near suppliers, lumberyards, and customers became less important as well. These trends set the stage for the departure of Kimberly-Clark from its namesake village. The final act, however, was a conscious business decision to exit its former core business of commodity paper and completely focus on consumer paper product brands.

By 1970, Kimberly-Clark's most profitable and lucrative businesses were in consumer products, in industry-leading brands such as Huggies, Kleenex, and Kotex. That year, outgoing CEO Guy Minard requested a task force to create a report on the long-term costs and benefits

involved in either expanding or liquidating the company's commodity paper business. That business included primarily products like newsprint and coated magazine paper.[41] Kimberly-Clark's mills were old and running below capacity, and the task force reported that the company should either re-commit to the industry and upgrade the mills, or sell them off and exit the industry while consolidating the remaining commodity paper production at the Kimberly mill.[42] In 1971, new CEO Darwin Smith acted on the report and sold mills in California, Niagara Falls, and Niagara, Wisconsin. All remaining production was moved to Kimberly. Continued rumors of the Kimberly mill being sold scared away potential customers, however, and the few moderate investments in the necessary equipment were not enough to return it to profitability.[43] As the mill continued to run operating losses, Smith became convinced that the mill would need to be sold despite the significance of the Kimberly mill in the company's history.[44]

In March 1976, the leadership of Kimberly-Clark met with village officials to make an announcement that Kimberly-Clark was planning to sell the mill or cease operations there by the end of July of that year, leading to predictably mixed reactions. The Appleton *Post-Crescent* collected the immediate responses from Kimberly residents in a story published after the announcement. Some expressed relief that Kimberly-Clark intended to sell the mill and operate it in the interim, as rumors had been spreading that the announcement was going to be about an immediate, permanent shutdown. Others expressed anger at the company for "abandoning" the town. With 900 workers' jobs at stake, the issue attracted regional attention in the Fox River Valley. Doubt that all of the unemployed workers could be absorbed into new jobs without major disruptions to the local economy took root. Some workers found any number of external factors to blame. One was "big business" and the relentless focus on stock prices. Another was the failure of the union, and another Kimberly-Clark's lack of investment in the old mill. As one worker quoted to the *Post-Crescent*, it was about "big Kimberly-Clark not caring about little Kimberly." Workers had heard rumors about a potential buyer but also expected layoffs or a significant pay cut. One resident told the paper that the "town would fall right on its [posterior] if the mill folds," and that he hoped someone would buy the mill – "this little village is a pretty nice place!"[45]

Kimberly-Clark did keep its word and find a buyer for the mill, which was announced on June 29, 1976. Midtec Corporation agreed to buy the mill for $15 million, conditional upon the approval of a three-year contract with the labor union and an agreement with the State Department of Natural Resources, or DNR, concerning a timetable for the installation of a water treatment facility that was required by law in the midst of growing concern about environmental damage to the Fox River. Midtec's plan called for a new shift schedule, continuous operation, and increased production. Kimberly-Clark officials speculated that a company like Midtec, which was solely focused on the coated paper industry, could operate the mill profitably.[46]

After the completion of the deal with the Wisconsin DNR, the final hurdle in the sale was the approval of a new union contract. In July, a week before Kimberly-Clark was to cease operation of the mill for the first time since it was built in 1889, the 750 wage-earning employees of the Kimberly mill voted 421 to 169 to reject a three-year contract with Midtec. Under normal circumstances, this outcome would not have been surprising; Midtec's offer included a fifty percent cut in fringe benefits, a one-year wage freeze, and raises only contingent upon mill operating profits.[47] It also reshuffled assignments and moved some senior workers down into lower-paying positions. Midtec held firm and refused to change the offer in the next week, which led to a final vote. Because the issue was a labor dispute, laid-off workers would not be eligible for unemployment compensation. Faced with no other good options, the union voted on July 29, 1976 on the same proposal that it had rejected a week earlier and approved the contract by a vote of 480 to 176.

Midtec assumed operations a week later and kept a significant portion of the 150 salary employees on staff.[48] The company that founded the town had left, and moved its corporate headquarters from neighboring Neenah to Texas within the next decade.

A week after the transition, the Appleton *Post-Crescent* Editorial Board published an editorial that summed up feelings in the Village of Kimberly. It began by citing the anger, betrayal, and denial that it acknowledged would be natural for people to feel. The paper noted a village official who had been contacted by multiple residents suggesting that the village change its name. However, the *Post-Crescent* chose to focus on some of the benefits of Kimberly-Clark's long relationship with the town – taxes paid, donations made, parks and buildings built, and policies like allowing volunteer firemen to leave their machines to answer distress calls. Finally, it thanked Kimberly-Clark for keeping its word and finding a buyer willing to take over and continue operating the mill. It closed by saying that "for many years, Kimberly-Clark was Kimberly," and that villagers had something taken from them that they had grown to expect rather than appreciate.[49]

For better or worse, the Village of Kimberly was never the same after the sale of its namesake mill. The next quarter-century plus saw the mill change owners four times as the total amount of people employed there continued to fall. In 2008, the NewPage Corporation purchased the mill and announced its intent to shut it down permanently and terminate all employment contracts. As it had been in 1976, the news was met with anger and denial. Unlike that episode, however, this shutdown was final. The site sat vacant for nearly four years before another sale to a demolition company that began destroying the structures in 2012. At the same time the Village of Kimberly developed a lengthy land use plan for the land along the river, featuring medium-density residential areas, commercial zoning, and green space. According to the village, the plan is meant to be environmentally conscious, creating walkable neighborhoods with plenty of areas for outdoor recreation in the prime real estate along the Fox River. The development will be called "The Cedars," a reference to what the area was known as to the local farmers and neighboring villagers before John A. Kimberly noticed that the site would be a good location for a paper mill in the 1880s. [50]

As they were in many other communities, the final decades of the twentieth century were a struggle for Kimberly, Wisconsin. Even as small American towns grapple with the decline of decent-paying manufacturing jobs due to increased global competition, thirty-seven years after Kimberly-Clark moved on, the Village of Kimberly has, too. The link between this one corporation and members of the community may now be broken, but it is a testament to the power of that impact on the identity of this place to note that a quarter-century after Kimberly-Clark sold the mill, the mascot of the Kimberly public high school is still the Papermakers.

ENDNOTES

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"We're Number One": The Summit Series of 1972 and Canadian Identity

1972 Summit Series - Paul Henderson and Bobby Clarke celebrate goal.

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Moscow, the night of September 28th, 1972: A team of Canadian professional hockey players was tied at five goals apiece with Soviet nationals in the deciding contest of an eight-game series. With under a minute left, Canadian forward Paul Henderson got involved in a frenzied sequence close to his opponent's net: a wild sprint past the Soviet goaltender brought him crashing into the boards, and Henderson popped to his feet with almost inexplicable speed.[1] Legendary broadcaster Foster Hewitt's staccato commentary captured the intensity of the moment: "Here's a shot…Henderson made a wild stab for it and fell…here's another shot…right in front…they score! Henderson has scored for Canada!"[2] The series-winning tally caused usually reserved Canadian goaltender Ken Dryden to leave his net and sprint across the ice in order to join the ecstatic celebrations taking place at the other end of the Luzhniki Ice Palace of Sport's rink while the Canadians in the stands cheered with abandon, waved flags, and gestured triumphantly.

