Chapter V
Of Property
24. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us that men, being
once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat
and drink and such other things as Nature affords for their subsistence,
or "revelation," which gives us an account of those grants God made of
the world to Adam, and to Noah and his sons, it is very clear that God,
as King David says (Psalm 115. 16), "has given the earth to the children
of men," given it to mankind in common. But, this being supposed, it
seems to some a very great difficulty how any one should ever come to
have a property in anything, I will not content myself to answer, that, if
it be difficult to make out "property" upon a supposition that God gave
the world to Adam and his posterity in common, it is impossible that
any man but one universal monarch should have any "property" upon a
supposition that God gave the world to Adam and his heirs in succession,
exclusive of all the rest of his posterity; but I shall endeavour to
show how men might come to have a property in several parts of that
which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express
compact of all the commoners.
25. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also
given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and
convenience. The earth and all that is therein is given to men for the
support and comfort of their being. And though all the fruits it naturally
produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are
produced by the spontaneous hand of Nature, and nobody has originally
a private dominion exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of them, as
they are thus in their natural state, yet being given for the use of men,
there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or
other before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial, to any particular
men. The fruit or venison which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows
no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his-
i.e., a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it before
it can do him any good for the support of his life.
26. Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all
men, yet every man has a "property" in his own "person." This nobody
has any right to but himself. The "labour" of his body and the "work" of
his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes
out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his
labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby
makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state
Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that
excludes the common right of other men. For this "labour" being the
unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right
to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good
left in common for others.
27. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or
the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated
them to himself. Nobody can deny but the nourishment is his. I
ask, then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he
ate? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he
picked them up? And it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his,
nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and com-
mon. That added something to them more than Nature, the common
mother of all, had done, and so they became his private right. And will
any one say he had no right to those acorns or apples he thus appropriated
because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his?
Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in
common? If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved,
notwithstanding the plenty God had given him. We see in commons,
which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is
common, and removing it out of the state Nature leaves it in, which
begins the property, without which the common is of no use. And the
taking of this or that part does not depend on the express consent of all
the commoners. Thus, the grass my horse has bit, the turfs my servant
has cut, and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a right to
them in common with others, become my property without the assignation
or consent of anybody. The labour that was mine, removing them
out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.
28. By making an explicit consent of every commoner necessary to
any one's appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common.
Children or servants could not cut the meat which their father or master
had provided for them in common without assigning to every one his
peculiar part. Though the water running in the fountain be every one's,
yet who can doubt but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His
labour hath taken it out of the hands of Nature where it was common,
and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated
it to himself.
29. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian's who hath
killed it; it is allowed to be his goods who hath bestowed his labour upon
it, though, before, it was the common right of every one. And amongst
those who are counted the civilised part of mankind, who have made
and multiplied positive laws to determine property, this original law of
Nature for the beginning of property, in what was before common, still
takes place, and by virtue thereof, what fish any one catches in the
ocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind; or what
amber-gris any one takes up here is by the labour that removes it out of that
common state Nature left it in, made his property who takes that pains
about it. And even amongst us, the hare that any one is hunting is thought
his who pursues her during the chase. For being a beast that is still
looked upon as common, and no man's private possession, whoever has
employed so much labour about any of that kind as to find and pursue
her has thereby removed her from the state of Nature wherein she was
common, and hath begun a property.
30. It will, perhaps, be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns
or other fruits of the earth, etc., makes a right to them, then any one may
engross as much as he will. To which I answer, Not so. The same law of
Nature that does by this means give us property, does also bound that
property too. "God has given us all things richly." Is the voice of reason
confirmed by inspiration? But how far has He given it us-"to enjoy"?
As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it
spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in. Whatever is
beyond this is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was
made by God for man to spoil or destroy. And thus considering the
plenty of natural provisions there was a long time in the world, and the
few spenders, and to how small a part of that provision the industry of
one man could extend itself and engross it to the prejudice of others,
especially keeping within the bounds set by reason of what might serve
for his use, there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions
about property so established.
31. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the
earth and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself, as that which
takes in and carries with it all the rest, I think it is plain that property in
that too is acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants,
improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property.
