Nominated:
 
 Gaddis, John Lewis, “The Third World,” in idem. We Now Know:  Rethinking Cold War History
 (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1997), 152-188.
 
 Gleijeses, Piero, “Looking Back,” in idem. Conflicting Missions:  Havana, Washington, and
 Africa, 1956-1976 (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 373-395.
 
 Possible Alternatives:
 
 Bradley, Mark, Imagining Vietnam and America:  The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919
 -1950 (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 2000).  Abstract: According to Ronald Spector’s review in Reviews in American History 29, no. 3 (2001):  455-459, “Bradley's book is primarily about ideas, perceptions, prejudices, illusions and expectations (or to use correct postmodernist jargon, about "culturally hierarchical discourse, "perceptual discourse and "mutually constitutive processes" [p. 6]) in the haphazard encounters between Vietnamese and Americans in the first half of the twentieth century. The tendency of American historians, Bradley points out, has been to ignore developments prior to World War II and to disregard the baggage of long-held beliefs about colonialism, politics, modernity, race, which Vietnamese and Americans brought with them to their unanticipated confrontation” (455).
 
 ________. “Writing International History from the Periphery,” Reviews in American
 History 24, no. 3 (1996):  507-512.  Abstract: Reviews Kenton J. Clymer's Quest for Freedom: The United States and India's Independence (1995), which advances understanding of American foreign policy toward Indian independence by placing it within the larger context of interactions among the British, Indian nationalists, and American policymakers.
 
 Brands, H.W., Bound to Empire:  the United States and the Philippines, 1890-1990 (New York:
 Oxford University Press, 1992).  Abstract:  According to Michael Onorato’s review in AHR 98, no. 4 (1993):  1345, Brand “wants his reader to see how American and Filipino leaders, before and since independence in 1946, have worked with each other and to wonder with him for whose good have Americans operated in the Philippines.  He also believes that American interaction with the Philippines can become a case study of how Washington interacts in Third World situations.”
 
 ________. India and the United States:  The Cold Peace (Boston:  Twayne, 1990).  Abstract:
 This book is part of an introductory level series designed to assess US  international relations since 1945.  Brands examines more than just global politics, including social, cultural, and domestic political aspects of both India and the United States in his discussion of US relations with the emerging Third World during the Cold War.  
 
 ________. “The Limits of Manipulation:  How the United States Didn’t Topple Sukarno,”
 Journal of American History 76, no. 3 (1989):  785-808.  Abstract: The overthrow of left neutralist President Achmed Sukarno of Indonesia and his replacement by right-wing General Suharto would indicate covert involvement by the CIA and that the Johnson administration had helped the United States secure Indonesian stability in the face of Communist expansion in Vietnam. However, analysis of the events surrounding the incident, including the elimination of the Indonesian Communist Party by the army, shows that true US covert action was either ineffective or only hastened the inevitable. The "myth of American responsibility" concerning the Sukarno affair shows several reasons why the United States should avoid covert operations. First, undercover activities rarely remain secret. Failures tend to "splatter everyone," creating embarrassment or an intolerant political environment. When they succeed those involved "cannot resist taking credit." Second, secret activities usually only hasten an event already set in motion by internal forces. Although an unexpected "massacre of hundreds of thousands" of people occurred during the overthrow of the Indonesian Communists, there was little doubt Sukarno would be replaced because of his killing of several top generals. Finally, covert warfare does not always have lasting benefits and "commonly compounds problems in the long run." The elimination of the Communist threat in Indonesia lends credibility to covert action because this is what the United States wanted, but circumstances were more a result of "basic forces" beyond American control.
 
 Cesar, Jaroslav and Vera Eisnerova, “The Developing Countries in the United States’ Post-War
 Policy,” Archiv Orientalni 52, no. 4 (1984):  321-346.  Abstract: After World War II, the United States pursued a foreign policy dominated by the Cold War, which treated the developing nations as the rear guard in the global conflict. The failure of that policy led to neocolonialism, a new policy which treated the developing nations as the main battlefield between the United States and the USSR. Foreign aid and foreign investments were tools to keep the Third World allied with the Western nations and in a state of dependency.
 