After the Canadians held on for the final thirty-four seconds to win the game and series, the players' revelry continued off the ice, both in the Canadian locker room and at the team's lodgings in Moscow. The victory bash continued into the morning hours as the nearly three thousand Canadian spectators who had traveled to the USSR in support of the players joined in the festivities. Those in Moscow were not the only ones participating in victory celebrations. People across Canada were just as excited about the outcome of the game, which, as many who were present in their home country remember, brought the country to a virtual standstill.[3] The national eruption of elation after the series translated into a catharsis of equal proportions. The players hailing from the country of hockey's origin had taken their rightful place of preeminence in the sport—by the skin of their teeth. Given the sky-high Canadian expectations in the run up to the contests, the reality of a hard-fought series capped by victory left fans astonished and relieved.

This thesis investigates the impact of the 1972 Summit Series had on the concept of Canadian identity. In the two decades leading up to the series, countrywide conversations had unfolded about the need for a stronger sense of Canadian unity and national identity, affecting the policy goals of even the highest levels of federal government. In the face of considerable societal divisions in the 1960s, largely brought on by the rise of an organized Québécois separatist movement, the arc of the series and its outcome became a tremendously unifying force that tied Canadians to their country and each other through a shared pride in one of Canada's distinct cultural facets. The national importance of the series came through reactions to the contests by all involved—players, coaches, fans and press commentators.[4] Team Canada's ultimate victory pushed the recent political and social strife to the fringes of the national mindset with an explosion of Canadianist sentiment. Moreover, the sentiments of prideful national identification and unity aroused at the time rapidly resurface when Canadians who experienced the event recall it today, marking the Summit Series as a crucial component of the country's recent historical memory.

Most literature on the Summit Series has employed a Cold War-influenced narrative that gives prominence to the East/West dichotomy that can easily be mapped on to this athletic contest. While not discounting the power of such a framework, this thesis hopes to broaden and deepen the historical understanding of this event by concentrating on its domestic effects.[5]

International sporting contests provide an opportunity for those in attendance to become part of a group that conveys a sense of collectivity that builds out of support of "their" team. This feeling of national identification can be further strengthened by the positioning of one's group against an "other"—that "other" being, in the case of international sport, the opposing team and its fans. In this way, collective responses at sporting events serve as concrete examples of feeling and emotion expressed through shared experience.

The Summit Series provides an opportunity to explore how national identity and sport

intersected at a critical time in a distinctly Canadian setting. Over the course of eight games, the Canadian players who participated in the series would transition from feeling an overblown sense of athletic supremacy to falling into the depths of doubt and despair, only to finish on top of international hockey after a momentous struggle with their Soviet adversaries. In many ways, the Canadian fans that watched the Summit Series followed a similar progression. However, lines of division were sharp within the general Canadian population. The gulf between the country's Francophone and Anglophone populations was especially wide in the decade or so leading up to the series in 1972. This divide is one of the major reasons why it was and continues to be so difficult for an authoritative conclusion to be reached on the topic of a distinct Canadian identity; to define a nation so disjointed is an awkward task. In the face of such issues, the unifying power of the Summit Series of 1972 stands out, as it has become a moment of great and common pride in their shared history and collective memory looked upon with tremendous satisfaction.

Theoretical Framework

This thesis is not putting forth the assertion that the Summit Series and its effects created a stable national identity that Canadians adopted and shared from then on. Such an assertion would assume that an identity is something whose creation leads to an objective, definitive form. It also implies that national identities have a latent, dormant quality, as if the concept is lying in wait somewhere just waiting to be discovered and applied to the relevant group of people. These assumptions can mislead scholars by forcing a mindset of having to "find" a conception of identity that has a sense of finality. Such assumptions discounts the state of fluidity that senses of self inhabit across space and time. Acknowledging this fact, this thesis interprets the Summit Series as an event that gave many Canadians an alternate way of viewing themselves and their place as a people in their country, allowing feelings of unity to well up where a national mood of discord and hostility had just recently prevailed.

Benedict Anderson's concept of "imagined communities" is useful for focusing on and analyzing the feelings brought about by the Summit Series. In explaining how this "imagining" occurs, Anderson emphasizes the importance of what he calls a "mass ceremony," specifically the daily ritual of a large number of individuals reading the same newspaper in various locations, which joins them through a shared "print language." But, "…each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existences he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion."[6] Thus, the community of which this individual is a part exists almost solely in his/her mind, making it truly imagined. The multitudes of fans that watched the Summit Series unfold participated in a "mass ceremony" of an analogous, although not completely identical nature to the situation outlined by Anderson.

One critical difference between reading a newspaper and watching international sporting competition is the nature of the environment in which the "mass ceremony" is experienced. Anderson's hypothetical newspapers are consumed in a solitary manner: "…performed in silent privacy, the lair of the skull."[7] Hockey, by contrast, is rarely watched alone. The Summit Series was no exception. Fans gathered around radio sets and television screens with family and friends to communally experience the event amid much cheering and shouting. Also, the "mass ceremony" that Anderson describes not only is a private act reproduced by a multitude of individuals, the individuals referenced are meant to be intellectuals capable and willing to carry out the mental abstraction necessary to acknowledge the formation of an "imagined community" across time and space.

Inside Luzhniki Palace or gathered around a TV set in a small town in Saskatchewan, participation in fandom tied viewers to a created "imagined community." Aggregating all the fans' experiences makes clear the wide scope of this "mass ceremony" that took place in the realms of viewers' individual minds. The experiential angle is key, yet it may seem rather strange. Fans experience in their own way the actions of the players and/or teams they follow that leads to feelings of pride. How is this possible? Nicholas Dixon addresses this question in a national context:

> "The pride supporters take in their national team's success is at first sight curious: how can they be proud of something that they had, in all probability, no role in achieving? The answer seems to be that fans believe that they share, albeit indirectly, in the credit that a successful national team merits. A national team's success reflects well on a country, and fans may feel that they, in turn, are augmented by an increase in the worth of the country to which they belong."[8]

It was in this manner that a community coalesced around one of Canada's cultural foundations, allowing it to be inclusive (regardless of the distances that separated its populace) in a way that might have been difficult to believe at the time given the fissure between Francophone and Anglophone Canada in the recent past.

A Desire for Unity

In the early to mid-1960s, a dialogue took place in Canada about the need to foster unity through an assertion of a distinct Canadian identity. The use of such terms and rhetorical devices as "unity" and "national identity" was extremely widespread and as such formed the basis of the discourse. Participants included economists, philosophers, and writers from across the wide ranges of Canada; all stressed the importance of this task. Indeed, the conversation came to include politicians and cultural leaders when it reached the highest levels of federal government, resulting in a concerted effort to create policy with Canadian identity and unity in mind.[9]

Critically, the idea of striving toward a national sense of unity gained traction in intellectual circles during the mid 1960s. The writers George Grant, Walter L. Gordon, and Eric W. Kierans all figured prominently in this phase, publishing influential works between 1965 and 1967.[10] The bulk of their writings dealt with the importance of Canada's remaining distinct from the United States, seen as Canada's overbearing "friend" to the south.

At the forefront of George Grant's fundamentally conservative work is a bemoaning of economic domination through the presence of American capital on Canadian soil. He coined the term "branch plant society" to describe the situation, but he also spoke of American influence in the political sphere as leaving Canada without the power of self-determination. Grant would see decision regarding Canada's joining the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) under the Diefenbaker[11] government as emblematic of his country's loss of independence in the field of foreign affairs. As if to add insult to Grant's injury, the main headquarters for the joint-defense program was located in not in Canada, but Colorado Springs.[12] Across all three works, the overarching theme was to create distinction as a country through a stronger sense of Canadianism amongst the nation's citizens.[13] Once difference was established, the ability to be seen as autonomous on the international stage would arise.