He by his labour does, as it were, enclose it from the common. Nor
will it invalidate his right to say everybody else has an equal title to it,
and therefore he cannot appropriate, he cannot enclose, without the consent
of all his fellow-commoners, all mankind. God, when He gave the
world in common to all mankind, commanded man also to labour, and
the penury of his condition required it of him. God and his reason commanded
him to subdue the earth-i.e., improve it for the benefit of life
and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour. He
that, in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled, and sowed
any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his property,
which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him.
32. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving
it, any prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough and as
good left, and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that, in effect,
there was never the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself.
For he that leaves as much as another can make use of does as good
as take nothing at all. Nobody could think himself injured by the drinking
of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole
river of the same water left him to quench his thirst. And the case of land
and water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same.
33. God gave the world to men in common, but since He gave it
them for their benefit and the greatest conveniences of life they were
capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed He meant it should always
remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the
industrious and rational (and labour was to be his title to it); not to the
fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious. He that had
as good left for his improvement as was already taken up needed not
complain, ought not to meddle with what was already improved by
another's labour; if he did it is plain he desired the benefit of another's
pains, which he had no right to, and not the ground which God had
given him, in common with others, to labour on, and whereof there was
as good left as that already possessed, and more than he knew what to
do with, or his industry could reach to.
34. It is true, in land that is common in England or any other country,
where there are plenty of people under government who have money
and commerce, no one can enclose or appropriate any part without the
consent of all his fellow-commoners; because this is left common by
compact-i.e., by the law of the land, which is not to be violated. And,
though it be common in respect of some men, it is not so to all mankind,
but is the joint propriety of this country, or this parish. Besides, the
remainder, after such enclosure, would not be as good to the rest of the
commoners as the whole was, when they could all make use of the whole;
whereas in the beginning and first peopling of the great common of the
world it was quite otherwise. The law man was under was rather for
appropriating. God commanded, and his wants forced him to labour.
That was his property, which could not be taken from him wherever he
had fixed it. And hence subduing or cultivating the earth and having
dominion, we see, are joined together. The one gave title to the other. So
that God, by commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to appropriate.
And the condition of human life, which requires labour and materials
to work on, necessarily introduce private possessions.
35. The measure of property Nature well set, by the extent of men's
labour and the conveniency of life. No man's labour could subdue or
appropriate all, nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small
part; so that it was impossible for any man, this way, to entrench upon
the right of another or acquire to himself a property to the prejudice of
his neighbour, who would still have room for as good and as large a
possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated.
Which measure did confine every man's possession to a very moderate
proportion, and such as he might appropriate to himself without
injury to anybody in the first ages of the world, when men were more in
danger to be lost, by wandering from their company, in the then vast
wilderness of the earth than to be straitened for want of room to plant in.
36. The same measure may be allowed still, without prejudice to
anybody, full as the world seems. For, supposing a man or family, in the
state they were at first, peopling of the world by the children of Adam or
Noah, let him plant in some inland vacant places of America. We shall
find that the possessions he could make himself, upon the measures we
have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day, prejudice the
rest of mankind or give them reason to complain or think themselves
injured by this man's encroachment, though the race of men have now
spread themselves to all the corners of the world, and do infinitely exceed
the small number was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of ground is
of so little value without labour that I have heard it affirmed that in
Spain itself a man may be permitted to plough, sow, and reap, without
being disturbed, upon land he has no other title to, but only his making
use of it. But, on the contrary, the inhabitants think themselves beholden
to him who, by his industry on neglected, and consequently waste land,
has increased the stock of corn, which they wanted. But be this as it
will, which I lay no stress on, this I dare boldly affirm, that the same
rule of propriety - viz., that every man should have as much as he could
make use of, would hold still in the world, without straitening anybody,
since there is land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants,
had not the invention of money, and the tacit agreement of men to put a
value on it, introduced (by consent) larger possessions and a right to
them; which, how it has done, I shall by and by show more at large.
37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of having
more than men needed had altered the intrinsic value of things, which
depends only on their usefulness to the life of man, or had agreed that a
little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay,
should be worth a great piece of flesh or a whole heap of corn, though
men had a right to appropriate by their labour, each one to himself, as
much of the things of Nature as he could use, yet this could not be much,
nor to the prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still left, to
those who would use the same industry.
Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the
wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed as many of the beasts as he could
he that so employed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of
Nature as any way to alter them from the state Nature put them in, by
placing any of his labour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in
them; but if they perished in his possession without their due use - if the
fruits rotted or the venison putrefied before he could spend it, he of-
fended against the common law of Nature, and was liable to be punished:
he invaded his neighbour's share, for he had no right farther than
his use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him
conveniencies of life.
38. The same measures governed the possession of land, too. What-
soever he tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of before it spoiled,
that was his peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed, and could feed and
make use of, the cattle and product was also his. But if either the grass
of his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished
without gathering and laying up, this part of the earth, notwithstanding
his enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, and might be
the possession of any other. Thus, at the beginning, Cain might take as
much ground as he could till and make it his own land, and yet leave
enough to Abel's sheep to feed on: a few acres would serve for both
their possessions. But as families increased and industry enlarged their
stocks, their possessions enlarged with the need of them; but yet it was
commonly without any fixed property in the ground they made use of
till they incorporated, settled themselves together, and built cities, and
then, by consent, they came in time to set out the bounds of their distinct
territories and agree on limits between them and their neighbours, and
by laws within themselves settled the properties of those of the same
society. For we see that in that part of the world which was first inhabited,
and therefore like to be best peopled, even as low down as Abraham's
time, they wandered with their flocks and their herds, which was their
substance, freely up and down-and this Abraham did in a country
where he was a stranger; whence it is plain that, at least, a great part of
the land lay in common, that the inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed
property in any more than they made use of; but when there was not
room enough in the same place for their herds to feed together, they, by
consent, as Abraham and Lot did (Gen. xiii. 5), separated and enlarged
their pasture where it best liked them. And for the same reason, Esau
went from his father and his brother, and planted in Mount Seir (Gen.
36. 6).
39. And thus, without supposing any private dominion and property
in Adam over all the world, exclusive of all other men, which can
no way be proved, nor any one's property be made out from it, but
supposing the world, given as it was to the children of men in common,
we see how labour could make men distinct titles to several parcels of it
for their private uses, wherein there could be no doubt of right, no room
for quarrel.
40. Nor is it so strange as, perhaps, before consideration, it may
appear, that the property of labour should be able to overbalance the
community of land, for it is labour indeed that puts the difference of
value on everything; and let any one consider what the difference is
between an acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat
or barley, and an acre of the same land lying in common without any
husbandry upon it, and he will find that the improvement of labour makes
the far greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very modest
computation to say, that of the products of the earth useful to the life of
man, nine-tenths are the effects of labour. Nay, if we will rightly estimate
things as they come to our use, and cast up the several expenses
about them-what in them is purely owing to Nature and what to
labour-we shall find that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are
wholly to be put on the account of labour.
41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration of anything than several
nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in land and poor
in all the comforts of life; whom Nature, having furnished as liberally as
any other people with the materials of plenty-i.e., a fruitful soil, apt to
produce in abundance what might serve for food, raiment, and delight;
yet, for want of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of
the conveniencies we enjoy, and a king of a large and fruitful territory
there feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day labourer in England.
42. To make this a little clearer, let us but trace some of the ordinary
provisions of life, through their several progresses, before they come to
our use, and see how much they receive of their value from human
industry. Bread, wine, and cloth are things of daily use and great plenty;
yet notwithstanding acorns, water, and leaves, or skins must be our
bread, drink and clothing, did not labour furnish us with these more
useful commodities. For whatever bread is more worth than acorns,
wine than water, and cloth or silk than leaves, skins or moss, that is
wholly owing to labour and industry. The one of these being the food
and raiment which unassisted Nature furnishes us with; the other provisions
which our industry and pains prepare for us, which how much
they exceed the other in value, when any one hath computed, he will
then see how much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of
things we enjoy in this world; and the ground which produces the materials
is scarce to be reckoned in as any, or at most, but a very small part
of it; so little, that even amongst us, land that is left wholly to nature,
that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as
indeed it is, waste; and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little
more than nothing.