 Chen, Jian, “China and the Korean War:  A Critical Historiographical Review,” Korea and
 World Affairs 19, no. 2 (1995):  314-336.  Abstract: Reviews the full range of Korean War historiography, including over twenty books published in English, 24 published in Chinese, 13 articles in English, and five originally published in Chinese.
 
 ________. Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill:  University of Chapel Hill Press, 2001).
 
 ________. “The Myth of America’s ‘Lost Chance’ in China:  A Chinese Perspective in Light of
 New Evidence,” Diplomatic History 21, no. 1 (1997):  77-86.  Abstract: The lost chance thesis is too US centered and regards the Chinese as passive reactors to American positions. In fact, the lost chance never existed. Mao intended, after the civil war was over, to install his vision of Chinese society before making contact with the West, who he believed owed China a great debt after a century of unequal treatment. Furthermore, Mao required the United States to sever its connection with the Nationalists. Meanwhile, the Communists in China and the Soviet Union grew closer, with Mao and Stalin consulting as to the direction China should take after the war.
 
 Chomsky, Noam, “The Cold War and the Superpowers,” Monthly Review 33, no. 6 (1981):  1
 -10.  Abstract: Examines the general framework of thinking within which US foreign policy has developed vis-a-vis the USSR and the Third World from 1945 to 1981, analyzes the role of Cold War rhetoric on the US position on Greece in 1947, Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador, and discusses the US government's attempt to manipulate public opinion.
 
 Connelly, Matthew, “Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization:  The Grand Strategy of the
 Algerian War for Independence,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 33, no. 2 (2001):  221-245.  Abstract: Chronicles the events leading to Algeria's independence, beginning with the French massacre of thousands of Algerians during World War II and continuing until the Cold War tensions in Algeria in October-November 1960 that nearly precipitated the outbreak of another world war. The article uses colonial Algeria's quest for independence to exemplify the influence of the Cold War on anticolonial foreign policies and suggests that Algerian exploitation of international tensions between the superpowers and other countries may have been the decisive factor in their realization of independence.
 
 ________. “Taking off the Cold War Lens:  Visions of North-South Conflict During the
     Algerian War for Independence,” American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (2000):      739-769.  Abstract: Critiques the tendency of scholars to analyze imperialism as either discourse or elite decisionmaking. The result of doing so is that an arbitrary distinction is drawn between imperialism's cultural and its political and economic elements. Instead, both approaches must be used to understand the nature and extent of critical issues such as decolonization. The case is made through an analysis of Algeria's war for independence that reveals how ideas and imagery of modernization and conflicts among civilizations shaped policy debates among French and American elites. While these discourses were intended to consolidate Western authority, they ultimately proved divisive and self-defeating. Indeed, Algerian nationalists managed to harness them to their own agendas. More generally, the specter of North-South conflict preoccupied policymakers at a time when most historians assume that they viewed the world only through a "Cold War lens." By reexamining the period through different optics, scholars can see how and why people in the First and Third Worlds began to reject "us versus them" dichotomies that did not effectively represent their lived experiences.
 
 Cullather, Nick, “‘Fuel for the Good Dragon’:  The United States and Industrial Policy in
 Taiwan, 1950-1965,” Diplomatic History 20, no. 1 (1996):  1-25.  Abstract: Contrary to US assertions, the Taiwanese economy did not develop as a market-influenced system in the postwar period but as one in which the government guided the economy. This was not in spite of American assistance but with Washington's tacit approval. The United States paid lip service to the market but Taiwanese conditions and ways of thinking led US officials to help create a state-centered political economy.
 
 ________. Secret History:  The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952
     -1954 (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1999).  Abstract:  According to Paul Dosal’s
 review in Hispanic American Historical Review 80, no.3 (2000): 633-63, “Cullather's Secret History is the only account [of CIA activities in Guatemala] based on the complete collection of CIA documents, over 180,000 pages” (p. 636).  Cullather’s book, however, is not an “official” history.   
 
 Gleijeses, Piero, “The Limits of Sympathy:  The United States and the Independence of Spanish
     America,” Journal of Latin American Studies 24, no. 3 (1992):  481-505.
 
 Karabell, Zachary. Architects of Intervention:  The United States, the Third World, and the Cold
     War, 1946-1962 (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 1999).  
 