However, all three recognized a prior condition to projecting a strong, healthy national identity: an absolute necessity for unity within the domestic sphere.[14] The problem that "Canadians have always felt the centrifugal tug of conflicting loyalties—to Britain, to Québec or a par-

ticular region, or even to the United States" necessitated a solution.[15] This sentiment was obvious in Kierans' thought: "One vital prerequisite of any Canadian nationalism is the need to find unity within our borders. Unity is not uniformity which refuses to acknowledge the dual nature of Canada and the diversity which can be our greatest strength."[16] Kierans often wrote about this concept in an expressive, lyrical manner, unlike the other thinkers mentioned above: "This country will find itself when it exists in the hearts of all its citizens; when each of us strives to assist and reinforce the other in the maintenance of that which is dear—in the creation of a tomorrow that spells unity."[17] While such poetic language may seem surprising—coming as it does from the pen of an economist—it truly speaks to the intensity of the desire for a Canadian population unified through a pride in their homeland.

Through thinly veiled allusions to the overwhelming of American influence in Canadian business affairs, he echoes sentiment of the 1956 Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, incidentally chaired by Walter L. Gordon.[18] More than economic independence was at stake, however. Hinted at with the phrase "own national character and style," Canada and its citizens needed to assert and project a nationalism that promoted a clear Canadianism in all aspects of life. Writers such as Grant, Gordon and Kierans hoped that their recommendations would take root, and over time, public officials in Ottawa would come to agree with this desire for unity, and see it as the government's duty to work towards the goals set forth by these three intellectuals. Gordon provided impetus for the undertaking: "We cannot hope to continue our existence as a separate, independent country unless we have a strong government in Ottawa…If we have a weak [central] government…Canadians will look to their provincial governments for leadership. This will encourage regional loyalties at a time when a healthy Canadian nationalism is essential if we are to hold together and make the most of our opportunities."[19]

To help Canada towards national unity, there was also an acknowledgement of the pressing need for rallying points towards which Canadian citizens could look, all in an effort to present a unified nationality to the world. Gordon himself stated, "Canadians need more symbols, more traditions, and more in the way of clearly identifiable national policies to remind them of their country and the pride they should take in it. We should adopt distinctively Canadian attitudes wherever this is natural and possible…we need more occurrences in our daily lives that will give us a thrill to think of Canada, to think of how lucky we are to be Canadians."[20]

Prompted by the proximity of centennial celebrations of Canada's confederation via the British North America Acts of 1867, Lester B. Pearson,[21] put himself in the vanguard of this endeavor. He believed the adoption of a new Canadian flag would provide an effective way to pursue this goal. Unsurprisingly, the prospect of putting an end to the use of the Red Ensign, with its overtly British imagery,[22] rankled more than a few government officials, not to mention parts of the general populace who thought to do so was a disservice to Canada's past.[23] Nevertheless, Pearson moved forward because he realized the unifying power of such a symbol, and was forthright in this opinion:

> I believe that a national flag of the kind described in this resolution…will bring us closer together; give us a greater feeling of national identity and unity…we need faith and confidence in ourselves as Canadians, with pride in Canada, devotion to our country. It will be something around which all Canadians, new and old, native born and naturalized, of all racial stocks, can rally, and which will be the focus of their loyalty to Canada.[24]

Québec Member of Parliament Milton L. Klein used similar language when he said "French Canada wants a distinctive Canadian flag in order to be able to rally around some common de-

nominator with the rest of Canada."[25] This cross-cultural support points to an acknowledgement of weak national identification and unity among the Canadian citizenry brought on by different constituent communities having their own quasi-national identities. There was also the recognition that federal government could play a role in bringing about change. However, political backing for the resolution was anything but total, and adoption came only after "lengthy and emotionally charged debate" on February 15, 1965.[26] Pearson himself saw the passions aroused by the flag as inevitable:

> I know, also, that a flag issue is bound to raise strong and deep and genuine emotions. All national symbols have a deep meaning and create strong sentiments. That is why they are so important in national growth; in nourishing loyalty and patriotism among those who make up our nation.[27]

Walter Gordon commended the act, saying, "The federal government should make a conscious effort to develop national symbols. The adoption of the red Maple Leaf Flag by Parliament was a first essential step in this direction."[28]

It should be noted that the controversial topic made itself visible on the ground even years after the parliamentary debates had ended. Former political aide Thomas Van Dusen made this observation: "Curiously, it was the Fleur de Lys, not the maple leaf flag that sprouted in thousands when General de Gaulle appeared in Québec in 1967, bringing his message of the new French Revolution, one hundred and seventy-five years after the original event."[29]

A Society Divided

To necessitate a unifying power, there has to be division to close or a gap to bridge. The national separation between Anglophone and Francophone provided just such a fissure in Canadian society. Editor B. K. Sandwell used an extended metaphor to describe how many saw the bicultural nature of Canada:

> Whenever we speak of it as if it were a unit we must be careful to remember that its unity is the unity of a walnut—it has a single shell, but within that shell are two quite distinct formations of meat flimsily joined in the centre. The shell is the political structure of the nation, still preserving some of softness of its unripe stage as a colony, but being gradually hardened by exposure to the sun and wind and rain of a very variable international climate. The meat is the two cultures, as yet very lightly joined together of French-speaking and English-speaking Canada.[30]

Québec was and is the center of Francophone Canada, set apart from the rest of the country by its official language, and the historical culture that came with it. Furthermore, until the tumultuous 1960s the province was distinguished by its penchant for right-wing policies as well as the overbearing influence of the Catholic Church, whose conservative and insular nature influenced all sectors of society, including education. These features made many outside the province doubt its ability to truly be a part of a federal Canada.[31]

Beginning in 1960 and continuing through the rest of the decade, the "Quiet Revolution" took hold of Québec. During this time, the provincial government in Québec City set about implementing several initiatives. Maurice Duplessis'[32] death in 1960 brought about the defeat of his Union Nationale party, whose conservatism was devoted to what was seen as the maintenance of the province's cultural and political purity.[33] The party's downfall led to reform-minded Liberal

politicians being at the helm. Forces of secularization took on the province's creaking and overly insular system of education. Economic measures such as the nationalizing of utilities companies increased government involvement in the regional economy. These larger programs and others attempted a liberalization of society in Québec, diminishing the role of the Roman Catholic Church, all in the hope of drawing Québec closer to inclusion in the larger Canadian welfare state, but Québec would come on its own terms.[34]

However, the societal changes brought on by the Quiet Revolution also marked the starting point of overt displays of a desire for Québec's future as a viable independent state. Politician René Lévesque echoed the sentiments of many Quebecers when, in 1963, he said: "We are…an authentic nation, but a nation without sovereignty."[35] The province of Québec had a language and history all its own, and yet, despite these factors which emphatically set it apart from the rest of Canada, Québec was bound to the rest of the country.