43. An acre of land that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and
another in America, which, with the same husbandry, would do the like,
are, without doubt, of the same natural, intrinsic value. But yet the benefit
mankind receives from one in a year is worth five pounds, and the
other possibly not worth a penny; if all the profit an Indian received
from it were to be valued and sold here, at least I may truly say, not one
thousandth. It is labour, then, which puts the greatest part of value upon
land, without which it would scarcely be worth anything; it is to that we
owe the greatest part of all its useful products; for all that the straw,
bran, bread, of that acre of wheat, is more worth than the product of an
acre of as good land which lies waste is all the effect of labour. For it is
not barely the ploughman's pains, the reaper's and thresher's toil, and
the baker's sweat, is to be counted into the bread we eat; the labour of
those who broke the oxen, who digged and wrought the iron and stones,
who felled and framed the timber employed about the plough, mill, oven,
or any other utensils, which are a vast number, requisite to this corn,
from its sowing to its being made bread, must all be charged on the
account of labour, and received as an effect of that; Nature and the earth
furnished only the almost worthless materials as in themselves. It would
be a strange catalogue of things that industry provided and made use of
about every loaf of bread before it came to our use if we could trace
them; iron, wood, leather, bark, timber, stone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth,
dyeing-drugs, pitch, tar, masts, ropes, and all the materials made use of
in the ship that brought any of the commodities made use of by any of
the workmen, to any part of the work, all which it would be almost
impossible, at least too long, to reckon up.
44. From all which it is evident, that though the things of Nature are
given in common, man (by being master of himself, and proprietor of
his own person, and the actions or labour of it) had still in himself the
great foundation of property; and that which made up the great part of
what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention
and arts had improved the conveniences of life, was perfectly his own,
and did not belong in common to others.
45. Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever
any one was pleased to employ it, upon what was common, which
remained a long while, the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind
makes use of Men at first, for the most part, contented themselves
with what unassisted Nature offered to their necessities; and though
afterwards, in some parts of the world, where the increase of people and
stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, and so of some
value, the several communities settled the bounds of their distinct terri-
tories, and, by laws, within themselves, regulated the properties of the
private men of their society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled
the property which labour and industry began. And the leagues that
have been made between several states and kingdoms, either expressly
or tacitly disowning all claim and right to the land in the other's possession,
have, by common consent, given up their pretences to their natural
common right, which originally they had to those countries; and so have,
by positive agreement, settled a property amongst themselves, in distinct
parts of the world; yet there are still great tracts of ground to be
found, which the inhabitants thereof, not having joined with the rest of
mankind in the consent of the use of their common money, lie waste, and
are more than the people who dwell on it, do, or can make use of, and so
still lie in common; though this can scarce happen amongst that part of
mankind that have consented to the use of money.
46. The greatest part of things really useful to the life of man, and
such as the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the
world look after-as it doth the Americans now-are generally things
of short duration, such as - if they are not consumed by use - will decay
and perish of themselves. Gold, silver, and diamonds are things that
fancy or agreement hath put the value on, more than real use and the
necessary support of life. Now of those good things which Nature hath
provided in common, every one hath a right (as hath been said) to as
much as he could use; and had a property in all he could effect with his
labour; all that his industry could extend to, to alter from the state Nature
had put it in, was his. He that gathered a hundred bushels of acorns
or apples had thereby a property in them; they were his goods as soon as
gathered. He was only to look that he used them before they spoiled,
else he took more than his share, and robbed others. And, indeed, it was
a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he could
make use of If he gave away a part to anybody else, so that it perished
not uselessly in his possession, these he also made use of And if he also
bartered away plums that would have rotted in a week, for nuts that
would last good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he wasted
not the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of goods that
belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselessly in his hands.
Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased with its
colour, or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a sparkling pebble
or a diamond, and keep those by him all his life, he invaded not the right
of others; he might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased;
the exceeding of the bounds of his just property not lying in the large-
ness of his possession, but the perishing of anything uselessly in it.
47. And thus came in the use of money; some lasting thing that men
might keep without spoiling, and that, by mutual consent, men would
take in exchange for the truly useful but perishable supports of life.