 McMahon, Robert,  Cold War on the Periphery:  The United States, India, and Pakistan (New
 York:  Columbia University Press, 1994).  According to Kenton Clymer’s review in AHR 100, no. 2 (1995):  494-495, “McMahon argues that the skewed perceprions of the Cold War produced tragic and expensive mistakes.  Despite the fact that South Asia had little to offer the United States (it had only a small industrial base, few raw materials, no major military advantages, and a geographical position of only limited strategic interest), the United States determined to line up both India and Pakistan with the free world” (p. 495).
 
 ________. “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism:  A Critique of the Revisionists,”
     Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 3 (1986):  453-473.
 
 ________., The Limits of Empire:  The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II
     (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1999).  
 
 ________. “United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia:  Making a Military Commitment to
     Pakistan, 1947-1954,” Journal of American History 75, no. 3 (1988):  812-840.
 
 Painter, David S, “Explaining U.S. Relations with the Third World,” Diplomatic History 19, no.
 3  (1995): 525-548.  Abstract:  Examines the study of US Third World diplomacy during the Cold War and provides a framework of overall study. There are three broad areas in this field: geopolitics, political economy, and regionalism-globalism. Geopolitics sees relations with the Third World as a function of strategic interplay with the Soviet Union. Political economy looks at how US economic needs at home have shaped its diplomacy, as well as how ideology has played its own role. In the regional-global perspective the United States looks at both the internal (local) and external (global) contexts of relations with a particular nation and adjusts its diplomacy accordingly (i.e., to intervene or not to intervene). 
 
 Paterson, Thomas G., “The End of the Cold War and Elusive Quest for the New Order,” New
 England Journal of History 54, no. 1 (1997):  61-70.  Abstract: Reprints an article from New England Journal of History 1993 50(2) (see entry 47B:70). The "relative decline of the United States and the Soviet Union in the international system" brought about the end of the Cold War. This decline was due to the economic cost of the Cold War for the superpowers, challenges to the superpowers from their independent-minded allies, the rise of the Third World and the nonaligned movement, and world-wide opposition to nuclear armaments.
 
 Rodman, Peter W., More Precious Than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third
     World (New York:  Macmillan, 1994).  Abstract:  According to Stephen Rabe’s review in
 AHR 101, no. 2 (1996):  593, “Rodman’s work does not qualify as historical scholarship.  He conducted no archival research, and his reading in secondary sources is thin.  Scholars will find, however, useful historical tidbits, such as Rodman’s observations on the personal habits of Leonid Brezhnev, the unsavory Soviet leader.  Historians will also consult this book because it opens a window to the ideological certainties of foreign policy makers during the Reagan era.  Indeed, Rodman;s study stands as a testament to American exceptionalism.”  Rabe also notes that Rodman was a preotege of Kissinger’s and worked in the Department of State under the Nixon, Reagan, and Bush administrations.
 
 Rotter, Andrew, Comrades at Odds:  The United States and India, 1947-1964 (Ithaca:  Cornell
     University Press, 2000).
 
 ________. “Gender Relations, Foreign Relations:  The United States and South Asia, 1947-
 1964,” Journal of American History 81, no. 2 (1994):  518-542.  Abstract: Examines how ideas about gender common in American popular culture affected US relations with India in the period 1947-64. The feminization of India that American culture adopted from British colonialist discourse conditioned US policymakers to describe Indian neutralist foreign policy as not merely wrong but weak and unmanly, and to prefer the "real men" in Karachi to the Hindu leadership in Delhi. The author points to the contrast between state visits to Washington by Indian president Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan to illustrate the effect of the different perceptions of the two countries and their leaders by US officials.
 
 Suri, Jeremi, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, Mass.:
 Harvard University Press, 2003).  Abstract:  From an international perspective, this book argues that détente was the result of elites’ needs both to avoid war among contending Cold War powers and to quell domestic unrest within the political boundaries of those powers.  This book integrates history “from below” with history “from above,” and shows links across national boundaries on these two levels. 
 
 Westad, Odd Arne, “Rethinking Revolutions:  The Cold War in the Third World,” Journal of
 Peace Research 29, no. 4 (1992):  455-464.  Abstract: During the Cold War, from 1945 to 1989, Third World regimes were unable to monopolize external support and this enhanced the potential of antiregime revolutionary movements.