During Expo 67, a world's fair put on to showcase the centennial of the Canadian Confederation, President of the French Republic Charles de Gaulle visited Montreal on July 24, 1967.[36] At the height of the widespread social changes wrought by the ongoing Quiet Revolution, in a situation where Canada was proudly displaying itself to the world, this was not a time to ruffle any feathers with inflammatory rhetoric. De Gaulle was not the man to fulfill these expectations. He felt he had to do just the opposite with his appearance in Montreal: "I am going to strike a strong blow. Things are going to get hot. But it is necessary…it will make some waves."[37] The French President made good on his word, capping his speech with cries of "*Vive Montréal! Vive le Québec! Vive le Québec libre!,*" thrusting his arms triumphantly overhead. The enthusiastic roar of the crowd below him marked the clear presence of many listeners sympathetic to the content of his eloquent and impassioned oration. Indeed, "scattered throughout the crowd were scores of separatists who brandished placards bearing the same 'Québec libre' slogan."[38] De Gaulle had certainly made some waves.

An editorial in the next day's paper recognized this: "President de Gaulle speaks of a national respect for itself, and he is applauded; he speaks of a determining your own future, and he is applauded; he speaks of a common future, and he is applauded. And if the people applaud what he says, it is they who are saying it."[39] His words became a clarion call for a burgeoning and quickly formalizing separatist movement.

The speech created a firestorm within the central government in Ottawa, with most reactions showing a tightening of the ranks against what was seen as de Gaulle's unwanted and groundless intrusion into Canada's delicate political climate. "Federal officials from Prime Minister [Lester] Pearson on down were reported shaken and angered by de Gaulle's cry…It was regarded as unwarranted meddling in Canada's domestic affairs."[40] A foreign head of state had, with a few exclamations, thrown fuel on the fire of controversy that soon burst into a full-fledged governmental crisis. De Gaulle had brought the potential strength of separatist fervor to Ottawa's doorstep, and it was not something those in the government wished to deal with at that moment.

Pearson issued an official statement soon afterward that rejected what he saw as an unabashed attempt to drive a wedge between diverse elements of Canadian society. He proclaimed that "Canadians do not need to be liberated" and the country will "continue to remain united."[41] However, the situation on the ground in Montreal did not indicate there was such a thing as a cohesive Canada. Separatist sentiment reared its head in the form of a very vocal and insistent minority.

"*Vive le Québec libre.*" De Gaulle's words bolstered Quebecers who believed that their home province's rightful place in the world was as a separate and independent state, not as a part of the

Canadian Confederation. His speech had the effect of injecting their aspirations with a real sense of power and legitimacy. Soon enough, this faction that had come to reject including Québec in a federalist Canada would find its political voice, expressed through both formal and extremist channels.

In the middle of October 1968, the political entity *Parti Québécois* formed as the result of a political union between the parties *Ralliement national* and *Mouvement Souveraineté-Association*, both of which had separatist leanings.[42] Unlike earlier times, the development and arrival of the Parti Québécois on the political scene had coincided with favorable provincial civic sentiment. The party now had a formal political opportunity to work towards the goal of bringing that which he called "an authentic nation" into the realm of sovereignty.[43] In April of 1970, the *Parti Québécois* made its first appearance on a Québec general election ballot and won a small number of seats. However, for a certain faction within the pro-independence camp, working through accepted political channels was not a worthwhile venture—desired changes had to be seized much more swiftly.

A group that called itself the Front de libération du Québec/des Québécois (FLQ) formed in 1963, relatively early during the Quiet Revolution, and before separatism truly came into the limelight. But the group was explicit in their goal of achieving complete separation from the rest of Canada. The FLQ was obvious in their revolutionary ilk, using acts of terror to broadcast their slogan of "Independence or Death."[44] In October 1970, separate cells under the FLQ umbrella proved their extremist disposition with the kidnapping of British trade representative James Cross on October 5. The group followed up with a second abduction, this time capturing Pierre Laporte, Québec's immigration and labor minister. These acts were all in an effort to have the central government to recognize the power behind the separatist movement and gain political leverage.[45] Soon after the kidnappings, Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau invoked the powers of the War Measures Act, which included the suspension of habeas corpus, in an effort to restore order in Québec.[46]

During this tumultuous period, Canada was a deeply divided country. Even among those who opposed Québec independence, some took issue with Trudeau's "just watch me" stance on how to maintain control of the situation and questioned his use of the War Measures Act in response to the crisis.[47] Things went from bad to worse on October 17 when a communication surfaced that stated, "Pierre Laporte…was executed at 6:18 tonight…We Shall Conquer. FLQ." The murder shocked the nation, and as evidenced by the thousands who viewed Laporte's body as it lay in state, multitudes thought what happened was detestable. At this point, mainstream support for the FLQ had effectively ended.[48] The same could not be said for the cause of separatism. Prime Minister Trudeau's actions may have avoided a descent into a situation of complete chaos, but there was little national unity to speak of and believers in Québec independence still held fast.

The situation in Canada up to this point makes clear that the concepts of national identity and unity were very far from stable. Separatism's rise, whether through the political goals of the PQ or the extreme actions of the FLQ, played off the discussion that occurred earlier in the 1960s. It was in this context of an uncertainty about basic issues of national identification that the 1972 Summit Series would provide a foundation for the building of national cohesion.

The Series

Amid these currents of drift or outright separatism, a team of Canada's best hockey professionals, after some struggles of its own, would bring their countrymen together like never before. At the end of September 1972, hockey would trigger an outpouring of Canadian national

sentiment that shone like a bright light, dispersing the gloom of previous discord and conflict. The game so central to a Canada and its culture would prove to be a force that unified its people, temporarily pushing them beyond a tumultuous recent past, instead bringing them together. The experience and expression of a feeling of community transcended, however briefly, existing grievances and differences.

The effect that the Summit Series had on Canada and its identity was not the end result of a progression of events that predictably followed one another. Neither was the outcome of the series (from a strictly hockey perspective) inevitable. When it comes to the end product, sports rarely deliver exactly what is expected or predicted. However, this did not stop a majority of Canadians, including most "experts" on the subject, from proclaiming the overwhelming superiority of their professionals. Such beliefs became the dominant Canadian narrative leading up to the series for a variety of reasons. First and most obviously, the belief that the Canadian brand of hockey and the players it produced were supreme stems from the fact that Canada was the original home of hockey. Its inhabitants were the creators and the originators of the game. Ken Dryden avers that the "first game was played just eight years after Confederation." Seeing as the confederation of Canada occurred in 1867, Canada had at this point almost hundred years of hockey heritage to draw from.[49] Therefore it was inconceivable that a team made up of the best professional players the nation had to offer would have even the slightest bit of trouble with an amateur squad from the Soviet Union.