48. And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessions
in different proportions, so this invention of money gave them
the opportunity to continue and enlarge them. For supposing an island,
separate from all possible commerce with the rest of the world, wherein
there were but a hundred families, but there were sheep, horses, and
cows, with other useful animals, wholesome fruits, and land enough for
corn for a hundred thousand times as many, but nothing in the island,
either because of its commonness or perishableness, fit to supply the
place of money. What reason could any one have there to enlarge his
possessions beyond the use of his family, and a plentiful supply to its
consumption, either in what their own industry produced, or they could
barter for like perishable, useful commodities with others? Where there
is not something both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded
up, there men will not be apt to enlarge their possessions of land, were it
never so rich, never so free for them to take. For I ask, what would a
man value ten thousand or an hundred thousand acres of excellent land,
ready cultivated and well stocked, too, with cattle, in the middle of the
inland parts of America, where he had no hopes of commerce with other
parts of the world, to draw money to him by the sale of the product? It
would not be worth the enclosing, and we should see him give up again
to the wild common of Nature whatever was more than would supply
the conveniences of life, to be had there for him and his family.
49. Thus, in the beginning, all the world was America, and more so
than that is now; for no such thing as money was anywhere known. Find
out something that hath the use and value of money amongst his
neighbours, you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge
his possessions.
50. But, since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man,
in proportion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only from the
consent of men-whereof labour yet makes in great part the measure -
it is plain that the consent of men have agreed to a disproportionate and
unequal possession of the earth - I mean out of the bounds of society
and compact; for in governments the laws regulate it; they having, by
consent, found out and agreed in a way how a man may, rightfully and
without injury, possess more than he himself can make use of by receiving
gold and silver, which may continue long in a man's possession
without decaying for the overplus, and agreeing those metals should
have a value.
51. And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive, without any difficulty,
how labour could at first begin a title of property in the common
things of Nature, and how the spending it upon our uses bounded it; so
that there could then be no reason of quarrelling about title, nor any
doubt about the largeness of possession it gave. Right and conveniency
went together. For as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour
upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make
use of. This left no room for controversy about the title, nor for encroachment
on the right of others. What portion a man carved to himself
was easily seen; and it was useless, as well as dishonest, to carve himself
too much, or take more than he needed.
…
CHAP. XIX.
Of the Dissolution of Government.
Sec. 211. HE that will with any clearness speak of the dissolution of
government, ought in the first place to distinguish between the dissolution
of the society and the dissolution of the government. That which makes the
community, and brings men out of the loose state of nature, into one politic
society, is the agreement which every one has with the rest to incorporate,
and act as one body, and so be one distinct commonwealth. The usual, and
almost only way whereby this union is dissolved, is the inroad of foreign
force making a conquest upon them: for in that case, (not being able to
maintain and support themselves, as one intire and independent body) the
union belonging to that body which consisted therein, must necessarily
cease, and so every one return to the state he was in before, with a liberty
to shift for himself, and provide for his own safety, as he thinks fit, in
some other society. Whenever the society is dissolved, it is certain the
government of that society cannot remain. Thus conquerors swords often cut
up governments by the roots, and mangle societies to pieces, separating the
subdued or scattered multitude from the protection of, and dependence on,
that society which ought to have preserved them from violence. The world is
too well instructed in, and too forward to allow of, this way of dissolving
of governments, to need any more to be said of it; and there wants not much
argument to prove, that where the society is dissolved, the government
cannot remain; that being as impossible, as for the frame of an house to
subsist when the materials of it are scattered and dissipated by a whirl-
wind, or jumbled into a confused heap by an earthquake.
Sec. 212. Besides this over-turning from without, governments are dissolved
from within,
First, When the legislative is altered. Civil society being a state of
peace, amongst those who are of it, from whom the state of war is excluded
by the umpirage, which they have provided in their legislative, for the
ending all differences that may arise amongst any of them, it is in their
legislative, that the members of a commonwealth are united, and combined
together into one coherent living body. This is the soul that gives form,
life, and unity, to the common-wealth: from hence the several members have
their mutual influence, sympathy, and connexion: and therefore, when the
legislative is broken, or dissolved, dissolution and death follows: for the
essence and union of the society consisting in having one will, the
legislative, when once established by the majority, has the declaring, and
as it were keeping of that will. The constitution of the legislative is the
first and fundamental act of society, whereby provision is made for the
continuation of their union, under the direction of persons, and bonds of
laws, made by persons authorized thereunto, by the consent and appointment
of the people, without which no one man, or number of men, amongst them, can
have authority of making laws that shall be binding to the rest. When any
one, or more, shall take upon them to make laws, whom the people have not
appointed so to do, they make laws without authority, which the people are
not therefore bound to obey; by which means they come again to be out of
subjection, and may constitute to themselves a new legislative, as they
think best, being in full liberty to resist the force of those, who without
authority would impose any thing upon them. Every one is at the disposure of
his own will, when those who had, by the delegation of the society, the
declaring of the public will, are excluded from it, and others usurp the
place, who have no such authority or delegation.
