On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673) was the major work by Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94). Pufendorf was the son of a Saxon clergyman, and was himself intended for a career in the church, but at university (in Leipzig, and then Jena) his interests shifted from theology to the new philosophy of Descartes, and to law and politics. Instead of becoming a clergyman, he opted for a career as a university teacher and as an advisor and assistant to aristocrats and kings. In 1661 he became a professor at the University of Heidelberg. A little later, he applied for a job in the Law School there (where the salary was higher). He was turned down, and in revenge he wrote an attack on the ideas of German lawyers about the German constitution - a constitution which they praised but which he criticized as monstrous and incoherent. This book was published under the name of a fictitious Italian nobleman in 1667. In 1670, Pufendorf accepted an offer from the King of Sweden to teach at the University of Lund (in the Law School this time, and with a high salary). Two years later, he published at Lund his massive De jure naturae et gentium (On the law of nature and nations), and in 1673 he condensed its teachings in De officio hominis et civis (our reading). This book was extremely influential during the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, and had a great impact on legal, moral, constitutional, and political thinking not only in Europe but also in America. In 1688, Pufendorf went back to Germany to work as court historian for the Elector of Brandenburg.
In previous weeks we have encountered the idea of natural law. This is the central concept in Pufendorf's work, and his discussion of it was to be his greatest contribution to later debate. Scholars disagree on the question of exactly how novel his approach to natural law was, but one idea is that he was a major proponent of the modern theory of natural law (other advocates of the theory, it is said, were Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, and Locke). Think about how Pufendorf's view of human nature, and natural law, differs from (or resembles) that of other thinker - like Thomas More or Hobbes. People who stress the differences between the modern school of natural law and older ideas focus on the secular (as opposed to theistic) nature of modern natural law thinking, and on its individualism, rationalism, radicalism, and minimalism. Is this convincing?
Since ancient times, many people have believed that we all have certain unalterable moral obligations. Let's take a look at the kinds of obligations we in fact have. Some are imposed on us by the state (or some lesser institution like a university or bank). For instance, the state tells us which side of the road we should drive on, and how much of our income we have to pay in taxes. Obligations of this sort are obligations only because they have been imposed on us by the state. They are moral obligations only in an indirect sense. Suppose the state put a 5% tax on the sale of popcorn last month, but increases it to 10% this month. Is paying the 10% morally obligatory (it's obviously legally obligatory, and it's probably prudent to pay, since if we don't we might get caught and punished)? If it is morally obligatory, were we being immoral last month when we paid just 5%? Obviously not. What's wrong with failing to pay the 10% is not that we're breaking some rule of morality which specifies that exactly 10% (not a penny more, not a penny less) is the right tax on popcorn; there isn't any such rule. What's wrong is that we're breaking a rule that we should normally obey the state's decrees. What is the basis for this rule, and what are the grounds of our obligation to obey it? Clearly, the duty to obey the state (and the law) cannot itself result simply from the state's command (or from the law). My obligation to obey the law can't stem from the law itself because even if there was a law saying "obey the law," I would have no grounds for obeying this particular law unless I acknowledged some extralegal principle requiring me to keep the law. One idea that many thinkers have endorsed is that individuals should normally abide by the laws of the country where they live because they have contracted to do so, either explicitly (for instance, by taking an oath) or implicitly (by benefiting from the protection of the laws). But this idea works only if there is some extralegal rule requiring us to keep our contracts. If there are no extralegal rules of this kind, then it is difficult to see why we should obey the law (if we can safely get away with breaking it), and difficult to see how we can coherently condemn such activities as genocide or mass murder ordered by the state.
The Stoics in ancient times, and most Christians in the Middle Ages and the early modern period, believed that we all share a common nature, and that we can read off from that nature certain obligations and prohibitions. By using reason, they argued, we can see that there are some things that we ought always to do and others that we should invariably avoid. The term used to describe these commands and prohibitions was the law of nature (or natural law). Pufendorf's work on natural law succinctly surveys the whole field of moral and political theory. What are the principles which Pufendorf takes to be natural and obligatory, and how convincing are his arguments for them? How does his political and moral theory differ from that of Hobbes, and Bodin? Modern critics of natural law argue that there is no such thing as human nature, since people are shaped by their social and historical contexts. What can be said for and against this point of view?
Alfred Dufour, chapter on Pufendorf in Leonard Krieger, The Politics of Discretion. Pufendorf and the Acceptance of Natural Law, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1965;
Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy from Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996;
A. P. D'Entrèves, Natural Law. An introduction to legal philosophy. With a new introduction by Cary J. Nederman, New Brunswick and London, Transaction Publishers, 1994; originally published in 1951.
Some URLs include:
| A brief introduction to Pufendorf | |
| John Kilcullen's scholarly essay on the theories of property of Pufendorf, Grotius and others. |
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