Leading up to the first game on September 2, forecasts regarding the outcome of the series rolled in, with the vast majority predicting an eight-game sweep or bust for the Canadians. Brian Conacher, who would provide color commentary during broadcasts of the games, was downright mild (and the member of a very small minority) with this thought: "the Russians will certainly win one at home. And they'll go all-out to win just one here, I'm sure."[50] Journalists such as John Robertson gave even less weight to Canadian prowess, predicting a dominating series win for the Soviets.[51] However, the pervasive "eight-straight" discourse effectively drowned out all dissenting opinions. The media was saturated with prophecies of easy victory.[52] Undoubtedly, the Canadian squad members heard the predictions, which would have instilled feelings of superiority in them regardless of attempts to avoid having this happen. Then the scouting report on the Soviet team, with its unflattering appraisal of goaltender Vladislav Tretiak came into the mix. The information portrayed a player who was quite weak at his position. Thus, one can see how difficult it would be for the players to gloss over the scouts warning them "not to take [the Soviet team] lightly" when the vast majority of their countrymen believed the contest would be a cakewalk.[53]

Just prior to the first game of the Summit Series, a Canadian unity of sorts had emerged that centered behind the prominent "eight straight" narrative. However, this unity was not analogous to the nationalist feelings that developed over the course of the series and impacted Canadian identity in a profound way. It is true that the togetherness apparent before the series was based on their national game. Ken Dryden recalled that he realized "the people have developed a common bond with hockey players" when a individual "grabbed [Dryden's] hand, shook it, and said in a vigorous voice, 'Try to do it for us.' For us! He did not say it in a corny way. He said it with genuine emotion. 'Do it for us! For Canada!'"[54] The scores of predictions that had the national team of Canada sweeping aside the Soviets without so much as a loss reveals the presence of a tremendous pride and unshakable belief in the athletic prowess of its players. Canadian fans wanted to assert their primacy in the hockey world, telling the Soviets "it's our game. Go away."[55]

Yet, these feelings of commonality were tenuous in spots. There were slight glimpses of apprehension among the press reports. The week before the series would get underway, *The Mon-*

treal Gazette reported that Henry Sinden, Canada's head coach, "eliminated a workout to give his exhausted troupe a breather," leading the writer of the column to say "cracks in Team Canada's seemingly-invincible armor appeared for the first time"[56] A day before the first game, the *Toronto Star* sport section led with the headline of "Canada's prestige on the line."[57] While this conveyed a sense of uneasiness, the tone of body of the body of the article still tied into the prevailing "eight straight" narrative, albeit in a less bombastic fashion than some other reports. Nevertheless, such a headline shows a Canadian public that realized the gravity of the endeavor before them—winning (and by a wide margin at that) was the only option at the time if pride was to be retained in their national game and, by extension, their national identity.

However, when thinking in terms of the national sentiment that came about post-series, and the sense of unity that came with it, consider this: if Canada had gone undefeated in all games, it is highly likely that the series would not be remembered as it is today as a seminal moment in the Canadian past. Instead, it would be relegated to the footnotes of history, because doing the expected does not translate into a formative influence. When one considers the context this hockey series took place in, of a nation deeply divided by the issue of separatism, an easy win would not have drawn the country and its people together. However, a sweep was not in the cards. Importantly, one group of people did not buy into the "eight straight" narrative: the Soviet nationals opposing Team Canada. Anatoli Tarasov, former head coach of the USSR national team proved prophetic when he said "The Canadian pros are strong, but [the Soviet players] are capable of extracting their poison fangs."[58] The night of the first game was one during which a collective naïveté was lost and the cries of a disbelieving nation in crisis reverberated throughout Canada. But out of this situation rose a more powerful form of national unity that helped connect Canada to its citizens and vice versa. Its genesis began, with a few steps back along the way, after the conclusion of the game in Montreal.

Full of self-confidence, the Canadian nationals hit the ice for their first matchup against the Soviets. Immediate apparent were two physical symbols that hinted at the national unity that the team would come to represent by the end of the series. First, the squad had been christened Team Canada—a term easily translated into French: Équipe Canada —so as to break down language barriers and posit the idea of a unified team competing for a unified nation.[59] Quite literally, the players were members of Canada's team, one that reached across the country's cultural divide to include all fans of hockey in the country. The design of the player's jerseys also added to the nationalization of the team. A jagged, stylized maple leaf, that uniquely Canadian symbol, adorned the front. Similar to its usage on the national flag, the uniform's sole logo sent "the message of nationality."[60] Indeed, the use of the maple leaf on the team's sweaters can be seen as an explicit validation of the flag passed by Parliament just a few short years prior.

Adding to the sense of national cohesion was the absence of individualistic nameplates on the reverse of the jerseys. Replacing them with an emphatic "CANADA" could be viewed as an attempt at furthering a project of collective unity and effort by the team and its fans.[61] These features, along with the overall "setting of international sport—flags, anthems, national colours and emblems, large crowds—are as easy and appropriate a setting for collective expressions of national identity as one could devise."[62] While circumstances surrounding the first game were primed for a prideful nationalist display through winning Canadian hockey, the Soviet team had other ideas.

When the final whistle had sounded the end of game one in Montreal, feelings of shock and disbelief swept aside any of the confidence in an eight-game sweep detailed above. The Soviets had hung a crooked number on the Canadians, winning easily at seven goals to three. Being

beaten at the national game cut right to the heart of Canadian identity. It planted seeds of doubt that called into question beliefs of supremacy that had felt so certain earlier. The unexpected loss triggered thoughts that the nation on the verge of catastrophe. Reactionary, gloomy headlines from a major Montreal daily the next day reveal the seriousness of the national mood: "A dark day: when pride turned to trauma," and "The night the Russians buried a myth forever."[63]

The theme of a myth evaporated was pervasive. Gone were excessively inflated feelings of supremacy. Canadian head coach Harry Sinden commented on the cold reality that remained: "they [the Soviets] beat us in almost every department." To prove his point, Sinden went on to list the necessary components of a capable hockey team, and his squad's deficiencies in each. His comments pointed to a desperate need for reevaluation of where his squad stood. With Canadian excellence in hockey now uncertain, one of the few foundations for cultural unity of the country was rocked to its core. As Ken Dryden had told readers via the journal he kept during the series, "Hockey is an intimate par of our life in this country… I'm certain you that you don't understand this. You must be a Canadian." And now, in that context, the loss was what he called "a black mark for Canada."[64] Add this to the political discord that occurred domestically and the blueprint for an identity crisis of national proportions became evident. Expectations necessitated eight easy victories, and yet the Canadian squad only beat the Soviets once in the first three games.

It was within this atmosphere that Dennis Braithwaite penned an opinion piece for the *Toronto Star*, which said "It will be a blessing in disguise if our hockey team loses the whole series to the Russians." The article went on to lambast the pretension evident in the lead-up to the series, seeing the game's outcome as Canadians' just deserts.[65] Team Canada and its fans dealt with emotions of crisis through a few more games, but soon began to turn the corner. Events after the contest in the series' fourth game, in Vancouver, became the starting point for the rebuilding of Canadian pride in its "home game" and thus an assertion of national identity.

After another difficult game—the last on Canadian soil—Team Canada came up short yet again, this time by a score of five to three. The series at this point stood at 2-1-1 in favor of the Soviet national team. Many fans in attendance had booed the home team, starting during team warm-ups and continuing throughout the game; it did not let up even after the last second ticked off the game clock. The incident profoundly affected some of the Canadian players, including Ken Dryden, the goaltender that started that evening.[66] But he admitted that he could see why it was happening. "I think it's understandable. Canada had a party set up and the Russians ruined it."[67]

The Vancouver fans' jeering of their national team has an explanation that fits in with Dryden's statement. Fans across Canada felt completely let down by this loss, and by the overall results in the series to this point as well. They had watched a team experts had hyped to sweep the series with ease finish the first four games with just a single win.

This deflated overblown feelings of superiority caused by insular views of Canada's prowess in hockey. Acknowledging the disappointment of all involved in the series, Ken Dryden had this to say, recalling the disastrous night in Montreal: "The people were trying too hard—just as we were in that first game." Dryden then returned to language of a party spoiled by the Soviets: "A big party was to take place. Suddenly, there was no party."[68] In essence, many fans were unable to accept how these Soviet "upstarts" could win so handily at the national pastime. The only way the fans in Vancouver could deal with such feelings was to lash out at their compatriots on the ice, Canada's representatives in what had become a titanic athletic struggle.