Sec. 213. This being usually brought about by such in the commonwealth who
misuse the power they have; it is hard to consider it aright, and know at
whose door to lay it, without knowing the form of government in which it
happens. Let us suppose then the legislative placed in the concurrence of
three distinct persons.
1. A single hereditary person, having the constant, supreme, executive
power, and with it the power of convoking and dissolving the other two
within certain periods of time.
2. An assembly of hereditary nobility.
3. An assembly of representatives chosen, pro tempore, by the people. Such a
form of government supposed, it is evident,
Sec. 214. First, That when such a single person, or prince, sets up his own
arbitrary will in place of the laws, which are the will of the society,
declared by the legislative, then the legislative is changed: for that being
in effect the legislative, whose rules and laws are put in execution, and
required to be obeyed; when other laws are set up, and other rules
pretended, and inforced, than what the legislative, constituted by the
society, have enacted, it is plain that the legislative is changed. Whoever
introduces new laws, not being thereunto authorized by the fundamental
appointment of the society, or subverts the old, disowns and overturns the
power by which they were made, and so sets up a new legislative.
Sec. 215. Secondly, When the prince hinders the legislative from assembling
in its due time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those ends for which it
was constituted, the legislative is altered: for it is not a certain number
of men, no, nor their meeting, unless they have also freedom of debating,
and leisure of perfecting, what is for the good of the society, wherein the
legislative consists: when these are taken away or altered, so as to deprive
the society of the due exercise of their power, the legislative is truly
altered; for it is not names that constitute governments, but the use and
exercise of those powers that were intended to accompany them; so that he,
who takes away the freedom, or hinders the acting of the legislative in its
due seasons, in effect takes away the legislative, and puts an end to the
government.
Sec. 216. Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the electors,
or ways of election, are altered, without the consent, and contrary to the
common interest of the people, there also the legislative is altered: for,
if others than those whom the society hath authorized thereunto, do chuse,
or in another way than what the society hath prescribed, those chosen are
not the legislative appointed by the people.
Sec. 217. Fourthly, The delivery also of the people into the subjection of a
foreign power, either by the prince, or by the legislative, is certainly a
change of the legislative, and so a dissolution of the government: for the
end why people entered into society being to be preserved one intire, free,
independent society, to be governed by its own laws; this is lost, whenever
they are given up into the power of another.
Sec. 218. Why, in such a constitution as this, the dissolution of the
government in these cases is to be imputed to the prince, is evident;
because he, having the force, treasure and offices of the state to employ,
and often persuading himself, or being flattered by others, that as supreme
magistrate he is uncapable of controul; he alone is in a condition to make
great advances toward such changes, under pretence of lawful authority, and
has it in his hands to terrify or suppress opposers, as factious, seditious,
and enemies to the government: whereas no other part of the legislative, or
people, is capable by themselves to attempt any alteration of the
legislative, without open and visible rebellion, apt enough to be taken
notice of, which, when it prevails, produces effects very little different
from foreign conquest. Besides, the prince in such a form of government,
having the power of dissolving the other parts of the legislative, and
thereby rendering them private persons, they can never in opposition to him,
or without his concurrence, alter the legislative by a law, his consent being
necessary to give any of their decrees that sanction. But yet so far as the other parts
of the legislative any way contribute to any attempt upon the government,
and do either promote, or not, what lies in them, hinder such designs,
they are guilty, and partake in this, which is certainly the greatest crime
men can be guilty of one towards another.