The anger felt in Vancouver's Pacific Coliseum went beyond the confines of the arena. A Toronto journalist captured the mood of fans across Canada when he said, "…as the last air escaped from the punctured balloon of a national ego, it had the angry sound of disappointment,

disillusionment, and—excuse the word—almost contempt."[69] Indeed, most fans were not just troubled by the losses suffered, but in *how* defeat came in those games. Letters came into Canadian dailies bemoaning what was seen as overly physical play unbecoming of a hockey powerhouse like Canada.[70] At this juncture, Canadian unity behind its team and fans' pride in the product the players produced was at its nadir.

Canadian center and alternate captain Phil Esposito was not as sympathetic to the fans' reactions as Ken Dryden. In fact, he was utterly frustrated, an attitude voiced in remarks to broadcaster Johnny Esaw after the game. What followed was more rant than interview. To start off, Esposito addressed the nation, acknowledging the domestic importance of the series. He continued by chastising the fans that booed incessantly during the game, pointing to the tremendous amount of effort that the team exerted, only to fall short of the wanted result.[71] The effort Esposito spoke of was plain to see if one only looked at his face. It bore the expression of an athlete who was absolutely spent, one that had given his all in the previous game. He concluded by expressing what motivated his individual as well as his teammates' participation in the series:

> Everyone one of us guys, thirty-five guys who came out to play for Team Canada, we did it because we love our country and not for any other reason. They can throw the money for the pension fund out the window, they can throw anything they want out the window—we came because we love Canada. And even though we play in the United States and we earn money in the United States, Canada is still our home and that's the only reason we come [sic]. And I don't think its fair that we should be booed.[72]

Esposito's speech marked a turning point in the series. For the team, it provided a moment in which players came together and could push onward as one. For Canada's fans, the rant by a sweat-drenched Esposito humanized the team, which initiated the process of the nation assuming the identity of their squad, thus truly supporting them. "We did it because we love our country and not for any other reason…we came because we love Canada…[it is] our home and that's the only reason we come" It was with these words that Esposito told all of Canada what it desired to hear in the first place: Canada comes first, nothing else. He was responding to the fans that had said, "we want to be proud of our team."[73] From here on, those playing in the series shouldered the hopes of a nation as it began to join together in what became a battle for national pride and identity.

The final games of the series would take place in Moscow. For the players, being in a metropolis far away from the familiarity of home led them to adopt a "backs against the wall" attitude. With (alleged) KGB agents around them at all times, feelings of paranoia abounded.[74] This sense of being isolated in a foreign environment, combined with the reality that the team had nothing to lose at this point, made it quite easy to for the Canadian competitors to see themselves as agents of national unity and those responsible for the maintenance of a country's pride in itself. As Harry Sinden recalled one of his pre-game talks in Moscow, he told Team Canada that "if we won this game, and went on to win the series, we would vindicate ourselves and all that we stand for."[75] The team and its compatriots back home had gone through the lowest of the low in the first four games, and the hard road that lay ahead still held obstacles, but nothing solidifies collective identity quite like shared struggle.

Canada's losing ways continued when the first game in Moscow—game five in the series—ended five to four in the Soviets favor. Phil Esposito saw a silver lining in the loss when he commented, "we [the Canadian team] were in a tremendous hole. The Russians won three, tied one, and lost only once. But we were more together than ever before"[76] The three thousand or so Ca-

nadian citizens who made the trip to the Soviet Union adopted an outlook similar to that of the players. They too were far from home and took it upon themselves to project feelings of Canadian unity and identity onto the scene in Moscow. In essence, these travelling fans became representatives for the home populace back across the Atlantic and wanted to make their presence known. Indeed, the Canadian contingent engaged in numerous overt displays of national identity and pride in Luzhniki Ice Palace. The waving of maple leaf flags and loud chanting of the simplistic (not to mention its incorrect usage of Russian) yet forthright "da da Canada, nyet nyet Soviet" are two such examples.[77] Fans were just as invested in the series and its potential consequences it as the players were. The multitudes of telegrams the players received during their time in Moscow makes this clear, leading Team Canada to cover "the walls of the dressing rooms at the rink with their messages of good cheer." Pierre Trudeau, the prime minister, also would also send words of support, telling the team "Canada is mighty proud of you."[78]

The last three games were must-wins if Team Canada wished to take the series and retain its reputation as representative of the top hockey-playing country. A singular opportunity to lift up a divided nation and affirm its identity through triumph at its "home game" was present and tangible. Games six and seven went Team Canada's way courtesy of narrow one-goal margins. The series' eighth and final contest would truly decide the outcome, as both the Canadian and Soviets possessed an equal number of victories, and the shared tie.

In the dying seconds of the back-and-forth contest, the score was even at five goals apiece. That was until Canadian winger Paul Henderson fulfilled the hopes of multitudes of his countrymen, including an ecstatic Foster Hewitt. The commentator described the decisive moment thusly: *"Here's a shot! Henderson made a wild stab for it and fell. Here's another shot, right in front—They score! Henderson! Henderson has scored for Canada! And the fans and the team are going wild!"*[79] The gritty winger capped off the series in style, adding the series-winning goal to his game winners for Team Canada in each of the previous two contests. Henderson had said before the final game that the deciding tally in game seven was "the greatest goal of [his] life," but he would surely offer an addendum to that statement after his historic actions in game eight.[80]

Foster Hewitt's exclamation conveyed the significance of what had occurred on two levels. Topically, he was simply a play-by-play commentator doing his job, doing what he could to add supplemental drama to a moment already steeped in it. Simultaneously, however, Hewitt's choice of words struck at a much deeper chord. A quick transition from the general statement of "they score" to "Henderson has scored for Canada!" signaled the commentator's awareness of the gravity of the moment before him. Hewitt implied that Henderson's athletic effort not only elevated his team, but millions of his fellow Canadians.

Paul Henderson had indeed scored *for* Canada. His series-wining tally ignited an explosion of Canadianist exultation that rippled out from Moscow and raced across the Atlantic into almost every sector of Canada. Wherever fans watched the game—in their homes, at school, or in the local pub—they all joined in to celebrate this moment of national triumph together. As one article put it, "the nation went on one giant ego kick."[81]

What an ego kick it was. Fans paraded through city streets in both Canada and Moscow, chanting "We're number one!" while proudly waving the maple leaf flag. The communality of such an act, as well as the usage of "we" language in the rallying cry itself emphasizes the sense of collective identity felt by all the fans involved. One individual shouted "God is Canadian!" insinuating that a benevolent Creator had cast the die in favor of Canada's retaining the international hockey crown, as if Team Canada's triumph was the fulfillment of divine providence.[82] The team had ultimately emerged victorious in what had initially been advertised as an exhibition between

two nations. Despite the trappings of friendly competition, its meaning had quickly went far beyond that for players, coaches and spectators. As The *Toronto Star*'s sports editor Jim Proudfoot put it, Team Canada went into Moscow and left "in triumphant possession of the unofficial but very genuine championship of the hockey world."[83] The photographs of jubilant fans' faces that adorned the head of celebratory newspaper columns best show how truly genuine the championship was.[84] The mood was one of national ecstasy, and underneath this was a feeling of immense togetherness among Canadian fans. A Montreal daily noted the presence of this togetherness on the city's streets: "There was also a nice touch of bilingual unanimity when the game ended. In Place Ville Marie a small crowd began singing O Canada and a few blocks to the East in Place Victoria another crowd sang the anthem—in French."[85]

Ken Dryden, in his seminal and introspective book *The Game*, briefly looked back on what the series meant: "In 1972, we had our chance, in what was called hockey's showdown. And we won, and the party was more glorious than any before it or since" it was "the cause of such explosive national celebration"[86] This carnival-like mood persisted for days after the conclusion of the series. Uncountable numbers of rejoicing fans welcomed their team back to Canadian soil, gathering in Toronto's Nathan Phillips Square on a rainy first of October. Impromptu singing of "O Canada" broke out while the masses awaited the plane, the mood one full of national pride, with the crowd buying into this manifestation of Canadian identity.[87] Once deplaned, several of the players were given the chance to speak to the crowd. The themes of collectivity and pride in national identification are unmistakable. Paul Henderson called the support of those gathered in front of him "just unbelievable," which elicited massive cheers. J.P. Parise followed him up with a simple yet heartfelt remark: "My god, it's nice to be back in Canada."[88] By telling those in the crowd that "You're standing on the greatest country in the world right here," Mickey Redmond put a final and emphatically pro-Canadianist stamp on the occasion.[89]

More than four decades onward, similar feelings well up whenever Canadian fans recall the series, the only difference is that now tinges of nostalgia are also present. The series has become a monumental element in the collective memory of Canadians. Photographer Frank Lennon snapped the now-famous picture of Paul Henderson being tackled by his exuberant teammate Yvon Cournoyer after scoring the decisive goal. Lennon believed it to be a moment "'etched into the visual cortex of every Canadian.'"[90] Today, objects connected to the series fetch high prices from collectors and, according to one sports memorabilia vendor, "will never go down in value."[91] If this holds true, if tangible reminders of the series are that important, the events of September 1972 are surely indispensable to Canadians' shared history and memory.

Paul Henderson's goal did more than set off an eruption of sports-induced euphoria. The outcome of the series reaffirmed that hockey primacy still belonged to Canada and, by extension, reaffirmed that the game is an integral component of Canadian national culture. Like no other event could hope to do, game eight unified people behind their team, effectively shutting down cities such as Montreal.[92] Such scenes most likely were common across Canada, and are indicative of the power hockey had. In a country horribly split by the threat of Québec separatism, a simple game made people ignore such divisions and come together. *Their* game was that unifying force. Colin McCullough of *The Globe and Mail* recognized this just hours after the final game concluded: "the series had produced more than hockey scores…a lot of Canadians discovered their nationality. Had any of them ever before stood up and loudly sung 'O Canada,' even the high notes, with tears running down their cheeks?"[93]

The triumph of Team Canada, accomplished by collective effort through fierce struggle caused individuals to recognize this view of the Canadian self—fans expressed a proud national

identity, prompted by victory in a hockey series. The strength of national identification it brought about cannot be denied. One fan that welcomed Team Canada home offered the sincere response of "I am true to my country" when asked why she had endured the rain.[94] Just a few years prior, with separatism at the forefront of domestic politics, these same fans may have questioned whether being Canadian was truly a critical component of who they were. And yet for a brief time at the end of September 1972, cultural, ethnic, and political differences were put aside and the people of Canada could truly say, "We're number one" together. Perhaps this proved Canadian cabinet minister John Munro's assertion: "[The reaction to the series] shows we've got a very deep sense of Canadian nationalism that has a flash every once in a while just to reassure you it's really there."[95]

It is ceaselessly intriguing that the national identification that Munro spoke of was the product of a few hockey games scattered over a month in 1972. Team Canada's progression and eventual victory in the Summit Series became a signature moment that stirred up feelings of national pride at the series' conclusion. It continues to be such a moment today, being highly evocative when recalled by Canadians. Bound up with this moment-creation is the way in which it was experienced; the winning of the series gave Canadians the chance to dramatically say that hockey was one thing that was distinctly, singularly "*ours*." A post-series editorial ably captured the spirit that resonated with many: "It was heartwarming to see Canadians of French extraction applauding the play of Henderson or Esposito, and Canadians of English extraction shouting themselves hoarse in their approval of Cournoyer or Savard…What a combination of two wonderful cultures; what a combination of two proud heritages. Two peoples living together, feeling together, fighting together and winning together![96] How potent it is that a simple game, imbued with symbolic power, can bring out national sentiment of such positive emotional intensity.

ENDNOTES

1. Henderson was a prototypical journeyman—a reliable player without a truly elite skillset—at the NHL level, yet he showed tremendous offensive prowess in pressure situations during the Summit Series, scoring each of Canada's game-winning goals in the last three games.
2. Quote taken from game film as a part of *Canada's Team of the Century: 1972, Canada vs. USSR*.
3. Roy MacSkimming, *Cold War: The Amazing Canada-Soviet Hockey Series of 1972* (Vancouver: Greystone, 1996), 235-239 The initial live broadcast of game eight began at 12:30 pm EST, attracting over 4.25 million viewers. To underscore the importance of the game, 4 million tuned in again to a re-broadcast later in the evening. "2010 Gold Medal Game Is the Apex of TV Viewing in Canada as Legend of '72 Summit Series Finally Laid to Rest." accessed 11/27/13. http://www.newswire.ca/en/story/575679/2010-gold-medal-game-is-the-apex-of-tv-viewing-in-canada-as-legend-of-72-summit-series-finally-laid-to-rest
4. A note on sources: I relied heavily on contemporary newspaper accounts for such reactions, as well as memoirs of players and coaches involved.
5. While such a framework is outside the realm of this thesis, one must also keep in mind the identity constructions of "Us" v. "Them" that are implicitly or explicitly tied up in narratives that contrast what are seen as two polar and competing opposites.
6. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006) 35.
7. Ibid.
8. Nicholas Dixon, "A Justification of Moderate Patriotism in Sports," in *Values in Sport: Elitism, Nationalism, Gender Equality and the Scientific Manufacture of Winners*, eds. Torbjörn Tännsjö