219. There is one way more whereby such a government may
be dissolved, and that is: When he who has the supreme executive power,
neglects and abandons that charge, so that the laws already made can no
longer be put in execution. This is demonstratively to reduce all to
anarchy, and so effectually to dissolve the government: for laws not being
made for themselves, but to be, by their execution, the bonds of the
society, to keep every part of the body politic in its due place and
function; when that totally ceases, the government visibly ceases, and the
people become a confused multitude, without order or connexion. Where there
is no longer the administration of justice, for the securing of men's
rights, nor any remaining power within the community to direct the force, or
provide for the necessities of the public, there certainly is no government
left. Where the laws cannot be executed, it is all one as if there were no
laws; and a government without laws is, I suppose, a mystery in politics,
unconceivable to human capacity, and inconsistent with human society.
Sec. 220. In these and the like cases, when the government is dissolved, the
people are at liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a new
legislative, differing from the other, by the change of persons, or form, or
both, as they shall find it most for their safety and good: for the society
can never, by the fault of another, lose the native and original right it
has to preserve itself, which can only be done by a settled legislative, and
a fair and impartial execution of the laws made by it. But the state of
mankind is not so miserable that they are not capable of using this remedy,
till it be too late to look for any. To tell people they may provide for
themselves, by erecting a new legislative, when by oppression, artifice, or
being delivered over to a foreign power, their old one is gone, is only to
tell them, they may expect relief when it is too late, and the evil is past
cure. This is in effect no more than to bid them first be slaves, and then
to take care of their liberty; and when their chains are on, tell them, they
may act like freemen. This, if barely so, is rather mockery than relief; and
men can never be secure from tyranny, if there be no means to escape it till
they are perfectly under it: and therefore it is, that they have not only a
right to get out of it, but to prevent it.
Sec. 221. There is therefore, secondly, another way whereby governments are
dissolved, and that is, when the legislative, or the prince, either of them,
act contrary to their trust. First, The legislative acts against the trust
reposed in them, when they endeavour to invade the property of the subject,
and to make themselves, or any part of the community, masters, or arbitrary
disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.
Sec. 222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of
their property; and the end why they chuse and authorize a legislative, is,
that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the
properties of all the members of the society, to limit the power, and
moderate the dominion, of every part and member of the society: for since it
can never be supposed to be the will of the society, that the legislative
should have a power to destroy that which every one designs to secure, by
entering into society, and for which the people submitted themselves to
legislators of their own making; whenever the legislators endeavour to take
away, and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery
under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the
people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left
to the common refuge, which God hath provided for all men, against force and
violence. Whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this
fundamental rule of society; and either by ambition, fear, folly or
corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any
other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the
people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put
into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people,
who. have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the
establishment of a new legislative, (such as they shall think fit) provide
for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in
society. What I have said here, concerning the legislative in general, holds
true also concerning the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in
him, both to have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of
the law, acts against both, when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary
will as the law of the society. He acts also contrary to his trust, when he
either employs the force, treasure, and offices of the society, to corrupt
the representatives, and gain them to his purposes; or openly preengages the
electors, and prescribes to their choice, such, whom he has, by
sollicitations, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to his designs; and
employs them to bring in such, who have promised before-hand what to vote,
and what to enact. Thus to regulate candidates and electors, and new-model
the ways of election, what is it but to cut up the government by the roots,
and poison the very fountain of public security? for the people having
reserved to themselves the choice of their representatives, as the fence to
their properties, could do it for no other end, but that they might always
be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act, and advise, as the necessity of
the common-wealth, and the public good should, upon examination, and mature
debate, be judged to require. This, those who give their votes before they
hear the debate, and have weighed the reasons on all sides, are not capable
of doing. To prepare such an assembly as this, and endeavour to set up the
declared abettors of his own will, for the true representatives of the
people, and the law-makers of the society, is certainly as great a breach of
trust, and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert the government,
as is possible to be met with. To which, if one shall add rewards and
punishments visibly employed to the same end, and all the arts of perverted
law made use of, to take off and destroy all that stand in the way of such a
design, and will not comply and consent to betray the liberties of their
country, it will be past doubt what is doing. What power they ought to have
in the society, who thus employ it contrary to the trust went along with it
in its first institution, is easy to determine; and one cannot but see, that
he, who has once attempted any such thing as this, cannot any longer be
trusted.
…
Sec. 229. The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is best
for mankind, that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will
of tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed,
when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for the
destruction, and not the preservation of the properties of their people?
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