and Claudio Tamburrini, (London: E & FN Spon, 2000), 74.
9. Events explored in this section occur before, after, or within the same time frame as those later examined. The author hopes the reader will forgive the breaks in chronology for the purposes of establishing a broader context. This will aid in understanding the concepts of unity and national identity as considered in this paper.
10. Respectively: *Lament for a Nation: the Defeat of Canadian Nationalism* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965), *A Choice for Canada: Independence or Colonial Status* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966), and *Challenge of Confidence: Kierans on Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967).
11. John Diefenbaker, Prime Minister of Canada from 1957-1963, member of the Progressive Conservative (Tory) Party.
12. Grant, *Lament for a Nation*, 39, North American Aerospace Defense Command, "A Brief History of NORAD," 5, accessed 11/20/13, http://www.norad.mil/Portals/29/Documents/History/A%20Brief%20History%20of%20NORAD.pdf. Joining NORAD allowed American nuclear warheads to be stored on Canadian soil, which fueled the debate over whether Canada should develop its own nuclear weapons capabilities.
13. The project was approached with varying levels of optimism by the three authors considered here. Grant's writing is undeniably most pessimistic in both tone and content, while Kieran's is at times romantically hopeful when looking to Canada's future.
14. One should note that the three writers referenced in this section occupied very different places along the Canadian political spectrum, with Grant being part of the English conservative traditon of Toryism, while Kierans and Gordon were in the Liberal Party's center-left camp. Also, Kierans was from Montreal, while both Grant and Gordon came from Toronto. In spite of these differences in outlook and background, all believed in the need for national unity and stronger sense of Canadian identification.
15. Andrew Potter, "Introduction to the 40th Anniversary Edition of *Lament for a Nation*" (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2005), x.
16. Kierans, *Challenge of Confidence*, 21.
17. Ibid., 30.
18. The final report was published in November 1957. "Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects," accessed 11/27/13, http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/en/article/royal-commission-on-canadas-economic-prospects/.
19. Gordon, *A Choice for Canada*, 21.
20. Ibid. 21-22.
21. Prime Minister of Canada from 1963-68
22. "First 'Canadian Flags'", Government of Canada, accessed 10/14/13, http://www.pch.gc.ca/eng/1363610088709/1363610249607.
23. cf. C. P. Champion, "A Very British Coup: Canadianism, Quebec, and Ethnicity in the Flag Debate, 1964-1965," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 40 (2006): 68-99 for a view that the newly adopted Maple Leaf flag actually retained British characteristics.
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25. Canada. Parliament. House of Commons Debates Vol. V, 1964, 5026. One should keep in mind the biases of the statement that may come with Klein's being a member of Pearson's Liberal Party.
26. Roger Riendeau, *A Brief History of Canada*, (Markham: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 2000), 254.
27. Canada. Parliament. House of Commons Debates Vol. IV, 1964, 4319.

28. Gordon, *A Choice for Canada*, 21.
29. Thomas Van Dusen, *The Chief*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 67.
30. B.K. Sandwell, "Present Day Influences on Canadian Society," in *Royal Commission Studies: A Selection of Essays Prepared for the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences,* (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, Printer to the King, 1951), 2.
31. Robert Bothwell, *The Penguin History of Canada* (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2006), 394-395.
32. Premier of Québec, 1936-39 and 1944-59.
33. Bothwell, *History of Canada*, 370, 378, 394-395.
34. John A. Dickinson and Brian Young, *A Short History of Quebec* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1993), 306-307.
35. Le Devoir, July 5, 1963, Quoted in Dickinson and Young, *Short History of Quebec*, 308.
36. Bothwell, *History of Canada*, 443-444.
37. Quoted in Dale Thomson, *Vive le Québec Libre* (Toronto: Deneau, 1988), 199.
38. "Charles de Gaulle speech" *CBC Newsmagazine* (CBC: Toronto, July 24, 1967), accessed 10/12/13, http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/politics/language-culture/language-culture-general/vive-le-quebec-libre.html George Radwanski, "City Hall Address Cheered," *The Montreal Gazette,* July 25, 1967, accessed 10/12/13, http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=Fr8DH2VBP9sC&dat=19670725&printsec=frontpage&hl=en.
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43. See note 12.
44. Gustave Morf, *Terror in Quebec: Case studies of the FLQ* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited, 1970), 2-5.
45. Hal Winter, Paul Water, and Eddie Collister, "U.K. Envoy's life hangs on seven FLQ demands," *Montreal Gazette*, October 6, 1970, accessed 10/14/13, http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=-Fr8DH2VBP9sC&dat=19701006&printsec=frontpage&hl=en. James Stewart, *The FLQ: Seven Years of Terrorism*, (Richmond Hill: Simon & Schuster of Canada Ltd.), 5.
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56. "Conditioning factor looming larger as tired Team Canada takes time off," *The Montreal Gazette*, August 26, 1972, accessed 11/11/13. http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=Fr8DH2VBP9sC&dat=19720826&printsec=frontpage&hl=en.
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59. Ibid., back cover photo by Melchior Di Giacomo.
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70. Editorial, "We want to be proud of our team, let them play hockey, not fight," *The Toronto Star*, September 12, 1972.
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EDITORS' BIOGRAPHIES

Gretechen Miron
Gretchen is a junior at UW-Madison studying history and journalism with a focus in strategic communications. Her interest in history spans across several genres and decades but she is currently working on her thesis about the Roman philosopher and political advisor Seneca. Gretchen sees *ARCHIVE* as the perfect mixture of her two majors and would like to pursue a career in publishing after college. Outside of school Gretchen is a member of the Varsity Lightweight Rowing Team and is an intern at *Madison Magazine*.

Oliver Roe
Oliver is a senior double majoring in psychology and history, and plans on pursuing a Clinical Psy.D after graduation. Oliver currently works in Dr. Gary Lupyan's Language and Cognition Lab in addition to being an editor for *ARCHIVE*. His interests include mapping the history of how we view the human condition, the cognitive processes of deception, and psychotherapy. In his free time, Oliver enjoys writing, music, theater, cooking, and travel.

Kristen Romes
Kristen is a sophomore studying history, english, and spanish. Her focus is on Medieval and Celtic Studies, and she will be traveling to Ireland to further her education. In her free time, Kristen enjoys reading, boxing, rugby, and catching up on the latest nerdy television shows and movies. After graduation, she hopes to find employment in book publishing and editing.

Marc Sieber
Marc is an historian, writer, editor, radio personality, and aspiring stand-up comic. His current goal in life is to at some point get paid to do one of the above things. He has interned with F+W Publications and the *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, does a weekly sports talk radio show on 91.7 WSUM, Madison Student Radio, and made it past the preliminary round of Madison's Funniest Comic 2014.

Alex Walsdorf
Alex is a senior graduating in May, triple majoring in history, legal studies, and political science. He currently works as a research assistant in the Department of Political Science, researching how the media, specifically televised news broadcasts, depict the Supreme Court of the United States. He plans on entering the workforce for a few years before applying to law school. Alex would like to thank his parents for their endless support.

EDITORS' BIOGRAPHIES

Eric Ely
Eric is a ninth-year senior history major with a specialization in modern Europe with interests in Germany and eastern Europe. His love of travel is the cause of his nine year path to a bachelors degree, which included several semesters of an online course or two that allowed him to study in places such as Berlin, Stuttgart, Toronto and Mexico City. Apart from traveling Eric is an avid reader. He also plays tennis (poorly), dances (out of rhythm) and builds plastic model kits (well). After graduation in May Eric will attend graduate school to pursue degrees in history and library and information science.

Charles Hartley
Charlie is a graduating senior majoring in history and pursuing pre-medicine. He wants to thank his history professors and peers for keeping him grounded (and sane) after hours of studying organic chemistry. Following graduation, Charlie will be venturing off to Peru where he has accepted an internship at an international public health non-profit. He will always study history, but he is eager to make a bit of his own now.

Lindsey Melnyk
Lindsey is a senior majoring in history and political science with a certificate in European studies. Her historical interest lies in British gender studies. In her free time, Lindsey enjoys naps, cats and romance novels. She hopes to work in a museum or non-profit setting after graduation.

Hannah Sandgren
Hannah is a senior at UW-Madison, graduating in May 2014 with a degree in history. She works at the UW-Hospital as a scheduler during the week and is excited to be a part of *ARCHIVE*.

Laura Luo
Laura is a graduating senior majoring in history and physics. Although seemingly irrelevant, she believes these two fields complement one another in offering us a comprehensive picture of our world past and present through observations of changing states. Incongruous with her studies, she will be moving to New York in July to begin her job as an analyst at an investment consulting firm. She hopes these divergent interests and pursuits will someday land her a career in public policy.

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

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